Water privatisation: Senegal at the crossroads

While the Senegalese government wishes to ‘disengage financially from the water sector’, it is precisely the previous public management of water that has begun to improve infrastructure and people’s access to the resource.
The water service in the Senegalese cities has been partially privatised since 1996 under the form of a lease contract between the state and the Sénégalaise des eaux (SDE). 51 per cent of the capital of the latter is held by SAUR, renamed FINAGETION in 2005. It is a subsidiary of the Bouygues group, the fourth-largest group in the global water sector. Water management in Senegal is often presented as a ‘model’ public–private partnership (PPP), particularly by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions, all of who have been trying to promote various forms of water privatisation for decades. According to them, the lease contract with SAUR has significantly improved access to water for urban populations, explaining that the country is one of the only ones in the African continent to be in a good way to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in regard to access to water, at least in urban areas (as they often forget to specify).

In an international context marked by the spectacular and repeated failures of water transnational corporations that have sought since the 1990s to take root in the cities of the global South, Senegal has therefore an emblematic character for the proponents of PPPs.

Recently the Senegalese government has however announced unilaterally that the contract that bound it to SAUR would not be renewed, and that in April 2011 there would be a tender for the total concession of water service, which would take place in 2012–13.

CONTEXT

The current water management system in Senegal stems from a series of reforms which were implemented in the early 1990s at the instigation of the World Bank in particular, and were part and still fit within a wider context of withdrawal from essential services by the Senegalese state. The reform of 1996 led to the establishment of three structures that replaced the SONEES (Société nationale d’exploitation des eaux du Sénégal):

- SONES, an investment company responsible for promoting investment in infrastructure and equipment
- The SDE, a private company that includes shares held by a strategic foreign partner (SAUR, who hold 51 per cent of the share capital), and the Senegalese state (5 per cent). The SDE is responsible for the technical and commercial running of supply system of drinking water. It operates with a 10-year concession with the Senegalese state and a contract that specifies the technical and commercial performance. This contract came up for renewal in 2006, and was extended until 2011.
- ONAS (Office national de l’assainissement du Sénégal), a state-owned company responsible for industrial and commercial affairs (EPIC). It is responsible for the development and running of infrastructure and equipment of collective independent sanitation of waste water and excreta as well as drains for rain water.

The law on public service management of drinking water and collective sanitation (LPSEPA) that was introduced in 2008 defined the legal framework for the supplying of clean drinking water and sanitation, and laid down the state policy in matters of public services. The state has powers to delegate public water services in the framework of this law. It carries the ultimate responsibility for management, maintenance and development of provision of water as well as all activities pertaining to their proper function, generally speaking. The sector water operators are: (i) the Société nationale des eaux du Sénégal (SONES); (ii) the Sénégalaise des eaux (SDE); and (iii) local authorities and consumer associations that have direct authority over the quality of public services and that are closely associated with the implementation of social programmes. An inter-ministerial coordination committee is designated by decree and responsible for the contractual regulation of the urban water and sanitation sector (monitoring, follow-up of contracts, arbitration).

This structure is supposed to change shortly in the framework of the so-called ‘third-generation’ reforms. The government has in fact suddenly announced that the contract would not be renewed and that a tender would be launched in April 2011 for the selection a new operator, and that the tender would be for ‘total concession, that is to say, a corporation that no longer just distributes water and charges for its consumption, but will make investments’ (the very words of a government official). An amendment to extend the contract with SAUR to the end of 2012 was signed without the government giving more details on its plans or the timing of the proposed reform.

Under a concession, unlike a lease contract, the private company (in most cases a large global water multinational) is responsible for managing, renewing and expanding infrastructure and equipment, and must find the funding itself and make the investments for a specified period, usually between 15 and 25 years. The ownership of new infrastructure is often left to the private company temporarily, depending on the type of contract. The private operator has to pay and finance investments through the sale of the service, in this case water billing.


WHAT IS THE REALITY OF PROGRESS MADE SINCE 1996?

It is a usual strategy of proponents of public–private partnerships in the water sector to start with ‘soft’ forms of privatisation such as lease contracts in order to ensure a better acceptance by the often reluctant local population, at a later stage, of more extensive forms of privatisation such as concessions. It is therefore all the more necessary to have a closer look, beyond the promotional announcements disseminated by international financial institutions, at the reality of the progress achieved since 1996.

It is hard to deny that substantial improvements have been made compared to the situation that prevailed in the late 1980s, characterised by the appalling state of infrastructures, water deficits, including in the capital Dakar, and very high inequalities between urban and rural areas, between Dakar and other cities, and between central urban areas and poorer peri-urban areas.

THE EXTENSION OF THE NETWORK AND NEW CONNECTIONS

Today, by contrast with the situation that prevailed in 1996, 90 per cent of people in Dakar and 85 per cent of those in other cities officially have access to drinking water (79 per cent and 63 per cent respectively have an individual connection to the network; the others rely on a collective connection close to their residence). More than 1.64 million additional people are said to have gained access to the water network, particularly through 150,000 so-called ‘social’ connections, offered at a very low rate for the poor. Cuts in the water supply, frequent before, have become increasingly rare. The quality of the water supply has also improved.

In contrast, however, to what is suggested (including towards the Senegalese themselves) by the promoters of public–private partnerships, most of the progress in extending infrastructure and network connections has not been accomplished by the private company responsible for commercial exploitation, the SDE, but by the public company responsible for infrastructure, SONES. The overall portfolio mobilised by SONES consists mainly of loans (56.2 per cent), donations (27.2 per cent) and state contributions (14 per cent). The major issue of this form of raising finance has been that it substantially increases the burden of public debt (1,448.2 billion CFA for the foreign debt, and 392 billion CFA for national debt in 2008). In other words these developments are largely explained by the significant funding provided by the Senegalese government on the one hand and the IFIs (international financial institutions) and other donors like European development agencies on the other. The latter funding was offered only under the condition that water services be partially privatised, and they will need to be repaid, even if they were granted with low interest rates and with other favourable conditions. This situation reflects how lease contracts often turn out to be very poor bargains for governments: they are the ones that need to seek loans and fund infrastructures, while the private company, which is the only visible face of the service for the general population, collects all the financial and reputational benefits. In any event, the progress achieved in urban Senegal cannot be explained by the fact that the operation of service was entrusted to a private company rather than a public operator.

THE PRICE OF WATER

The promoters of the lease contract also highlight the fact that the price of water in urban Senegal has not been subject to the dramatic increases that have often characterised other privatisations of water services in developing countries. Thus the price per cubic metre for the so-called ‘social’ bracket (consumption of less than 20 cubic metres per month) has increased by 19 per cent between 1996 and 2009, representing an average annual increase of 1.5 per cent. Overall, for all brackets, the increase was greater, at 3 per cent per year. As the water rates for individuals have stagnated since 2003, the increase was actually 40 per cent over the period 1996–2003. The fact that there has been no additional price increase since 2003 can be partially explained by state policy (as the price of water is set by the state), and the will to provide a positive response to pressure from consumer organisations and trade unions.

Moreover, the establishment of a ‘social’ tariff system (the price of water increases according to the amount of water consumed) touted by the proponents of the lease contract hides the fact that the poorest, those living in suburbs and who have no access to individual connections, continue to pay more for the water because they must use a collective water source and are therefore charged at the rate corresponding to a high consumption – not to speak of those who still don’t have access to the network at all.

THE PERSISTENCE OF DISPARITIES

Beyond the debate on the progress actually achieved, the lease contract did nothing to resolve the structural problems of water service in Senegal, namely the issue of unequal access and the financial equilibrium of the service. These fundamental problems have only been avoided.

First, the problem of water access in rural areas has been simply erased from the contract. If today a large majority of urban Senegalese has, one way or another, access to drinking water, this is the case of only 62 per cent of the rural population (and only 17 per cent of them have access to sanitation).

Residents who do not have a personal connection to the network but depend on collective access cannot, as we have seen, benefit from the ‘social’ tariff because the overall consumption at their connection puts them in the higher bracket. Substantial proportions of the urban population still are without access to the network or can no longer afford to use it. They have to rely on private fountains, where they purchase water for a price far higher than the official rate, or on polluted water sources such as rivers or artisanal wells. Water-related diseases, including cholera, have not diminished in urban Senegal.

The unilateral application of a billing system based on individual consumption has had other negative consequences, such as the suppression, under the pretext of fighting water wastage, of many public fountains, often locally managed by communities, which provided the poorest with water for free or at a very low cost. Institutions such as schools and mosques, which benefited from preferential treatment (and sometimes a free water supply) as part of this community system, had to bear heavy bills or give up their water supply. A whole system of sociability, involving mainly women, has been suppressed and replaced by a system based on a conception of water as a commodity.

Ultimately, the lease contract has reinforced previously existing dichotomies in the provision of water services, creating a two-tier system distinguishing between creditworthy consumers and others, at the expense of a perspective of universal right to water for all citizens of Senegal. This two-tier system is likely, once again, to be compounded by a total concession of the service.

A FINANCIAL SITUATION RESTORED ONLY IN APPEARANCE

The second structural problem that has been resolved only in appearance is that of the financial equilibrium of the service.

SONES – which manages the funding of investments, contracts loans from donors and is responsible for their repayment – is experiencing significant financial difficulties. These may explain, along with the problems of mismanagement that also characterise SONES, why the Senegalese government now wishes to withdraw entirely from a sector in which it has heavily spent.

The financial difficulties that SONES is facing can be explained by the institutional instability at the head of the company, which is caused by the decisions – often political in nature – as well as the extent of the debt owed by the state to the water services, which is said to be 36 billion CFA and which weighs heavily on the accounts.

It must be noted that ONAS also has presented a structural deficit since its creation in 1996, the fees repaid by the SDE only covering about a third of its operating and investment costs according to some sources.

THE RISKS OF A CONCESSION

The prospect of a total concession of the water service is likely to exacerbate all problems reported above.

First, everything suggests that the fundamental reason for the announcement of a future total concession is the desire of the Senegalese government to get rid of SONES and disengage financially from the water sector, even though it is precisely its financial commitment that has led to improvements.

In theory, the future private contractor will have to take care of investments and of the loans that will be necessary for them. There are in these conditions only two ways they can secure reasonable profits – which is the only raison d’être for a private company. These are either by drastically increasing the price of water, with the risk of being confronted with the resistance of the population and soaring unpaid bills, or by failing to implement but a small portion of the necessary investments – a trend already common among private contractors because their contracts do not run for more than 25 years, while the lifetime of networks and equipment is closer to 50 years. In both cases, the population, and primarily the poor, will bear the costs.

Indeed, it is actually not certain that the Senegalese government will find a company willing to take over the water service under a concession contract. Most large multinational water companies are now very conservative in their investments in cities of the global South and focus on less risky types of contracts. But even this situation is a source of danger, as Senegal might be tempted to attract a company by offering even more advantageous conditions in terms of guaranteed profits, weak regulatory framework and definition of the concession’s perimeter. The unilateral and opaque manner in which the government has so far handled the announcement of the end of the lease contract does not bode well from this point of view, even though a total concession of the service would require much more rigorous and independent mechanisms of control of the private provider.

‘Unprofitable’ users may therefore be abandoned for good, for the benefit of some customers that will promise fast and secure income for the private company, and will not need new investments.


ALTERNATIVES EXIST

So is there no alternative to this move towards a complete privatisation? The current system could certainly be improved by increasing transparency, regulation and renegotiating the fees repaid by the SDE to SONES.

But above all, without denying the past and present problems of the water public service in Senegal, only a solution based on public management seems likely to extend the progress already achieved and to address the structural problems identified above.

There are, however, two conditions. The first is a genuine democratic reform of the water service, with real transparency, accountability and genuine participation of citizens and civil society. Various public services from the global South, in Brazil and India in particular, have carried out such reforms to great success.

The second is the ability to access financial, technical and organisational support. If international financial institutions and major donors continue to focus on public–private partnerships as the only solution to all the problems of the water sector and as a condition to access their loans, there is an emerging trend in favour of public solutions. The European Union has recently set up a small fund to support public–public partnerships in the field of water for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). In public–public partnerships, it is not a private company but another public utility that helps a water utility to reform and improve its performance and the quality of its management, for reasons of solidarity rather than profit. Public–public partnerships started more than 20 years ago when the water company of Yokohama, Japan, began to sign contract for assistance with other water utilities in Asia. Today, 70 countries are concerned by public–public partnerships. Public water utilities that are ready to engage in such partnerships often are in industrialised countries (such as the water utility of Paris who assisted Vietnam and Morocco, and the one of Amsterdam, active in Egypt and Suriname) but there are also South–South public–public partnerships, for example between Morocco and Mauritania.

Ghana’s quest to quench its thirst

Ghana has a long history of struggle against the inequitable allocation of water - beginning with protests against colonial water policy and, more recently, with opposition to water privatisation that began in the 1990s. Alhassan Adam writes about the history, the challenge to privatisation and the road ahead.
Access to water in Ghana has always been one of the most contested issues in the history of the country and this was so even before the country gained independence from Britain. In the 1930s, the introduction of water rates in Accra by the British colonial administration sparked a wave of protest by the citizens. The water protest was a key unifying factor across different classes and social strata. It brought together youth groups, lawyers, chiefs, ratepayers and landlords.

After independence, the nationalist government led by Kwame Nkrumah made efforts to expand the provision of water services beyond the major cities. Subsequent governments continued this approach until the 1990s when Ghana begun to introduce major reforms in the water sector. The reforms in the 1990s were part of an economic recovery programme, seen as a vehicle for resurrecting the ailing Ghanaian economy.

This major shift in the management and governance of water in Ghana delivered a number of things: the introduction of full cost recovery; the unbundling Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWS) into Ghana Water Company and the incorporation of numerous water boards for rural water supply. The reform further introduced private sector participation in water management, however, attempts to introduce private ownership of water were resisted by civil society.

In June 2006, the Ghanaian government, represented by Ghana Water Company Limited, finally signed a management contract with Aqua Vitens Rand Limited after almost six years of stalemate due to a vigorous campaign mounted by the National Coalition Against Privatisation of Water (NCAP).

The performance of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited has been abysmal. As part of restructuring, about 1,600 workers were retrenched, water tariffs were increased and the organogram of Ghana Water Company Limited has been radically changed, leading to industry actions. The labour union is calling for the abrogation of the management contract, and has also accused Aqua Vitens Rand Limited of victimising unionists.

Come December 2011, the management contract will expire. While consumers, social movements and labour unions are calling for an end to the relationship with Aqua Vitens Rand Limited, the World Bank, on the other hand, is making frantic efforts to get the contract extended.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER

Ghana is said to have abundant water resources. It is drained by three main river basin systems: the Volta, South Western and Coastal, which cover, in that order, 70 per cent, 22 per cent and eight per cent of the total area of the country (Sarpong 2005). Ghana has a total annual runoff of about 54.4 billion cubic meters and consumptive water demand for 2020 is projected to be about 5.13 billion cubic meters, about 13 per cent of the surface water resources (Ampomah 2010). As a result, Ghana is one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa which is least water stressed. That said, resources are unevenly distributed across the ecological zones in the country; the guinea and coastal savannah ecological zones experience water stress during the harmattan season, the driest months.

The utilisation of water in Ghana can be broadly classified as follows: domestic water supply, navigation (transportation), hydro-electricity, fishing, irrigation, and industrial (i.e. mining, canning, textile, brewery, building and construction, pharmaceuticals and tanning).

In the pre-colonial era, water was governed as a ‘common’ base on the norms and practices of individual communities. There were no unified laws or codes for the use of water; each community prescribed the way and manner they used their water resources. According to Sarpong (2005:3) water governance was then governed by what is known in legal terminology as customary law. He argues that this practice was useful for the protection of water resources especially in areas where water is scarce: ‘Water in all its forms including the sea, rivers and lakes is regarded as public property not subject to individual appropriation. The rule is said to be strict, especially in areas where there is scarcity of water.’ The enforcers of these customary norms and practice were the fetish priest and priestesses, who even dictated the kind of tools and equipment that could be used for water abstraction (Sarpong 2005; Hauck and Youkhana 2008).

With the arrival of the colonialists, customary law co-existed side by side with statute laws, but the former had greater influence. Ghana’s current constitution also recognises customary law, but it still comes secondary to statute law. Under the 1992 constitution, ownership of water is vested in the hands of the president. This constitution has further alienated community and traditional control of water by the creation of the Water Resources Commission (WRC) which is the only institution that has the mandate and responsibility of issuing permits and rights for the use of water in the country.

The WRC Act, 1996 (Act 552) conferred on the Water Resources Commission the mandate to enact regulations on water use, while the Water Use Regulations, 2001 (L.I. 1692) provides procedures for allocating permits for various water users, including domestic, commercial, municipal, industrial, agricultural, power generation, water transportation, fisheries (aquaculture), environmental, recreational and under water (wood) harvesting (GOG 2007:57).

The creation of the WRC was part of the bigger scheme of liberalisation of the entire water sector. The water reforms were also a subset of the general economic reforms which Ghana has embarked on since 1983 through the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP).

Under the ensuing reforms, cost recovery measures were introduced for water rates, and user fees for community stand pipes. The Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) was unbundled into the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) and hundreds of water boards across the country responsible for small town and rural water and sanitation. These reforms introduced new dimensions of water management and governance. Emphasis was placed on the participation of the private sector in water management and on quasi community ownership (Whitfield 2006; Hauck and Youkhana 2008).

Private sector participation in the water sector was to take the form of foreign direct investment and the introduction of efficient management practices in urban water supply, while in the rural water sector it focused on providing services such as supply of drilling equipment, borehole parts, engineering and managerial skills.

The Ghanaian government and the World Bank developed two lease contracts by dividing Ghana’s urban water supply systems into two business units. It was expected that the successful winner for the bid on each business unit would invest about $70-million dollars and have management rights for 25 years. Most multi-national water companies entered bids for the contract. However, this proposal was not successful due to the vigorous campaign launched by the Coalition Against Privatisation of Water (Fall et al. 2009).

The coalition continued to target multi-national water companies that put in their bids and as a result got private companies such as Suez and Biwater out. However, they were not successful in getting companies such as Rand Water and Vitens to pull out. In hindsight, it is clear that the Ghanaian government and the World Bank were desperate to get the project implemented.

Though the management contract has been in operation for the past four years, urban water supply in Ghana has seen little progress. Residential and industrial consumers are complaining of erratic water supplies and higher tariffs. In 2009 alone, water tariffs were increased by 66 per cent. Industrial relations between the unions and management is seriously deteriorating. In a recent petition signed by the general secretary of the Public Utility Workers Union, he alleged that Aqua Vitens Rand Limited had resorted to victimisation of unionists through transfers and other tactics.

In the rural water sector, they are grappling with the issues of repairs and maintenance; about 30 per cent of boreholes are not functioning. There is a hydrological problem with the drilling of boreholes and about 40 per cent of drillings do not yield water (CWSA 2010), which is affecting the rate of water supply. Also, some areas have high fluoride and iron content, which poses a health problem.

Water is still a burning issue in Ghana. It is evident that the water reforms have not solved the water situation in Ghana. Water still attracts a lot of debate on political platforms and radio discussions. It was not surprising that during the 2008 presidential elections, Voice of America did a report which suggested that water would play a significant role in the outcome of the election (Ghanaweb 2008). The incumbent government that had signed the management contract ended up losing the election.

WATER PROTESTS

The first recorded civil society mobilisation over water was in 1934, when the colonial government introduced an urban water supply system in Accra. The introduction of potable water to citizens was as a result of a recommendation by the World Health Organisation. In order for the colonial government to recover its cost it introduced water rates, a move that was challenged by civil society groups in Accra. They wrote a petition to the King of England calling for the repeal of the law and transfer of management of the water supply to Accra city council. The petitioners were made up of the following groups: the rate payers association, Accra Youth League, Manbie party, and Chiefs of Accra’ (Bohman 2010:72).

From the 1930s until the 1990s there was no major civil society mobilisation on water. The only forms of protest were limited to people breaking up pipelines to siphon water and scuffles between metre readers and residents. These forms of direct actions were not organized, but based on individual reactions to situations. The 1990s water reforms activated civil society engagement in water governance.

The reforms opened a window of opportunity for formalised civil society organisations (NGOs) to pick up some contracts from the state. One such organisation was ISODEC. In an interview with Bishop Akolgo (executive director, ISODEC), he said that ISODEC worked with the National Service Secretariat (a parastatal agency) to mobilise and train rural communities to develop and manage boreholes and basic sanitation facilities. This work also initiated the first pilot community water management scheme in the Brong Ahafo region, which was later scaled up to national level.

He said ISODEC and the National Service Secretariat’s community improvement unit initiated a national platform for the promotion of rural water and sanitation issues. The idea was welcomed by most of the NGOs and donors engaged in the sector. The first meeting of the platform was held at the Mole National Park and subsequent meetings of the platform adopted the name of the park and hence have become known as the Mole series. This platform has survived since its establishment in 1989 and it has become an institutionalised space for the assembly of rural water and sanitation NGOs, experts, donors and policy makers.

ISODEC’s role as one of the key NGOs in providing water services to rural communities gave them leverage to win more government contracts and insights into the water reform agenda. The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) engaged ISODEC to undertake social mapping in Kumasi as part of the proposed urban water reforms. Results from this study alerted ISODEC to the dangers of the reforms, especially for the urban poor, as well as Ghana’s sovereign control over its water system. In 2001, ISODEC organised a national forum to discuss the urban water reforms. Presentations for the forum were drawn from both national and international water experts, activists and trade unions. At the end of the national forum, the Accra Declaration was issued which called for a campaign against the reforms.

The National Coalition Against Privatisation of Water (NCAP) is one of the few social movements on water in Africa (Bond 2007; Prempeh 2006). Since its inception, NCAP has focused on the mobilisation of workers, students and communities as their core activists (Whitfield 2006). This is a major departure from the usual type of advocacy carried out by NGOs, which has come to dominate the Ghanaian development landscape.

The campaign employed teach-ins and leafleting at workplaces and university campuses as well as occasional community public forums. Since 2001, NCAP has also mounted a vigorous media engagement with government and proponents of water privatisation. NCAP has also used direct actions such as picketing to draw attention of the general public to the privatisation issue (Public Agenda 2008 & 2009).

The campaign has been deemed as one of the most potent in the history of Ghanaian social movements. In an interview with Mawuli Dake, he said:

‘It is probably the first time that citizens were able to fully engage, interrupt and impact a World Bank/multi-national policy in Ghana…NCAP’s approach… has to do with its mobilisation at local, national and international levels…defeating some of the world’s [most] powerful multi-national companies is no small accomplishment for a social movement.’

The profile of the campaign was so high on the Ghanaian political landscape that every opposition political party in Ghana was issuing solidarity support messages to the coalition (Ghanaweb, 2001a).

It is important to note that, within the milieu of the anti-water privatisation struggle, another network emerged from the Mole Series crowd called the Coalition of NGOs in Water and Sanitation (CONIWAS). In an interview with Patrick Apoya, executive secretary of CONIWAS and former Northern Sector Coordinator of NCAP, CONIWAS entered the advocacy scene in 2003 when the 12th Mole Series conference mooted the idea of forming a network on water and sanitation with a functional secretariat. CONIWAS was formed as a 25-member organisation; present membership is estimated to be close to 100 organisations.

CONIWAS, unlike NCAP, is predominantly a coalition of service delivery NGOs whose position on privatisation is not clear. The approach of CONIWAS to policy change is the use of dialogue with policy makers and donors. They have been instrumental in influencing 2007 Ghana Water Policy to include a human right to water, as well as abolishing five per cent counter part funding from communities for water infrastructure. It is also common to find within the ranks of CONIWAS some of the NCAP members.

In Ghana, civil society organisations are using different approaches to bring change in the water sector. These approaches range from a direct anti-privatisation stance to dialogue. Also there seems to be continuous horizontal and vertical dissemination of tactics and strategy by those joining or initiating new platforms.

CHALLENGES

In an interview with Akolgo, he mentioned that, when ISODEC decided to campaign against water privatisation, the Ghanaian government blocked their funding from UNDP and one of their international partners pulled out and even attempted to undermine ISODEC.

The trade unions and political parties which identified themselves with the coalition position were attacked by the then ruling government as ideologues and as against development and foreign investment. The tactics by the government were therefore to appeal to the Ghanaian middle class in order to isolate the coalition and its sympathisers.

CONCLUSION
Fifteen years of reforms and five years of the management contract have not yielded any remarkable result in the urban water sector; industrial and residential consumers complain daily about poor water services and higher tariffs. On the part of rural water provision, there has been an increase in infrastructure provision, but there has been less attention to repairs, maintenance and quality of water. As a result, rural people are provided with water that comes with health problems due to high fluoride and iron content.

This year is the end of the management contract and the mobilisation by NCAP has to be more vigorous in putting forward an alternative agenda. There does seem to be a wind of change blowing from the corridors of donors, starting from the European Union, who last year opened up a public-private partnership funding window. Though the funding will not meet the levels of investment needed to solve the backlog investments gaps, it is important that activists in Ghana capitalise on such initiatives and push their governments to give it a shot after the failure of the management contract.

The water crisis in African cities

The water issue is a major problem for people in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the water situation in sub-Saharan Africa remains characterised by the difficult access to this resource, the poor supply management of watering places and the high costs of water network connections. For instance, in Benin one household in three doesn’t have access to drinking water, and the problem is much more acute in rural areas.

Households having access to drinking water are considered as households who have drinking water at home or within 200 metres from home: running water from the company’s distribution network, fountain water, water from the village pump, water tank and water from protected wells.

Various consultations led with the populations have indeed confirmed that the water issue is a major problem for them. The concerns, as raised by the populations, focus on the difficult access to water and the poor management of the watering places, the difficulties to call for the financial participation of the population for the creation and the management of watering places and the borehole characteristics which are too often inappropriate: even if this water is neither used for drinking nor for cooking, it is nevertheless inappropriate.

Better water management is essential for urbanisation and sustainable development in African cities. According to the UN-Habitat general information document on water management, during the Second World Water Forum in the Hague, the Netherlands, in 2000, Lisa Ochola, a typical Nairobi teenager, taking part to this forum to represent the youth, told the entire world that her family had no running water, sometimes for months. She said that during such periods, she manages to maintain her personal hygiene with a glass of water. In order to make the water problem better understood, she added that a bottle of water bought at the supermarket is more expensive than gasoline. John Njoroge, a Nairobi inhabitant living in the Lavington district, has also to deal with this problem: he must spend 10,000 KSh (Kenyan shillings) per month, that is to say about US$128, to meet the water needs of a family of five persons. Kibera, another part of the town and one of the largest slums in Africa, is confronted to the ‘flying toilets’ phenomenon: people get rid of their excrement by putting them in plastic bags and throwing them into the air anywhere.

The water and sanitation crisis in Nairobi has worsened in 2000 when an important drought compelled the authorities to cut down water and electricity. As in most African cities, problems do not stem from the scarcity of water as such, but to the fact that 50 per cent of this water is wasted or diverted.

The water crisis in cities is increasingly the subject of special attention in all international fora on water. The alarm was raised in Dublin and Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and continued to resound in other meetings such as Beijing and Istanbul in 1996, in Cape Town in 1997 and at the Second Global Forum on Water held in the Hague in 2000. In most of these meetings, the water crisis in African cities has been one of the main concerns.

Globally, Africa is urbanising at a rate of about 5 per cent, the fastest rate in the world. The urban population in Africa could rise from 138 million in 1990 to 500 million in 2020, and African cities with over 1 million inhabitants will then have to accommodate nearly 200 million people. Regarding water, a survey conducted in 1990 in 29 sub-Saharan countries showed that eight of these countries suffered from a shortage or a scarcity of water. According to estimates, in 2025, that number should increase to 20 out of 29.

For instance, Lagos, the commercial centre of Nigeria, the African country with the largest population, has nearly 14 million inhabitants, that is to say half the population of Kenya and more that most African countries. It is the most populated city in Africa – Lagos is the sixth-largest city in the world and could become the third-largest in two decades. This would require greater access to water supply and to other infrastructures as well as essential services for millions of additional inhabitants. Moreover, as in many other African countries, Lagos is about to face a real water crisis.

If we do not want future generations to suffer the consequences of our mistakes, as Lisa Ochola did, we must listen to the opinion of Professor Kader Asmal, winner of the Stockholm Water Award: ‘We cannot enter the 21st century with the usual commercial approach we are used to having concerning water management in big cities. We must make a realistic assessment of our water management capabilities in specific circumstances. We must dare. We must show unfailing commitment to equity. We need political determination. It is important that research and education play their role and lead the way that will best achieve fairness and efficiency in the long term. Finally we need national and international collaboration and understanding because sustainable water management represents long term security for all of us.’

METHODS OF SUPPLY

Access to clean water in Africa does not correspond to that of Europe.

In fact, a small proportion of the population has access to drinking water and the water service is not restricted to the conventional networks, as there are still other drinking-water sources available such as communal water points (springs), wells and boreholes.

Water from the natural environment (oceans, lakes, rivers, creeks, groundwater, rains) is a collective good. It belongs altogether to no one and to everyone. Considered as a natural resource, water has multiple utilisations: agriculture (70 per cent), industry (20 per cent) and domestic consumption (10 per cent).

Water management is complex. It is a cross-cutting resource because it affects altogether health, urban development, agriculture, industry and leisure. It also has multiple stakeholders and has to be approached on a territorial basis too.

Management of water services is rather complicated. It requires high technical ability, permanent adaptation to changing conditions and important funds, because of the high cost of infrastructure and equipments, together with permanent maintenance needs.

Although water management has often been transferred to local authorities in Africa, resources themselves were not transferred. Water companies are still in charge of water management in African cities, but without adequate consultation with local authorities.

In the case of Cotonou, access to drinking water seems secured, but some neighbourhoods still remain without water supply.



The results of the above table show that 98.9 per cent of people have access to drinking water. Nevertheless, only 43.6 per cent have running water at home and 54.5 per cent of them will buy running water from nearby homes. The water from the Société national des eaux du Bénin (SONEB) and elsewhere – which comes from fountains, district pumps, tanks or protected wells – is considered as running water at home.

Proper fountains or fitted-out watering places almost do not exist anymore in the city of Cotonou. But households which have no connections at home stock up buckets of water bought in a nearby house.

Cotonou populations often face water cuts, which sometimes last all day. The company in charge of water distribution explains that this problem is due to the maintenance of the network and to power cuts. But the investigations that we made showed that 20 years ago a German firm called GIGGS had forbidden the urbanisation of the area around the pumping stations because it might damage the groundwater. But the advice given by the firm was not followed and the area was largely urbanised, causing damage to the groundwater and thus to the water supply company. This led the distribution company to increase the price of drinking water. Leaders of the company usually explain that these adjustments are due to the international financial crisis and to the high maintenance costs.

In accordance with article 93 of the law 97-029, dated 15 January 1999 and concerning the organisation of cities in the Republic of Benin, the town is responsible for the supply and the distribution of drinking water. But this has never been respected whereas it might have encouraged competition and enabled populations to have a say.

CHALLENGES

For a good water management policy in African cities, several challenges have to be met, such as:

- the implementation of laws and regulations giving water management to local communities
- the knowledge of water sources
- the development of a framework for the management of surface water resources
- the necessity of financial means and human resources to monitor and operate the equipments
- informing and educating people for a rational use of watering places.

PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve people’s access to drinking water, African cities need support in the following areas:

- the control, the development and the water supply based on the principle of demand
- the management and the rational exploitation of water resources
- the training and re-training of communities as well as the establishment of a process concerning equipments renewal
- the strengthening of the drinking water supply systems
- the establishment of a high council for water
- the setting-up of a water fund for a real management of the resource
- the establishment of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

If these proposals were followed, African cities could expect a significant percentage of its population with access to safe drinking water by 2020.

Access to water and privatisation

On 29 July 2010, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognised, in a proposed resolution by Bolivia and adopted by 122 votes with 41 abstentions, ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.’ The resolution also calls upon ‘states and international organizations to provide financial resources, capacity-building and technology transfer, in particular to developing countries’.

It was a historical decision. But what explains the need to proclaim this right is that it is barely respected around the world. According to the UNESCO/WHO 2010 report, 884 million people around the world (13 per cent of the world population), among whom 343 million are in Africa, do not have access to an ‘improved drinking water supply’ (running water network, public drinking fountains, protected wells or springs, rainwater tanks), and 2.6 billion people (39 per cent of the world population) do not have access to ‘improved sanitation systems’ (mains drainage, septic tanks, latrines). The consequences are tragic: To this day, water-borne diseases (diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid, polio, meningitis, hepatitis, etc) are the main cause of death in the world, killing 8 million people a year according to the NGO Solidarites International (and about 3 million as stated by the World Health Organization). The culprits behind the ‘water crisis’ are numerous: Climate, demography, lifestyles, economy, politics, institutions, and the like. It is imperative that all are eliminated, so this ‘right to clean drinking water’ can at last become a reality.

EXPLAINING THE WATER CRISIS

The African climate is often considered the catalyst. While it is true that the world’s water is not distributed fairly, the effect of global warming will only accentuate the gaps by bringing more rain in polar, temperate and equatorial zones, and less in tropical ones. Moreover, human needs are spread out over twelve months, usually increasing during the dry season; however, supplies vary greatly during the year. Natural storage (glaciers, lakes, rivers, perennial water flows) is also more scarce in the tropical regions. Those disparities are nothing new, yet they haven’t precluded the development of adapted human societies on the world’s continents.

It is a different story with demography and globalisation of lifestyles. The world’s population rose from 2.5 billion in 1950 to almost 7 billion in 2010 while – it goes without saying – proportionally increasing its water needs. Because those needs add up to less than 10 per cent of water consumption, the list should include more than just domestic use (5 litres per day for survival, 50 litres per day for a decent life, more than 500 liters per day to satisfy North American standards). To accurately measure the impact of population growth on water needs, we should consider the total amount of water used for food, goods, energy production, and the like, which is called the water footprint. On average, this footprint reaches 3,400 litres per day worldwide, varying from 6,800 litres per day in the United States to 1,850 litres per day in Ethopia, while France uses about 5,140 litres per day. The water footprint depends on global consumption, lifestyle and climate. For example, knowing that the output of one kg of beef calls for 15,500 litres of water, one kg of chicken for 3,900 litres and one kg of wheat for 1,300 litres, it is possible to measure the impact that westernisation has had on consumption patterns.

Urbanisation is another key element of the water crisis. Though a fairly simple problem for small rural communities who make do with limited amounts of water, supplying this natural ressource becomes a much bigger problem as the community grows and diversifies its activities: In such cases, we need to look for further water repositories. The water they contain will need to be transported, stored, distributed among a zone too large to be supplied by only one water point, etc. All this is not free.

Nowadays, more than half the world’s population live in urban areas, which increases water conveyance and distribution needs, as well as the costs associated with storage, pumping, and potabilisation. This conurbation not only exacerbates purification and storm water drainage problems and their treatment, but also the ones associated with service management. Unlike small villages in which most of the time the community manages its water resources, water service management and purification (when the latter exists) is usually under the leadership of political powers, either the central government or municipal authorities.

In countries recently decolonised, where technical competence was scarce, those services have long been the responsibility of national utilities in the case of cities, and most often of the Department of Agriculture through a programme for water supply in rural areas. The achievements of these utilities is variable, but on the whole they have been, alas, quite poor. Numerous reasons, which too often mirror the country’s political and economic landscape, explain these failures: Unfit and corrupt leaders, lack of supervision, shortage of maintenance equipment, insufficient funding, penniless consumers. From these deficiencies, multinational water companies made a lot of profit, being able to say that better (private, of course) management of the water service would help put the situation back on its feet.

PRIVATISATION: A SOLUTION?

In the past, Africa has only marginally interested water multinationals, aside from the Ivory Coast’s water taken over by the Saur group, then owned by the Bouygues group, in 1960. In the early 1990s, the increasing intervention of two major international financial organisations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, forced developing countries to put in place structural adjustment policies: The only way to reduce the external debt was by decreasing public spending. Privatisation, including that of drinking water distribution, is at the heart of this system. In sub-Saharan Africa, Saur lead the way in Conakry (1989), Central African Republic (1993), Mali (1994), Senegal (1995), South Africa (1999) and Mozambique (1999). As the leader in the public works and civil engineering sector, Bouygues uses its influence as a water contractor (not always a lucrative endeavour) to be awarded, competition-free, the far more profitable renovation and expansion contracts. Veolia (former Vivendi) and Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, which did not share the same interests, resisted a bit before following in Bouygues’ footsteps: South Africa (1992), Guinea-Bissau (1995), and Cameroon (2000) for Suez; Gabon (1997), Kenya (1999), Chad (2000), Burkina Faso (2001) and Niger (2001) for Vivendi. Some outsiders, not related to ‘Françafrique’, were also involved, among them Biwater in South Africa, or IPE (Portugal) in Mozambique or Cape Verde. In the more prized North Africa, while SONEDE Tunisia resisted privatisation, Morocco, on the other hand, gave Casablanca to Suez (1997), Rabat to a Lusitanian Spanish group for a short while before Veolia inherited it, the latter also getting Tangier and Tétouan (2002). Algeria, which was contemplating broadening the scope of privatisation, hesitated a bit longer before entrusting Alger to Société des Eaux et de l’Assainissement d’Alger (SEEAL) in 2006 (of which Suez is a shareholder), Oran to the Spanish Agbar Agua, and Annaba to the German Gelsenwasser (2007). Yet, Africa is a lightweight on the scale of multinationals’ profits: 8.5 per cent (total for Africa Middle East-India) of Veolia Eau’s sales figure (out of 12.5 billion euros), 7 per cent (total for Africa-Middle East) for Suez Environment (out of 12.3 billion euros), but 19 per cent for Saur (of 1.5 billion euros) in 2009.

One possible reason for such small numbers may lie in the poor achievements of these public services’ handovers. Almost always translating into a rate increase (up to 40 per cent in Nairobi) without improving the service, privatisations often anger users that are unable to pay any more and who form coalitions to force the government to cancel the contracts. Veolia had to get out of Mali, Gabon, Chad, Niger, and Nairobi, while Saur left Guinea. Movements against water privatisation spread here and there, particularly in South Africa, and movements of about forty other countries joined together in what is called the African Water Network during the World Social Forum held in Nairobi.

In fact, the privatisation model doesn’t answer Africa’s multiple water problems:

- The water resources being exploited are insufficient, potential new resources are scarce, remote, and expensive to develop.

- Actual production, purification and storing equipments are often run-down because of a chronic lack of technical and financial means to maintain them; therefore they need renovation.

- Distribution networks are in need of renovation and extensions, another costly endeavour.

- Purification networks (not including purification stations) are at best embryonic.

- Public corporations’ institutional flaws are just ‘the icing on the cake’.

In short, it’s pointless to add expertise (even if it is at a high-level) and to improve business management if installations remain in disrepair, a fact that calls for investments that municipal authories cannot make. Moreover, users’ buying power will not suffice to pay back a debt through an increased water price tag. And this picture doesn’t even include the need of multinational companies to release funds to satisfy their shareholders.

THE EXAMPLE OF MOMBASA IN KENYA

With a population of more than 3.3 million people, 60 per cent of whom live below the poverty line, Mombasa is the second largest city in Kenya, and the capital of the Coast Region. It is Kenya’s first touristic destination as well as the main port of East Africa, where more than 10 million tons of merchandise transit annually. Fifty-two percent of the population have access to drinking water supplies, to which 16 per cent of them are directly connected, and 36 per cent get their water through public drinking fountains (PDF). The rest have to make do with water peddlers (whose costs can be as much as 10 per cent higher than the PDFs). The remote two major existing supply installations, 215 km for Mzima and 85 km for Marere, are in ruins (built respectively in 1950 and 1920): 60 per cent of the water is lost to leaks. The actual production capacity is 95,000 m3/d, but once we substract the supply to industries and hotels (a priority), only 26,000 m3/d remain for 52 per cent of the population (17 litres per day). The main consequences of this situation are the consumption of unsafe waters (wells, backwaters, water peddlers, etc) by the population, which brings inevitable sanitary and financial woes, limits to the development of economic activities (which in turn affect employment), and the priority given to production of water, which leads to a neglect of water purification, again with adverse consequences in termes of public health.

Renovating the existing infrastructure and increasing its capacity to 260,000 m3/d would cost about US$1 billion. With the World Bank’s terms of lending, a price increase to 50 Ksh/m3 (about US$0.60), from the actual 15 Ksh/m3 charged at drinking water fountains, would necessary to repay the loan, and this ‘arrangement’ doesn’t even include the cost of pumping (production), all of which would be financially unbearable for the population. What good would a DSP do in such a case?

WHAT NOW?

The UN’s declaration making water a fundamental human right has not reduced the water multinationals’ expansionism. On the contrary, they applauded, considering that this new right would open new markets for them, paid by the states, but in reality funded by the people! Even though it won’t be possible anymore to claim, as did the European Union’s spokesperson Joe Hennan, that ‘water is a good like any other’, multinational companies will aim at using water to do ‘business as usual.’ To fight this, we can use the existing notion of ‘common heritage of humankind’ which thus far has been applied to the management of seas and oceans, planets, celestial bodies, etc. It includes the following four components:

Enforcement of a principle of non-appropriation by anyone
International management by the UN
Benefit sharing by all nations
Exclusively peaceful use of natural resources.

‘The battle goes on’ and the enemy is known: The World Water Council, the private sector-led international organisation which pretends to be the leading political forum for water issues at global level, although it was created and is still managed mostly by water mutinationals.

Archbishop Sabino calls for dialogue to solve political rifts

At least a million Christians celebrated the Uganda Martyrs’ Day at Namugongo shrine yesterday with the lead celebrant calling for “serious dialogue to address political and social problems in the country”.
Clad in the ceremonial catholic robes, Archbishop Sabino Ocan Odoki of Arua Diocese, told pilgrims that this will be the only way to amicably solve the country’s problems instead of “the walk-to-work campaign and teargas”.

“Uganda is known for her beauty and hospitality but it is also known for political turbulence and tribalism. We should address this through dialogue,” he said to a crowd which included the newly-appointed Vice President Edward Kiwanuka Sekandi who represented the President, and pilgrims who had trekked from Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Sudan, DR Congo, among other countries.

Every June 3, Christian pilgrims from within and without gather at Namugongo Christian shrines to remember and celebrate the lives of the 45 Christians - both Catholics and Anglicans - who were martyred by King Mwanga between 1885 and 1887.

In yesterday’s cultural milieu the Bible was presented to the altar in a granary to symbolise that the Gospel of God is food.
There were also 24 catechists each with palm leaves, symbolising victory and also representing the martyrs. Initially remembered and commemorated only by the Catholics, the celebrations today are also embraced by the Anglicans.

But according to Bishop Odoki, also 72 Muslims were martyred together with the Christians and President Amin built the Mosque near the Anglican shrine in honour of those Muslim martyrs.

“These martyrs, although of various faiths and cultural backgrounds, were believers in God. This gift of faith is only reached in freedom as a gift of God’s love,” he said, adding that the situation in Uganda today calls for a replica of the unity that was exhibited by the martyrs whom he said sat together as royal servants of the Kabaka, irrespective of their backgrounds, and embraced faith.

In Arua District, the lead celebrant, Fr Ceasar Dralega, called on Ugandans to resist injustices of human rights abuses and in the judiciary in the country.

That although Ugandans have witnessed widespread abuses of their rights, especially the ruthlessness with which the military quashed protests against rising commodity and fuel prices, he called on Christians to emulate the martyrs who chose to suffer and die when they were persecuted and oppressed by Kabaka.

He advised that even in hard times, Christians should be joyful because the Martyrs chose to have a better life by suffering and dying for their faith and truth.

“We should have a critical mind-set to reject what is wrong in society. You should have courage to resist injustice in judicial system and violation in the systems,” he said.

G charges 100 officials over funds in Uganda

THE Inspector General of Government (IGG), Raphael Baku, has lined up over 100 public officials for prosecution over offences including abuse of office, causing financial loss and receiving bribes.

Others are illicit enrichment, false claim, forgery and uttering false documents.

Bukenya is the most prominent among those in the lineup. He is facing charges related to the expenditure of the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).

Last week the Kololo-based anti-corruption court issued him with criminal summons.

Others on the list are Onegi Obel, the former chairman Board of Directors of NSSF; Damian Akankwasa, former head of the National Forest Authority (NFA) and David Nestor Machumbi, a principal accountant in Public Service ministry.

Former health ministers Maj. Gen. Jim Muhwezi, Dr. Alex Kamugisha and Capt. Mike Mukula are still on the list. Also on the list are Godfrey Ntale, a personal assistant to the vice-chairman of the Democratic Party; Naboth Twine, former headteacher at Kitamba Primary School; John Rubabanza, deputy DISO of Mpigi and Syson Kekuruso, a city lawyer.

The IGG’s spokesperson Ali Munira said those on the list have been investigated thoroughly and their names forwarded to court. She said most of the officials on the list allegedly committed the offenses in the previous years.

According to the report issued to the Speaker of Parliament on April 13, many of the cases being prosecuted by the IGG came from the district administrations.

Between July and December, the IGG received 181 complaints from the districts, accounting for 17.4% of the total complaints which the office received.

Most of them were related to embezzlement, mishandling of tenders and misappropriation of public funds.

Complaints against individual public officials were 115 and they ranked second. Other offenses being prosecuted came from school authorities and the district service commissions.

The most common titles on the list are chief administrative officers, district financial officers, accountants, town clerks, district education officers and sub-county chiefs.

Between January and May 2011, the IGG prosecuted and concluded 12 cases. Among them was that the former Managing Director of NSSF, David Chandi Jamwa, who was convicted of causing a financial loss to NSSF funds and sentenced to 12 years in jail.

Emmanuel Matovu, a former prison’s commander in Mukono district, was also convicted of causing a financial loss and false accountability of sh2.7m in the same period and given a three-year-jail term.

The suspects who pleaded guilty to the offences before consuming court’s time and the tax payers’ money were sentenced to fines or had their cases withdrawn. Those who denied the cases and were later convicted got long jail sentences.

Despite the efforts of the IGG, corruption continues to hit Uganda’s institutions. Over the last one year, President Yoweri Museveni has repeatedly said his government would ruthlessly deal with public officials found guilty of corruption.

He has also said public officials will in future work on contract so that those with corrupt tendencies do not get their contracts renewed.

In executing his work, the IGG noted, in the report, that he faces a lot of challenges, which include understaffing, underfunding, poor record keeping in some government institutions and inadequate support and good will from other government institutions.

BUUZA OMUSAWO

Mutabani wange wa myaka 11 naye alina akawuka ka siriimu. Omwaka oguwedde yatandika okumira eddagala lya ARVs. Ndi mwetegefu okumuyamba okulaba ng’amanyiira eddagala lino asobole okuwangaala naye bikulu ki ebirala bye nnina okumanya okusobola okumuyamba? Nansikombi, Kyengera.

NANSIKOMBI weebale kufaayo kukebeza mwana wo nga bukyali n’okumujjanjaba era kino kyakuyiga eri abazadde abalala.

Mu ngeri y’emu kyakuyiga eri abazadde n’abantu ababeera n’abaana abalina akawuka nti buvunaanyizibwa bwabwe okulaba nti abaana abo bamira eddagala lyabwe mu butuufu bwalyo n’okugoberera amateeka g’abasawo ge babawa nga balibawa okulimira.

l Ky’olina okusooka okukola okuyamba mutabani wo okuwangaala kwe kussaawo enkolagana ennungi wakati wo naye kimusobozese okuba ng’asobola okukubuulira ku kizibu kyonna ky’aba afunye oba obulwadde obuba bumukutte mu ekiseera kyonna.

l Kolagana bulungi n’abasawo b’omwana ono naye okimusseemu kikwanguyize okubeebuuzaako ekiseera kyonna ate nabo abeeyabize mu buli kimu.

l Omwana yenna alina akawuka ka siriimu afuna okusoomoozebwa okutali kumu buli lw’agenda ng’akula ekitegeeza nti yeetaaga abasawo abamuli ku lusegere ng’abategeera ate nabo nga bamutegeera bulungi era weetegekere obudde buno.

l Musikirize okunyummya n’okweyabiza banne bwe bali mu mbeera emu nga bonna balina akawuka. Kino kimuyamba okuba n’ebigendererwa ebirungi n’obuteekubagiza.

Musembereze abaana abalina akawuka naye nga bali bulungi era basanyufu mu mbeera y’obulamu bwabwe.
Abaana bano baba n’ebibiina mwe beegattira naddala ku malwaliro gye bajjanjabira abalina akawuka.

l Nyikira okumutwala mu ddwaaliro buli lwe bakulagira ne bw’aba afunye obuzibu obw’engeri yonna.

l Muliise bulungi omubiri gusobole okuba omulamu n’okulwanyisa endwadde. Musuzenga bulungi era omwagale.

Abantu bazirikidde e Namugongo omu n’afiirawo

KYASUSSE e Namugongo ku kiggwa ky’Abajulizi Abakatoliki nnamungi w’abantu abaabadde mu mitwalo n’emitwalo bwe beeyiyeeyo mu kusaba olw’okujjukira abajulizi abaafiiririra eddiini yaabwe emyaka 125 egiyise.
Mu kusaba kuno okwakulembeddwa essaza lya Arua era ng’Omusumba waalyo, Sabino Ocan Odoki ye yakulembedde ekitambiro kya Missa, abantu bangi baazirise olw’omujjuzo ekyavuddeko omu eyategeerekeseeko erya Mubarak okufa kyokka ng’obwedda poliisi etwala bangi mu malwaliro nga bataawa.

Omu afudde
Mu mikolo gino mwe mwafiiridde Mubaraka Mwanje eyavudde e Iganga, abantu gwe baayogeddeko ng’eyafudde ekiziyiro, kyokka omuduumizi wa Poliisi mu Kampala n’emiriraano, Mw. Grace Tyryagumanaawe n’atangaaza nti yazze mulwadde era yafudde ku ssaawa nga 11 nga bukya.

Mu ngeri y’emu okusaba kwabadde kugenda mu maaso, ng’ababbi kye beekola nkoko baana bwe baagufudde omugano gwa kubba nsawo, obusimu n’ebirala kyokka poliisi yakutte bangi era obwedda esomba etwala ku poliisi.

Mu kusaba kuno okwamaze essaawa nga nnya, Ssabasumba w’essaza ly’e Kampala, Cyprian Kizito Lwanga yatutte omukisa n’alabula Bannayuganda bonna nga bw’atajja kukkiriza bantu bamala gakyamuukirira ne basalawo okugenda ku mmeeza entukuvu ne bafuna omubiri gwa Kulisitu so nga si Bakatoliki. Kuno yakuyise kujooga.

Gye buvuddeko, Ssabasumba yasembezza munnabyabufuzi Omukulisitaayo, Olara Otunnu Pulezidenti w’ekibiina kya UPC omubiri gwa Kulisitu mu butanwa wabula Otunnu e Namugongo yabaddeyo era bino bwe yabiwulidde n’akoteka omutwe nga n’Abakristu abamu bwe beesooza okulaga obunyiivu.

Omumyuka wa Pulezidenti omugya, Edward Kiwanuka Ssekandi yakulisiddwa okugwa mu gufo n’omukisa n’aguweebwa okukola obulungi emirimu gye. Ssekandi bwe yabadde asoma obubaka bwa pulezidenti yasabye bannayuganda bonna balabire ku bajulizi bano abaatufiirira nga baagala eggwanga lyabwe nabo bagoberere ennono eno ey’obutatabulatabula mirembe giba gituukiddwako

Ssaabasumba yasabye Baminisita n’ababaka ba Palamenti abaakalondebwa okubaga amateeka agayamba abantu n’okukola ebintu ebigenda okubagya mu bwavu ate Omusumba Sabino n’asaba abali b’enguzi b’ekube mu kifuba basaasire Bannayuganda be babba nabo basobole okukulaakulana.

Mu birabo ebyaweereddwa Mukama abategesi b’essaza lya Arua mwabaddemu n’obusaale 24 nga buno bwayogeddwako ng’akabonero k’okukuuma Eklezia n’ebyayo. Okusaba kwetabiddwako Abasumba n’abakristu okuva mu mawanga ag’enjawulo omuli Nigeria, Zambia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi, Congo n’awalala.
Akabenje

Mu kusaba kw’Ekkanisa ya Uganda e Nakiyanja okwakulembeddwa Henry Luke Orombi abalamazi baabunye emiwabo oluvannyuma lw’enkuba okutonnya n’egotaaya emikolo.

Okusaba kwetabiddwamu Ssabalamuzi Benjamin Odoki , sipiika Rebecca Kadaga , Polof. Apolo Nsibambi n’abanene abalala bangi. Omulabirizi w’e Kenya Steven Mwangi ye yabuulidde n’asaba abantu okutwala eky’okulabirako ky’abajulizi ba Uganda banyweze enzikiriza yaabwe mu mitima.

Ssabalabirizi Henry Luke Orombi yasabye mwoyo mutukuvu ajje ataase Bannayuganda ku mbeera eriwo omuli ebbeeyi y’ebintu erinnya buli kadde n’obwegugongo.

Ate abantu bana baatomeddwa mmotoka nga bagenda okulamaga e Namugongo abamu ne bamenyeka amagulu nga kati bapooceza Mulago.

Oliver Namagembe omutuuze we Luzira, yamenyese okugulu , Rebecca Nakabugo omutuuze we Mukono naye yamenyese okugulu Josephine Nakato ne Israel Saku abatuuze b’e Luzira ne bafuna ebisago nga bonna baweereddwa ebitanda.

Namagembe agamba nti yabadde ku pikipiki ya bodaboda nga bagenda e Namugongo bwe batuuse e Kyaliwajjala mmotoka ya takisi n’ebatomera ku ssaawa ssatu ez’ekiro ekyakeesezza ku Lwokutaano nga bali ne Saku

Abalala baakoneddwa nga bayimiridde ku kkubo bamaze okutuuka ku kiggwa ky’abajjulizi e Namugongo bonna ne bateekebwa mu mmotoka nga kati bapooca e Mulago mu waadi 2B.

Omubbi attiddwa
Ye Mukasa Kivumbi agamba nti ku luguudo oluva e Buikwe okugenda e Kiyindi ku mwalo, abanyazi ababadde n’emmundu nga bateeze abaabadde bagenda okulamaga e Namugongo ,abatuuze babazingizza ne battako abadde n’emmundu

Bamuzingizza mu kisaalu ekirimu omugga Mubeeya e Bulere n’abulwa gy’addukira abantu okubadde n’abo be babadde banyaguludde babataayizza era abadde n’emmundu baamutemye ejjambiya ku mutwe kumpi kugubajjula n’afa ng’ayogedde banne bwe babadde kyokka nga bo babulidde mu bikajjo bya Mehta

Basoose kukwata musajja Richard Ssebyala abadde agenda okulima ne bamutema nga bamulagira okuyingira ebikajjo kyokka n’akuba enduulu esombodde abantu okubadde n’ababadde bagenda e Namugongo nga bali mu mmotoka olugendo abamu ne balukomya wano nga basuubira nti mu maaso wandibaayo abalala

Mafabi names 9th Parliament Shadow Cabinet

The Leader of Opposition in Uganda, Mr Nandala Mafabi, yesterday unveiled a new Shadow Cabinet comprising a 25-person team that will focus on their opposite numbers in the government, develop alternative policies and hold the ruling party to account for its actions.

Announcing the Shadow Cabinet at the FDC headquarters in Najjanankumbi, Mr Mafabi said he had put forward a formidable force to counter government excess in order to improve service delivery.

“Ours is not a rubber stamp Cabinet. We are going to make sure that these people are accountable to the taxpayers. It’s a clean team with high levels of integrity and selected after a meticulous process.”
Sources at Najjanankumbi told Daily Monitor that a decision was also made to create a position of the Deputy Leader of Opposition.

However, legal minds and the former Opposition Chief Whip Kassiano Wadri warned that the move would be outside the law since the Constitution and the Administration of Parliament Act do not provide for the position.

“The Constitution doesn’t provide for the deputy Leader of Opposition, the Chief Whip is the de facto deputy of the Leader of Opposition,” Mr Wadri said. “The Deputy Chief Whip is also not in the law but there was an administrative arrangement with the Parliamentary Commission to help the Chief Whip.”

The Shadow Cabinet

Finance, Planning and Economic Development--------Hon. Ekanya Geoffrey(FDC)
Energy, Oil and Mineral Resources--------Hon. Anywar Beatrice(FDC)
Presidency and Anti Corruption--------Hon. Mathias Mpuga(SSUBI)
Information --------Hon. Wafula Oguttu(FDC)
Justice and Constitutional Affairs--------Hon. Medard Ssegona(DP)
Agriculture--------Hon. Epatait Francis(FDC)
Internal Affairs--------Hon. Hussein Kyanjo(JEEMA)
Environment--------Hon. Ken Lukyamuzi(CP)
Lands and Physical Planning--------Hon. Ibrahim Nganda( FDC)
Health--------Hon. Lulume Bayiga(DP)
Education --------Hon. Judith Akello Franca(FDC)
Gender , Labour and Social Development--------Hon. Florence Ibi(FDC)
ICT--------Hon. Benson Obua(UPC)
Defence--------Hon. Fungaro Kaps(FDC)
Works and Infrastructure Development--------Hon. Ssebuliba Mutumba( DP)
Foreign Affairs--------Hon. Wamai Wamanga(FDC)
Rehabilitation, Relief and Disaster Preparedness--------Hon. Rev. Fr Ogwal(UPC)
Public Service--------Hon. Kaginda Mugume(FDC)
Housing and Urban Development--------Hon. William Nzoghu(FDC)
Tourism , Trade and Industry--------Hon. Kevina Taaka(FDC)
Local Government--------Hon. Nambooze Betty(DP)
Special Regions--------Hon. Ochola Stephen(FDC)
Youth & Sports--------Hon. Acire Christopher(FDC)
Deputy Opposition Chief Whip--------Hon. Betty Aol(FDC)
Deputy Leader of Opposition--------To be appointed

Ahabwenki nikintwarira obwire kutwara enda?

ABAKAZI abamwe abatakazaire n’abazaire nibaaba nibenda kuzaara kwonka enda eyanga kuheza obweire batari kutwara. Nibatandika kwerariikirira barikuteekateeka ekyakubaasa kuba kibabaireho.

Omushaho Ndiwalana Billy naagira ngu obutaza munshonga buri kwezi nikyo kimwe ahabirikureeta ekizibu eki;

Ebindi ebirikureta ekizibu eki ni;



Abakazi bamwe beine asidi y’amaani omu m’amaizi g’ekihama ekirikwitiraho amaizi g’ekishaija agari kuzaara gatakahikire mahuri.


Enshekye z’omukazi kuba zaine obuzibu nari zihendekire ahabw’endwara nk’ez’obushambani nakyo nikiretera omukazi kusiibaho kutwara.


Obutafari bw’omubiri obutingana ahabw’ebintu bitari bimwe nka waaba ori ahamibazi y’endwara z’amaani nka kansa, erikuretera obutafari by’omubiri bwa burabura nari okukozesa obujuma bw’okubaririra ruzaaro.


Okuba otuubire ninga ogomokire munonga nakyo kibaasa kuretaho okasiibaho kutwara enda.


Nyin’enda okuba eine obuzibu, ekuzire hamwe n’okuhika aha myaka y’obutazara juba nka 30-35 nakyo nikireetera watwara obwire kugira enda.


Omukazi baaba bamushobiizeho akirimuto haza omunda omubukazi bakabwata nari bakakozesa amaani mingi bukagira obuzibu, kibaasa kumuretera kusiibaho kuzaara.


Okuteeba kubi. Omushaija namunonga yaaba natambura munonga atarikutuura n’omukazi we, abaasa kuremesibwa kumukwasa gye arugire omu micwe.


Omukazi kuba aihirwemu orushekye ahabw’enshonga zitari zimwe nakyo nikireetera yatuuraho kutwara enda n’ebindi.

Ebi byona nibireetera omukazi yaheza obweire buringwa arikwenda kutwara kwonka bikiremire.

Sebaggala rejected by Parliament appointment's committee

As the vetting of President Museveni’s weekend cabinet appointees enters day two, news emerging from the appointments committee indicates that MPs have rejected the appointed Minister without portfolio, Mr. Nasser Sebaggala.

Mr Museveni last Friday appointed former Kampala Mayor Al Haji Nasser Ntege Sebaggala as a full cabinet Minister without portfolio.

Mr Sebaggala appeared before the committee today (Wednesday) morning after Ministers John Nasasira (Chief Whip), Hillary Onek (Internal Affairs), and Ruhakana Rugunda (ICT) appeared and he was the last cabinet minister to appear.

His appearance took more than an hour, rather awkward as the committee has been vetting close to 5 ministers in one hour. And after he came out, the MPs took close to another hour discussing his fate with very sharp disagreements on his fate until a final decision to throw him out was arrived at.

Sources say that although Sebaggala failed to express himself before the committee, his glaring English inadequacies could have been overlooked but his suspect moral record made it all but impossible for the committee to vet him as fit for an executive position.

The committee noted that he is an ex-convict who served time in an American jail for money laundering and wire fraud, and his travel to certain countries has been restricted.

Vetting continues with state ministers and the committee has decided to push the exercise to tomorrow (Thursday) because of the numbers.

When he stepped out of the meeting room, Mr Sebaggala told journalists that he had delayed because he has the biggest ministry, “one of portfolio.”

“You know am the only full minister who has no deputy…so I have the biggest ministry and it is the most important,” he said.

MPs block Kajura’s appointment

Parliament yesterday refused to approve the appointment of 77-year-old Henry Muganwa Kajura as Minister of Public Service on account of his advanced age.

Sources inside the House Appointments Committee meeting that ended after 9pm told Daily Monitor it was unanimously resolved that Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, who chaired the committee, writes to President Museveni to appoint “a fresh and younger person”.

Leader of the Opposition Nandala Mafabi is said to have proposed the rejection of the appointment. It was, however, agreed that Mr Kajura be retained as a Second Deputy Prime Minister.
“The man sleeps a lot and forgets every time, everything,” a source said. “We debated and took this decision in the interest of the country after we realised that in most cases he doesn’t connect things in a proper manner. We also took account of his performance for the last 10 years he has been a minister for Public Service and resolved to have a new person.”

The source added: “Even when we asked him some questions during the vetting exercise, he couldn’t remember his first answers. We felt he is very tired and can’t handle the Public Service which has a lot of work and is the life-line of service delivery in the country.”

Mr Kajura has been at the helm of Public Service since 2005 and in Cabinet since 1989. He will celebrate his 77th birthday on July 7. He is the MP for Hoima Municipality. After vetting, Mr Kajura told journalists: “They raised the issue of stamina because of my age but I can assure you that I have enough stamina to serve.”

Concern about age
The MPs complained about the age of all the Deputy Prime Ministers. First Deputy Premier Eriya Kategaya told the journalists that Mr Mafabi also questioned his age. “But I told him (Mafabi) that he is enjoying the benefits of our labour,” referring to the bush war where he took part in. Mr Kategaya will turn 66 on July 4. And the story was the same for the 3rd Deputy Premier Gen. Moses Ali, 72. “They said I am old but I said I thank God for my age.”

Approved ministers
The committee vetted and approved 22 Cabinet ministers including First Lady Janet Museveni, the minister for Karamoja Affairs. Former Kampala Mayor Nasser Ntege Sebagala, who was supposed to be vetted for the position of Minister without Portfolio at 4pm was told to return today at 9:30am due to time constraint. The committee had planned to vet 35 ministers.

Before he was asked to return today morning, Mr Sebaggalatold journalists that allegations that he didn’t hand over office are baseless and a “circus.” “Those who say I don’t qualify should ask the President why he appointed me, not them,” Mr Sebaggala said. “I have been mayor twice, how many other people have a criminal record?” he said, in reference to his US arrest in 1998 while he was Kampala mayor. “The reason for going to jail is to reform.”

Ministers Kabakumba Masiko (Presidency) and Wilson Muruli Mukasa (Security) Ms Maria Kiwanuka (Finance), Amelia Kyambadde, were among the ministers approved.