Sunday, October 30, 2011

Good reasons to stay in bed

You might think it's your worst habit: groaning at the sound of your alarm clock, slamming the snooze button and sleeping in until you're running very, very late. But if you're tired enough to want to stay in bed all morning, your body might well be telling you to stay in bed – at least for a little while.

The snooze button can be an important part of healthy sleep management. Without proper sleep, you're more at risk of developing chronic health conditions like diabetes and heart disease.

Waking up tired is more likely to make you irritable, forgetful, depressed, accident-prone and, of course, sleepy. And even just one hour of sleep less than the recommended eight per night increases your chances of coming down with a cold.

So, as the clocks go back, here are three reasons to spend that extra hour in bed.
You've been missing precious sleep

When you don't get enough sleep too many nights in a row, you become increasingly tired. Don't let your sleep debt get out of hand – alleviate it in small intervals by sleeping an extra hour or less every day until you've caught up. The increments are important, as researchers have found that oversleeping by more than an hour can disrupt your body clock.
You're planning to skimp on sleep

If you know you'll be low on sleep during a busy period, pay it forward. A study has found that people who stocked up on sleep prior to a sleepless week were more alert than their more tired peers. Remember, the same rules apply here as in the post-deficit naps – don't add more than an hour of extra sleep onto your wake-up time each day.
You're sleeping less so you can exercise

Exercising in the morning is a sensible habit – as long as you don't go overboard. The days when you wake up dragging your feet and dreading the thought of going to the gym are usually days when you're tired or low on sleep, or days before you get sick, are actually the days you might want to skip your fitness routine.

Give yourself that extra hour in lieu of exercise so that you can get back on track with your rest. This will also ensure you won't have to skip more gym days later.

Finally, whatever your sleep habits or strategy, make sure that the hours you sleep are high quality.

Create a perfectly comfortable sleep environment, follow a bedtime routine and have a regular sleep schedule.

If you exercise, do so at least three hours before bedtime. Make sure to get some sunshine during the day. Avoid caffeine in the evening, and remember that a light snack late in the day can help you sleep.

Strawberries may protect stomach against alcohol

Strawberries may help protect the stomach from some of the adverse effects of alcohol, a study has found.

European scientists found that strawberries can reduce the harm that alcohol causes to the stomach mucous membrane.

Gastritis, or inflammation of the stomach mucous membrane, is linked to alcohol consumption. It can also be caused by viral infections, by nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs such as aspirin and by drugs used to treat ulcers caused by the bacterium Helicobacter pylori.

In the study, published in the journal PLoS ONE, the scientists gave strawberry extract to rats - 40 mg per day per kilo of weight - for 10 days, before giving them alcohol.

The researchers found fewer ulcerations in the stomachs of the rats given the strawberry extract.

Study co-author Sara Tulipani from the University of Barcelona said: "The positive effects of strawberries are not only linked to their antioxidant capacity and high content of phenolic compounds (anthocyans) but also to the fact that they activate the antioxidant defences and enzymes of the body."

The study findings suggest that a diet rich in strawberries can have a beneficial effect when it comes to preventing gastric illnesses, and may even help to slow down the formation of stomach ulcers in humans.

Maurizio Battino, who coordinated the research at the Marche Polytechnic University in Italy, said: "This study was not conceived as a way of mitigating the effects of getting drunk but rather as a way of discovering molecules in the stomach membrane that protect against the damaging effects of differing agents."

Warning signs of a stroke and mini-stroke

A mini-stroke is a medical emergency and needs to be dealt with immediately, yet many of us have never heard of them.

Mini-strokes, or transient ischaemic attacks (TIA), are caused by a temporary interruption of the blood flow to the brain, depriving it of oxygen. Most TIAs are usually caused by a blood clot in one of the arteries supplying blood to the brain.

Symptoms of a TIA are the same as a full blown stroke, but the big difference is that they are temporary and only last for a short time, anything from a few minutes to a day.

A TIA is the major warning sign that a full blown stroke may be on the way. Around one in five people who have a TIA go on to have a major stroke within four weeks.

Yet too many people carry on as usual without getting the treatment urgently needed to prevent a future stroke. One study by Oxford University found that TIA patients were less likely to visit a doctor if their symptoms didn't last for long or if they occurred on a Friday, during the weekend or on holiday.

Each year around 65,000 people will have a TIA, according to a recent UK stroke audit. Stroke is the third biggest cause of death in the UK, after heart disease and cancer, and the leading cause of disability. A TIA should never be ignored, no matter how quickly you may recover from one.

If you had problems breathing and/or chest pain, you wouldn't think twice about dialling 999; you should react in the same way if you experience any of the symptoms of a TIA.
Stroke and mini-stroke warning signs (FAST signs)

* Face: facial weakness - can the person smile? Has their mouth or eye drooped?
* Arm: does it show weakness? - can the person raise both arms?
* Speech: problems - can the person speak clearly and understand what you say?
* Time: time to call 999

Other symptoms of a TIA or stroke include:

* Weakness, numbness, pins and needles on one side of the body - an arm, leg or face
* Blurred or disturbed vision in one or both eyes
* Sudden memory loss or confusion
* Slurred speech, or difficulty finding words

Evangelists perish in Jinja accident

TWO American evangelists are among four people, who perished in a Thursday night accident along the Jinja-Iganga highway.

Dr. Reos Godzck, fellow citizen Leos Both and their hosts namely Bishop John Michael Mugerwa and Ronnie Ssebunya died after a trailer crashed their vehicle at Kakira at 7pm.

According to Jinja police spokesperson, Samsom Lubega, Paul, the driver of a Toyota Super Custom in which the deceased were, attempted to overtake two fuel tankers.

“As he overtook, he realized there was oncoming traffic so he decided to squeeze into a narrow gap between the two trailers,” Lubega stated.

Owing to humps on the road, the trailer in front reduced speed and Paul followed suit, Lubega said, adding that in the next few minutes, the trailer behind rammed into the Super Custom.

Godizic, Both, Mugerwa and Ssebunya died on the spot while Paul was rushed to hospital in Jinja. The police by Friday morning could not establish his state.

A fire brigade team from Jinja had to cut the wreckage to extract the bodies. The remains were taken to the city mortuary in Kampala.

From Phoenix, Arizona in US, the two Americans were here on the invitation of Mugerwa of Fast Assemblies Church located in Nkere zone, Katwe Makindye Division, Kampala.

Earlier in the day, they had attended a crusade for married couples in Namutumba district.

Saidi Nyogolo, the driver of the killer trailer disappeared but the police apprehended his colleague, Hamasi Kaizera. Kaizera disclosed that their vehicles contained jet fuel, which they were driving to Entebbe.

South Eastern traffic chief, Washington Labeja, who assessed the accident scene, attributed the crash to recklessness.

The vehicles were towed to Nalufenya police post traffic police continued investigating the tragedy continued. Accidents are among the leading causes of death in Uganda. Thousands of people perish in accidents annually.

The top 10 risk factors for stroke identified

Ten factors have been identified which account for 90 per cent of the risk of having a stroke.

The deadly 10 are:

* high blood pressure
* smoking
* waist-to-hip ratio (abdominal obesity)
* diet
* physical activity
* lipids (fats)
* diabetes mellitus
* alcohol intake
* stress and depression
* heart disorders

Of these the first 5 factors accounted for 80% of the risk. This is important because all of them can be modified by lifestyle and behaviour choices.

A stroke is caused when the blood supply to the brain is disturbed, for instance by a blocked or burst blood vessel. It is one of the leading causes of adult death in the UK and the rest of the world.

The study looked at over 6,000 people in 22 countries over a period of three years. Half of the study participants were people who had suffered a stroke for the first time, the other half were a control group with no history of stroke. The control group was chosen to match with the stroke sufferers group by age and sex.

All participants completed a detailed questionnaire and underwent a physical examination, and most provided a blood and/or urine sample.

The 10 factors identified from the study accounted for 90% of the so-called "population attributable risk" (PAR) for all types of stroke.

All of the factors were also linked to the risk of a ischaemic stroke (caused by a blood clot blocking a blood vessel in the brain), whereas high blood pressure, smoking, waist-to-hip ratio, diet, and alcohol intake were significant risk factors for intracerebral haemorrhagic stroke (bleeding into the brain tissue).

When analysed individually, high blood pressure was the most important factor for stroke, since it was associated with one-third of the risk of all stroke. Smokers were at double the risk of stroke compared with non-smokers, and smoking was associated with one in five strokes

This study, called the INTERSTROKE study, is run by scientists from McMaster University in Canada. They also run a related study, the INTERHEART study, which looks at the causes of heart attack. This has found that 9 of the 10 factors in the INTERSTROKE study are the same as in the INTERHEART study.

The results are published by the Lancet in print and online, and is presented at The World Congress of Cardiology, Beijing by Dr Martin J O’Donnell and Dr Salim Yusuf.

Mini-stroke signs

A mini-stroke is a medical emergency and needs to be dealt with immediately, yet many of us have never heard of them.

Mini-strokes, or transient ischaemic attacks (TIA), are caused by a temporary interruption of the blood flow to the brain, depriving it of oxygen. Most TIAs are usually caused by a blood clot in one of the arteries supplying blood to the brain.

Symptoms of a TIA are the same as a full blown stroke, but the big difference is that they are temporary and only last for a short time, anything from a few minutes to a day.

A TIA is the major warning sign that a full blown stroke may be on the way. Around one in five people who have a TIA go on to have a major stroke within four weeks.

Yet too many people carry on as usual without getting the treatment urgently needed to prevent a future stroke. One study by Oxford University found that TIA patients were less likely to visit a doctor if their symptoms didn't last for long or if they occurred on a Friday, during the weekend or on holiday.

Each year around 65,000 people will have a TIA, according to a recent UK stroke audit. Stroke is the third biggest cause of death in the UK, after heart disease and cancer, and the leading cause of disability. A TIA should never be ignored, no matter how quickly you may recover from one.

If you had problems breathing and/or chest pain, you wouldn't think twice about dialling 999; you should react in the same way if you experience any of the symptoms of a TIA.
Stroke and mini-stroke warning signs (FAST signs)

* Face: facial weakness - can the person smile? Has their mouth or eye drooped?
* Arm: does it show weakness? - can the person raise both arms?
* Speech: problems - can the person speak clearly and understand what you say?
* Time: time to call 999

Other symptoms of a TIA or stroke include:

* Weakness, numbness, pins and needles on one side of the body - an arm, leg or face
* Blurred or disturbed vision in one or both eyes
* Sudden memory loss or confusion
* Slurred speech, or difficulty finding words

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Muammar Gaddafi

In power since 1969, the colonel has been one of the longest-serving, most erratic, most grimly fascinating leaders.

Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has been Africa's and the Arab world's longest-ruling, most erratic, most grimly fascinating leader - presiding for 42 years over this desert republic with vast oil reserves and just 6 million people.

For years, he was an international pariah blamed for the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270 people. After years of denial, Libya acknowledged responsibility, agreed to pay up to $10 million to relatives of each victim, and Gaddafi declared he would dismantle all weapons of mass destruction.
That eased him back into the international community.

In February, one week into the uprising, Gaddafi vowed to die as a "martyr" on Libyan soil
But in February, days after the uprising against him began, Gaddafi gave a televised speech amid violent social unrest against his autocratic rule. In the speech, he vowed to hunt down protesters "inch by inch, room by room, home by home, alleyway by alleyway."
The speech caused a furor that fuelled the armed rebellion against him and it has been since mocked in songs and spoofs across the Arab world.
Gaddafi came to power in 1969 after leading a bloodless coup toppling King Idris at the age of 27. He maintained tight control of his oil-rich country for decades by clamping down on dissidents.
He was born in 1942 in the coastal area of Sirte to parents who were nomads. He went to Benghazi University to study geography but dropped out to join the army.
After seizing power, he laid out a pan-Arab, anti-imperialist philosophy, blended with aspects of Islam. While he permitted private control over small companies, the government controlled the larger ones.
He was an admirer of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Arab socialist and nationalist ideology.
He tried without success to merge Libya, Egypt and Syria into a federation. A similar attempt to join Libya and Tunisia ended in acrimony.
Crushing dissident
In 1977 he changed the country's name to the Great Socialist Popular Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah (State of the Masses) and allowed people to air their views at people's congresses.
However, critics dismissed his leadership as a military dictatorship, accusing him of repressing civil society and ruthlessly crushing dissident.
The regime has imprisoned hundreds of people for violating the law and sentenced some to death, according to Human Rights Watch.

At the UN General Assembly in 2009, Gaddafi accused the body of being a terrorism group like al-Qaeda [EPA]
"Gaddafi, gradually as he took power, he used force and he used brutality," Mohammed al-Abdalla, the deputy secretary-general of the National front for Salvation of Libya, told Al Jazeera.
"In the 1970s against students, when he publicly hung students who were marching, demonstrating, demanding rights in Benghazi and in Tripoli and many other squares, and his opposition members abroad in the 1980s, including here in London and other places in Europe and in in Arab Middle East.
"He executed, in probably the most brutal massacre that we saw, 1,200 prisoners in the Abu Salim prison who were unarmed, They were already in jail, he executed them in less than three hours."
Gaddafi played a prominent role in organising Arab opposition to the 1978 Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.
Later shunned by a number of Arab states on the basis of his extreme views on how to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among others, Gaddafi's foreign policy shifted from an Arab focus to an African focus.
His vision of a United States of Africa resulted in the foundation of the African Union.
Lockerbie bombing
Among his many eccentricities, Gaddafi is known to sleep in a Bedouin tent guarded by dozens of female bodyguards on trips abroad.
In the West, Gaddafi is strongly associated with "terrorism", accused of supporting armed groups including FARC in Colombia and the IRA in Northern Ireland.
Libya’s alleged involvement in the 1986 bombing of a Berlin nightclub in which two American soldiers were killed prompted US air attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi, killing 35 Libyans, including Gaddafi’s adopted daughter. Ronald Reagan, the then US president, called him a "mad dog".
The 1988 bombing of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie in Scotland is possibly the most well known and controversial international incident in which Gaddafi has been involved.
For many years, Gaddafi denied involvement, resulting in UN sanctions and Libya’s status as a pariah state. Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence agent, was convicted for planting the bomb. Gaddafi's regime formally accepted responsibility for the attack in 2003 and paid compensation to the families of those who died.
Also in 2003, Gaddafi broke Libya's isolation from the West by relinquishing his entire inventory of weapons of mass destruction.
In September 2004, George Bush, the US president at the time, formally ended a US trade embargo as a result of Gaddafi's scrapping of the arms programme and taking responsibility for Lockerbie.
The normalisation of relations with Western powers has allowed the Libyan economy to grow and the oil industry in particular has benefited.
However, Gaddafi and Lockerbie came back into the spotlight in 2009, when al-Megrahi was released and returned to Libya. The hero’s welcome al-Megrahi received from Gaddafi on his return was condemned by the the US and the UK, among others.
In September 2009, Gaddafi visited the US for the first time for his first appearance at the UN General Assembly.
His speech was supposed to be 15 minutes, but exceeded an hour and a half. He tore up a copy of the UN charter, accused the Security Council of being a terrorist body similar to al-Qaeda, and demanded $ 7.7 trillion in compensation to be paid to Africa by its past colonial rulers.
During a visit to Italy in August 2010, Gaddafi's invitation to hundreds of young women to convert to Islam overshadowed the two-day trip, which was intended to cement the growing ties between Tripoli and Rome.
Libyan uprising
Inspired by revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans began to hold peaceful protests against his regime in February of this year.
Demonstrations were met with military force and the uprising escalated into a civil war, with NATO-led forces later siding with the rebels.
On June 27, the brutal actions of the government were referred to the International Criminal Court and an arrest warrant for Gaddafi was issued for crimes against humanity.
Gaddafi repeatedly blamed the unrest on al-Qaeda and a "colonialist plot". He called those opposed to him "rats", and alleged that they had been influenced by "hallucinogenic drugs".
The war raged on for months, with slow gains for the opposition. Eventually, the rebels entered Tripoli on August 21.

Mammar Gaddafi died of wounds suffered on Thursday 20Th 2011 as fighters battling to complete an eight-month-old uprising against his rule overran his hometown Sirte
His killing, which came swiftly after his capture near Sirte, is the most dramatic single development in the Arab Spring revolts that have unseated rulers in Egypt and Tunisia and threatened the grip on power of the leaders of Syria and Yemen.
"He (Gaddafi) was also hit in his head," National Transitional Council official Abdel Majid Mlegta told Reuters. "There was a lot of firing against his group and he died."
Mlegta told Reuters earlier that Gaddafi, who was in his late 60s, was captured and wounded in both legs at dawn on Thursday as he tried to flee in a convoy which NATO warplanes attacked. He said he had been taken away by an ambulance.
An anti-Gaddafi fighter said Gaddafi had been found hiding in a hole in the ground and had said "Don't shoot, don't shoot" to the men who grabbed him but his pleas fell on dead ears. He was finally finished by a young fighter aged 22 years.

White-collar crimes vs Blue collar crimes

Within the field of criminology, white-collar crime has been defined by Edwin Sutherland as "a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation" (1939). Sutherland was a proponent of Symbolic Interactionism, and believed that criminal behavior was learned from interpersonal interaction with others. White-collar crime, therefore, overlaps with corporate crime because the opportunity for fraud, bribery, insider trading, embezzlement, computer crime, copyright infringement, money laundering, identity theft, and forgery are more available to white-collar employees.

Historical background
The term white-collar crime only dates back to 1939. Professor Edwin Hardin Sutherland was the first to coin the term, and hypothesize white-collar criminals attributed different characteristics and motives than typical street criminals. Mr. Sutherland originally presented his theory in an address to the American Sociological Society in attempt to study two fields, crime and high society, which had no previous empirical correlation. He defined his idea as "crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation" (Sutherland, 1949). Many denote the invention of Sutherland's idiom to the explosion of U.S business in the years following the Great Depression. Sutherland noted that in his time, "less than two percent of the persons committed to prisons in a year belong to the upper-class." His goal was to prove a relation between money, social status, and likelihood of going to jail for a white-collar crime, compared to more visible, typical crimes. Although the percentage is a bit higher today, numbers[which?] still show a large majority of those in jail are poor, "blue-collar" criminals, despite efforts to crack down on white-collar, and corporate crime. The introduction of white-collar crime was a relatively new issue to criminology at that time. He was urging other criminologists to stop focusing on the socially and economically disadvantaged. The types of individuals who committed these crimes lived successfully and were respected by society in general-also criminologists; because these criminals were held to such a high regard, these individuals were given a blind eye to the crimes they committed.
Other fiscal laws were passed in the years prior to Sutherland's studies including antitrust laws in the 1920s, and social welfare laws in the 1930s. After the Depression, people went to great lengths to rebuild their financial security, and it is theorized this led many hard workers, who felt they were underpaid, to take advantage of their positions.
Much of Sutherland's work was to separate and define the differences in blue collar street crimes, such as arson, burglary, theft, assault, rape and vandalism, which are often blamed on psychological, associational, and structural factors. Instead, white-collar criminals are opportunists, who over time learn they can take advantage of their circumstances to accumulate financial gain. They are educated, intelligent, affluent, confident individuals, who were qualified enough to get a job which allows them the unmonitored access to often large sums of money. Many also use their intelligence to con their victims into believing and trusting in their credentials. Many do not start out as criminals, and in many cases never see themselves as such.[1]
Definitional issues
Modern criminology generally rejects a limitation of the term by reference, rather classifies the type of crime and the topic:
• By the type of offense, e.g. property crime, economic crime, and other corporate crimes like environmental and health and safety law violations. Some crime is only possible because of the identity of the offender, e.g. transnational money laundering requires the participation of senior officers employed in banks. But the Federal Bureau of Investigation has adopted the narrow approach, defining white-collar crime as "those illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which are not dependent upon the application or threat of physical force or violence" (1989, 3). This approach is relatively pervasive in the United States, the record-keeping does not adequately collect data on the socioeconomic status of offenders which, in turn, makes research and policy evaluation problematic. While the true extent and cost of white-collar crime are unknown, it is estimated to cost the United States somewhere between $300–$660 billion annually, according to the FBI (Lane and Wall 2006, cited; in Friedrichs, 2007, p46).
• By the type of offender, e.g. by social class or high socioeconomic status, the occupation of positions of trust or profession, or academic qualification, researching the motivations for criminal behavior, e.g. greed or fear of loss of face if economic difficulties become obvious. Shover and Wright (2000) point to the essential neutrality of a crime as enacted in a statute. It almost inevitably describes conduct in the abstract, not by reference to the character of the persons performing it. Thus, the only way that one crime differs from another is in the backgrounds and characteristics of its perpetrators. Most if not all white-collar offenders are distinguished by lives of privilege, much of it with origins in class inequality.
• By organizational culture rather than the offender or offense which overlaps with organized crime. Appelbaum and Chambliss (1997, 117) offer a twofold definition:
o Occupational crime which occurs when crimes are committed to promote personal interests, say, by altering records and overcharging, or by the cheating of clients by professionals.
o Organizational or corporate crime which occurs when corporate executives commit criminal acts to benefit their company by overcharging or price fixing, false advertising, etc.

Relationship to other types of crime
Blue-collar crime
The types of crime committed are a function of what is available to the potential offender. Thus, those employed in relatively unskilled environments and living in inner-city areas have fewer "situations" to exploit (see Clarke: 1997) than those who work in "situations" where large financial transactions occur and live in areas where there is relative prosperity. Blue-collar crime tends to be more obvious and thus attracts more active police attention (e.g. for crimes such as vandalism or shoplifting, where physical property is involved). In contrast, white-collar employees can incorporate legitimate and criminal behavior, thus making themselves less obvious when committing the crime. Therefore, blue-collar crime will more often use physical force, whereas in the corporate world, the identification of a victim is less obvious and the issue of reporting is complicated by a culture of commercial confidentiality to protect shareholder value. It is estimated that a great deal of white-collar crime is undetected or, if detected, it is not reported.
Corporate crime
Corporate crime deals with the corporation or the company as a whole. The crime benefitting the investors or the individuals who are in high positions in the company or corporation. The relationship white-collar crime has with corporate crime is that they are similar because they both are involved within the business world. Their difference is that white-collar crime benefits the individual involved, and corporate crime benefits the company or the corporation.
State-corporate crime
The negotiation of agreements between a state and a corporation will be at a relatively senior level on both sides, this is almost exclusively a white-collar "situation" which offers the opportunity for crime. White-collar crime has become a priority of law enforcement, however evidence shows that it continues to be a low priority.
When senior levels of a corporation engage in criminal activity using the company this is sometimes called control fraud

Monday, October 24, 2011

HERE I REPRODUCE THE DOSSIER THAT KIZZA BESIGYE AUTHORED IN 1999, A DOCUMENT THAT CHANGED NRM FACE FOR GOOD

BY KIZZA BESIGYE

I have taken keen interest and participated in the political activities on the Ugandan scene since the late 1970s. This was during a period of intense jostling to topple and later succeed the Idi Amin regime. I am, therefore, fully aware of the euphoria, excitement and hope with which Ugandans received the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A). Ugandans supported the UNLF’s stated approach of "politics of consensus" through the common front. It was hoped that the new approach to politics would be maintained and Uganda rebuilt from the ruins left by the Amin regime. Unfortunately, instead of nurturing the structures, and regulations which bound the front together, we witnessed a primitive power struggle that resulted in ripping the front apart to the chagrin of the population.

Some of us young people were immediately thrown into serious confusion. We had not belonged to any political party before, and we did not approve of the record and character of the existing parties – UPC and DP. Spontaneously, many people started talking of belonging to a Third Force. This force represented those persons who wished to make a fresh start at political organization, with unity and consensus politics as the centre pin. With a few months left to the 1980 elections, the Third Force crystallized into a new political organization– the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). The population, to a large extent, expressed their appreciation of the ideas and opportunity presented by the young organization, but was pessimistic regarding its electoral success.

Pessimism was justified, because the new organisation simply had no time and resources to organize effectively nationally; and UPC was already positioning itself very loudly and arrogantly to rig the elections and seemed to have what was essential for them to do so successfully. After the sham 1980 elections, when Paulo Muwanga, a leader of UPC (and chairman of the Military Commission) took over all powers of the Electoral Commission and declared his own election results, there was widespread despondency and tension. While the "minority" DP Members of Parliament took up the opposition benches in Parliament, the rank and file of the party rapidly united behind the new forces of resistance to struggle against the dictatorial rule. The Popular Resistance Army (PRA and later, NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni which started with about 30 fighters, was overwhelmed by people seeking to join its ranks. The NRM was born as a political organization in June 1981.

It was created by a protocol that effected the merger of Uganda Freedom Fighters UFF (led by the late Prof Y.K. Lule and Museveni’s PRA). The armed wing of the organization became the National Resistance Army (NRA). The NRM political programme was initially based on seven points which were later increased to become the well-known Ten-Point Programme. The basic consideration in drawing up the programme was that it should form the basis of a broad national political and social force. A national coalition was considered to be of critical importance in establishing peace, security, and optimally moving the country forward. The political programme was, therefore, referred to as a minimum programme around which different political forces in Uganda could unite for rehabilitation and recovery of the country.

To achieve unity, it was envisaged that the minimum programme would be implemented by a broad-based government. After the bush war, discussions were undertaken with the various political forces to establish a broad-based government that would reflect a national consensus. The NRM set up a committee led by Eriya Kategeya (then chairman of the NRM Political and Diplomatic committee) for the purpose of engaging the various groups in these discussions. This exercise was, however, never taken to its logical conclusion. It would appear that once the leaders of the political parties were given "good" posts in the NRM government, their enthusiasm for the discussions waned, and the process eventually fizzled out. In spite of the lack of a proper modus operandi, the initial NRM government (executive branch) was impressively broad-based. Consensus politics conducted through elections based on individual merit and formation of broad-based government became the hallmark of the NRM.

Broad base undermined

However, the popular concept of the broad-based government, which had also received support of most political groups, was progressively undermined. It ought to be remembered that due to the support and cooperation of other political groups, no legal restrictions were imposed –on political parties until August 11, 1992 when the NRC made a resolution on political party activities in the interim period. In my opinion, there were three factors responsible for undermining and later destroying the NRM cardinal principle of broad-basedness, especially in appointment to the Executive: The NRM had set itself to serve for a period of four years as an interim government, then return power to the people. However, it was not very clear how this would happen at the end of the four years.

Some politicians in NRM government who came from other political parties set out to use their advantaged positions to, on the one hand, undermine the NRM and on the other, strengthen themselves in preparation for the post-NRM political period. Consequently, they fell out with the NRM leadership, and a number of them were arrested and charged with treason. Historical NRM politicians who thought that they were not "appropriately" placed in government, blamed this on the large number of the "non-NRM" people in high up places, and set out to campaign against the situation. They created a distinction between government leaders as "NRM", and "broad-based". If you were referred to as "broad-based", it was another way of saying that you were undeserving of your post, or that you were possibly an enemy agent ("5th Columnist").

After some years of NRM rule, some in the leadership began to feel that there was sufficient grassroots support for the NRM, such that one could "off-load" the "broad–based" elements in government at no political cost. These factors were at the centre of an unprincipled power-struggle which was mostly covert and hence could not be resolved democratically. It continued to play itself out outside the formal Movement organs, with the results of weakening and eventually losing the concept of consensus politics and broad-basedness. By the time of the Constituent Assembly elections were held in 1994, the NRM’s all encompassing, and broad-based concept remained only in name. For instance, while the CA electoral law clearly stated that candidates would stand on "individual merit", the NRM Secretariat set up special commercial committees at districts whose task was to recommend "NRM candidates" for support. Not only did the logistical and administrative machinery of NRM move against the candidates supporting or suspected to be favouring early return to multi-party politics, it even moved against liberal candidates advocating for the initial NRM broad–based concept.

That is why many people were surprised and confused when some senior NRM leaders declared that "we have won!" after the CA results were announced. Who had won? It was clear that there were two systems; one described in the law, and another being practised. Moreover, the conduct of the CA, again exhibited the contradictions between the principles of NRM (and the law), and the practice. I was quite alarmed when I read a document titled ‘Minutes Of A Meeting Between H.E The President with CA Group Held On 25.8.94 At Kisozi.’ The copy had been availed to me by my colleague Lt Col Serwanga Lwanga (RIP) who attended the meeting. Present at the meeting were recorded as: H.E. the President (Chair), Eriya Kategaya, Bidandi Ssali, Steven Chebrot, Agard Didi, George Kanyeihamba. Miria Matembe, Mathias Ngobi, Mr Sebalu, Lt Noble Mayombo, Jotham Tumwesigye, Aziz Kasujja, Beatrice Lagada, Faith Mwonda and Margaret Zziwa. The introduction of the meeting reads in part as follows: The National Political Commissar introduced this committee as a Constituent Assembly Movement Group which wants to agree on a common position.

 

The arbitrary hand-picked group went ahead to take positions on major areas of the draft constitution, which we members of CA, (considered as "NRM supporters"), were supposed to support in the CA. It is interesting to note that among the 16 hand-picked members of the group, only six were directly elected to represent constituencies in the CA. The others were presidential nominees and representatives of special interest groups. One member was not even a CA delegate. We strongly resisted this approach, and after intense pushing and shoving, this group was replaced by the "Movement caucus" under the chairmanship of the National Political Commissar, Kategaya.

Changing movement

The Movement caucus acted very much like an organ of a ruling party. All ministers (except Paul Ssemogerere who later resigned from government) were members. The hand-picked group, and the Movement caucus after it, both undermined the principles of the Movement and the law. The Constituent Assembly was negatively influenced by executive appointments. In the middle of the CA proceedings, a cabinet reshuffle saw Speciosa Kazibwe elevated to the vice presidency, Kintu Musoke to premier and several other delegates appointed to ministerial posts. Many others were appointed to be directors of parastatal companies. It is my opinion that after these actions, some CA delegates took positions believed to attract the favourable attention of the executive. Most CA delegates also intended to participate in the elections that would immediately follow the CA.

This had two negative effects:

Being aware of the previous role of the NRM Secretariat in elections, some CA delegates would be compromised to act in such a way as to win the support of the secretariat in the forthcoming elections. Some CA delegates saw themselves as the first beneficiaries of the government structure and arrangements that were being constitutionalised. So, they took positions which would favour them, and not the common good. As a result, the CA progressively became polarized, and its objectivity was diminished, especially when dealing with political systems. For example, at the commencement of the CA, every delegate made an opening statement highlighting major views on the draft constitution. Analysis of these statements shows that few delegates supported the immediate introduction of multiparty system while the majority supported the continuation of the "Movement system" for a transitional period of varying length.

The positions expressed were very much in line with the views gathered by the Constitutional Commission. The commission noted in its report (paragraph 0.46) that a consensus on the issue could not be attained. This was demonstrated by the statistical analysis of views gathered from RC 1 to RC V, plus individual and group memoranda. It will be seen that nationally, at RC 1, "Movement" supporters were 63.2% and this percentage decreased progressively as they went to higher RCs until RCV (District Councils) where Movement supporters were only 38.9% and multiparty supporters were 52.8%. Among the individual memoranda, 43.9% supported a multiparty system, while 42.1% supported Movement. Among the group memoranda, 45.1% supported multiparty, while 41.4% supported Movement. It is important to note that these views were gathered at a time when there was no impending election, and therefore, no campaigning.

Accordingly, the Constitutional Commission proposed the following, as the only limitation on political party activities (in Article 98 of Draft Constitution): "For the period when the Movement is in existence, political parties shall not endorse, sponsor, offer platform to or in anyway campaign for or against any candidate for public office." The CA under the influences outlined earlier ended up with restrictions contained in the highly contentious article 269 of the Constitution. The character of the Movement gradually changed, and the process of change was not determined democratically. Instead, it was continuously manipulated. Established Movement organs were continuously undetermined, and others completely ignored. For example, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of NRM was the organ supposed to be coordinating change in the NRM, yet NEC had not met for more than three years prior to the promulgation of the 1995 constitution – in spite of a requirement for it to meet at last once every three months. Instead, covert and arbitrarily constituted groups came in, like district election committees, special CA groups, Movement political High Command, Movement caucus, Maj Kakooza Mutale’s group, etc. The Movement created by the CA and completed by Parliament (through the Movement Act 1997) was different from the one of 1986-1995.

The Movement Act 1997 created a political organization with structures outside the governmental structure. For the first time, the Movement was a political organization distinct from government, the only remaining link being that it was funded by the government. Unfortunately, instead of describing the Movement as a political organization, the CA chose to call it a political system – distinct from "Multiparty Political System", and other systems that may be thought of later. This was, in my opinion, a grave error. We even ignored advice given to us through a letter by President Yoweri Museveni (chairman NRM and Commander in Chief NRA) to the CA-NRM caucus delegates, dated June 21, 1995. In the letter, the chairman says, "the NRM is not a state but a political organization that tries to welcome all Ugandans. It therefore cannot coerce all Ugandans to be loyal to it. Loyalty to NRM is voluntary."

 

The reality of the Movement today is that it is a political organization in much the same way as any political party is. Having no membership cards does not make it less so. In fact, in the letter referred to above, President Museveni further explains: "then some people may ask the question. If NRM could be already to compete for political office with opposing political forces in future, why not do it now? Do not support doing it now because it is not in the best [interest] of governance and fortunately now the people still agree with us. It is only when the majority of the people change that we have to adjust our position. It would be something imposed on us by circumstances." So the NRM/Movement system is a convenient and, for the time, popular means to political power.

Manipulation

The characteristics which made the NRM government popular, such as the broad- based strategy, principle of individual merit, and the 10-Point Programme have been seriously eroded. This is evidenced by the bitter antagonism and animosity which exists between Movement supporters in many parts of the country, e.g. Kabale, Ntungamo, Kasese and Iganga. After more than 13 years of NRM rule, armed rebellion rages on in northern Uganda, and has also become entrenched in the western part of the country. All in all, when I reflect on the Movement philosophy and governance, I can conclude that the Movement has been manipulated by those seeking to gain or retain political power, in the same way that political parties in Uganda were manipulated. Evidently, the results of this manipulation are also the same, to wit: Factionalism, loss of faith in the system, corruption, insecurity and abuse of human rights, economic distortions and eventually decline. So, whether it’s political parties or Movement, the real problem is dishonest, opportunistic and undemocratic leadership operating in a weak institutional framework and a weak civil society which cannot control them.

I have shown that over the years the "Movement System" has been defined in the law in a certain way, but the leaders have chosen to act in a difficult way. This is dishonest and opportunistic leadership. I have also shown how changes have been made to the Movement agenda, and other important decisions have been made outside the Movement structures. This too is undemocratic leadership. In my opinion, the way forward in developing a stable political situation is to do the following: Urgently revisit the legal framework with a view to making an equitable law and regulation for all political organizations. The Movement should be treated as a political organization. Implementing this would need amendments to the Constitution, including amendment of articles 69 and 74. This requires the approval of the people through a referendum and the forthcoming referendum could be used for this purpose. In any case, laws are a reflection of the political will, so if there is political will to correct a situation, finding a way is easy.

The primary guarantor of democracy, human rights and the rule of law must be the civil society. Its capacity should, therefore, be quickly developed. Focus on a programme that could quickly raise the standards of living of our people to a decent level. This is an essential antecedent for our society to build a viable democracy. Of course, the approach to raising the standards of living is highly debatable. I have personal views that I hope to share with the public at another time. I pray to the almighty God to guide us so that we do not tumble again.

 

KIZZA BESIGYE

 

Saturday, October 22, 2011

IS THIS LIBERATION OR SAVAGENESS??

Gaddafi and sons are gone, Saddam and sons went, Mobuttu and sons, faced the same situation, to mention but a few. Other leaders should be preparing themselves for the same wrath. But who is fooling who in all these incidents??? Do leaders deserve such kind of death?? Are the killers/hangmen so holy that they they mill not face a similar death? Who incites these young men to behave the way they do like killing people as if they are killing flies? Please assist and give me answers to these questions which are puzzling me. Thank you

Thursday, October 20, 2011

Organizational justice and behavioural ethics: New perspectives on workplace fairness

Guest Editors:
Jonathan Crawshaw (Aston Business School, Aston University, UK)
Russell Cropanzano (Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, US)
Chris Bell (Schulich School of Business, York University, Canada)
Thierry Nadisic (EMLYON Business School, France)

The deadline for submission is 31 January 2012 and submissions should not be submitted before Tuesday 03 January 2012.

Over the past half century or so, scholars of both organizational justice and behavioural ethics have provided essential insights into issues of workplace (un)fairness. At the heart of this research are concerns of employee wellbeing and happiness, and the continuing improvement of working lives, as well as the integrity and cohesiveness of the organization as a social entity. All of which, of course, eventually affects individual and organizational performance. To date, however, the justice and ethics literatures have largely run parallel to one another, very often responding to similar ethical, justice or moral concerns/dilemmas but from different perspectives and paradigms. Organizational justice has tended to study how managers and their organizations are judged as (un)fair by employees (e.g. through voice provision) and how this impacts the level of performance and wellbeing at work. On the other hand, behavioural ethics has been concerned with explaining individual behaviour that occurs in the context of larger social norms, such as lying, stealing, charitable giving, and whistle-blowing. The aim of this special issue is to begin to bridge the divide between the organizational justice and behavioural ethics literatures, encouraging future research that integrates the field and extends our theoretical understanding of these issues.

Examples of recent high profile cases of business corruption – including bribery, exploitation and the role of financial traders in the banking crisis; the controversies surrounding senior management pay and bonuses; and the continuing felt discrimination of minority employee groups (e.g. on grounds of race, gender, disability, sexuality) regardless of nearly a half century of legislation – have all made salient concerns of ethics, justice and morality to consumers, employees, employers and politicians across the globe. Given this context, we feel that the time is ripe for a special issue that aims to bring together research from these parallel disciplines so that new insights into workplace (un)fairness and (un)ethicality may be generated.

By recognising the shared concerns of, and concepts within, organizational justice and behavioural ethics research, scholars are challenged to explore, and borrow from, each other's field to more effectively respond to individual and societal concerns regarding workplace (un)fairness. Indeed, recent organizational justice research has taken tentative, yet encouraging, steps in this direction. For example, studies of fairness motivations and deontic justice have begun to explore the importance of morality (e.g. moral motivations, moral convictions, moral identity, ethical orientation) in the driving of individual justice behaviours and judgements. By opening up the organizational justice research agenda to these wider ethical models and concepts we begin to better understand how and why various actors within the employment relationship behave (un)fairly, justify their decisions and actions as fair, and react to the perceived (un)fairness of others.

This special issue invites papers that are at the forefront of contemporary research into organizational justice and/or behavioural ethics. Our hope is to develop new insights into the moral, ethical and justice challenges facing organizations. In particular, we encourage submissions that address the following research questions, although this is not meant to be an exhaustive list:

* What are the contextual antecedents of (un)just (e.g. discrimination, denial of voice) and (un)ethical (bribery, corruption, theft, whistleblowing) behaviour? For example, what is the role of HRM/people management policies and practices?
* How can collective justice concepts, such as systemic justice, entity justice or justice climate, help us to understand (un)ethical phenomena at work (e.g. multilevel research on ethical climates or culture of justice)?
* What is fair, just or ethical leadership? How can organizations promote, support and develop ethical/just leaders?
* What are the individual differences that may explain (un)just and (un)ethical behaviour – including themes of justice sensitivity, moral identity, ethical orientation, moral maturity and empathy? Work on individual differences should not simply be a search for moderators but should provide substantial insight and contribution through clearly articulated conceptual models. Individual differences could also consider the role of context and circumstances.
* How can theories of justice and behavioural ethics inform policies of environmental sustainability, corporate social responsibility and business ethics?
* What are the challenges of managing fairness cross-culturally – including questions of societal/cultural values and differences in what is perceived as (un)fair and peoples reactions to (un)fairness? What are the implications for multinationals and FDIs?
* When might morality and justice be incongruent – can moral decisions be unfair, or fair decisions be immoral?

We are particularly seeking submissions based on well designed empirical investigations of these issues, although strong conceptual work will also be considered. Empirical studies that utilise qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods are all welcomed, however, a clear emphasis on both theoretical and practical/policy implications must be evident. All submissions will be reviewed in light of their potential to stimulate future debate and discussion around the integration of organizational justice and behavioural ethics research.

Contributors should note:

* This call is open and competitive, and the submitted papers will be blind reviewed in the normal way.
* Submitted papers must be based on original material not under consideration by any other journal or outlet.
* For empirical papers based on data sets from which multiple papers have been generated, authors must provide the Guest Editors with copies of all other papers based on the same data.
* The editors will select a limited number of papers to be included in the special issue, but other papers submitted in this process may be considered for publication in regular issues of the journal.

The deadline for submission is 31 January 2012 and submissions should not be submitted before Tuesday 03 January 2012.

The special issue is intended for publication in the second half of 2013 or early 2014.

To be considered for this Special Issue, submissions must fit with the Aim and Scope of Human Relations as well as the call for papers.

Papers should be submitted online in accordance with our submission guidelines. Please indicate in your covering letter that the paper is intended for this special issue. Please direct any questions about the submission process, or any administrative matter, to Claire Castle, Managing Editor.

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Thursday, October 13, 2011

Ecomog, the monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been hailed. Discuss the constraints and achievements of Ec

INTRODUCTION
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea and air components, that was set up by member states of the ECOWAS to deal with the security problem that followed the collapse of the formal state structure in the Republic of Liberia in 1990. The force successfully restored an atmosphere that permitted the reinstatement of a functional state structure in Liberia.
The success of the force despite numerous shortcomings and some failures has attracted international attention. But in order to understand the operations of ECOMOG, it is necessary to provide a bird’s eye view of the nature of the political states that created the force, the type of security threat that faces them collectively and individually, and the external interests at play in the West African subregion.
There have been various constraints facing Ecomog in its operations to bring peace in West Africa as presented here below,
Firstly, the members of the regional organization were themselves involved in complex political transitions, with most of their regimes under considerable challenge from their own civil societies.
Secondly, the war generated huge resource demands economic, military, political and diplomatic that these states were ill-equipped to fulfill, and which the international community was disinclined to deliver.
Thirdly, the structural and political crises that sustained these rebellions economic stress, state decay and delegitimisation, the dislocation of youth were present among other states in the region. There was thus a real danger that the conflict would spread beyond the borders of Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Further more, in the course of their operations, ECOMOG troops have repeatedly encountered the constraint of civilian refugees fleeing towards their positions. In most cases, the forward units with whom they come in contact do not have the necessary food and medicine to take care of the large number of refugees. They are consequently forced to share their operational rations and medicines with civilians. Efforts to get relief agencies to take over the management of these refugees have always proven difficult. Relief agencies do not want to go to the frontline and ECOMOG usually lacks the transport facilities to move such large numbers of civilians to sites that are acceptable to relief agencies. In addition, relief agencies are reluctant to hand over their food and medicines to ECOMOG to administer to the refugees. This problem has been persistent and a solution has not yet been found by ECOMOG high command.
More still the geographic terrain of most parts of West Africa favours insurgency warfare and guerrilla operations. Experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone has proved that helicopters are crucial to operations in these areas. Unfortunately, West African armed forces have very few helicopters for combat and support operations. Hence this constraint hampered Ecomog operations.
Since member states of ECOWAS have limited capacity to manufacture military ordinance and equipment, it will remain difficult to standardise equipment, arms and ammunition. A possible solution is for member states to earmark specific units of their armed forces for ECOMOG service. Such units could be equipped with similar equipment, arms and ammunition. The training standards, doctrine and staff procedure of these ECOMOG earmarked units could be harmonised by an ECOMOG standing command staff whose headquarters would have to be designated and manned permanently.
However, these innovations would require more political will than what is currently in existence among member states.
The economy of most member states is poor, hence they rely on non-regional states to sponsor their contingents for ECOMOG operations. The level of political will in such sponsor states determines the extent of logistic support that will be provided to the units they are sponsoring. Sometimes, these sponsor states change their policy or experience budget problems which have a direct impact on the continued stay of contingents they are sponsoring in the mission area and/or their operational effectiveness thus posing a constraint to ECOMOG operations.
Nigeria remains the only member state of ECOWAS that has the capacity for heavy military air and sea lift. The country is thus in a position to support its troops effectively, but other member states often lack such capability. This is sometimes responsible for their reluctance to contribute troops for ECOMOG operations.

Finally there was a constraint of cynical disregard which was apparent among the states involved, on the one side, in the way in which certain Francophone states connived in the attack on Liberia and deliberately frustrated peace initiatives and, on the other side, in the way in which the intervening states (Nigeria in particular) acted unilaterally and resisted control by the regional political directorate. And as has been shown, the operation was bedeviled by linguistic and geopolitical rivalries, and undermined by questions about its legitimacy and format.

Despite the above constraints, ECOMOG operation was ultimately successful for several reasons as here below presented;
The first was the sheer political will and tenacity of ECOWAS. The organisation did not have the option of cutting and running, for reasons that were as much self-interested as humanitarian.
The second was the ability to combine three phases of conflict resolution: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement, thereby changing mandates of forces in the field as developments on the ground required (a flexibility due, ironically, to the autonomy enjoyed by the military command and as a result of the weak control exercised by the ECOWAS directorate). In addition, the subregional, regional, and international initiatives each brought different strengths and weaknesses to the peace process.
One of the more notable achievements of ECOMOG, in the long term, is its success in pushing the region from argument to consensus and from division to unity on matters of regional security. Prior to the Liberian crisis, as well as throughout the early stages of the intervention, ECOWAS members displayed little commitment to the ideals of regional security embodied in the 1981 treaty.
In December 1997, the Fourth Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Lomé directly confronted these issues, approving the establishment of a regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and regional security. Following this, a meeting of experts in Banjul in July 1998 drafted a set of proposals for such a Mechanism for the approval of the ECOWAS Heads of State meeting in Ouagadougou in October. These proposals recognised that "... though the organization [ECOWAS] was established for the primary purpose of economic integration of the region, economic development can only be effectively pursued in a secure and stable environment", thus getting around the ‘constitutional’ issue that had earlier generated such heat.
These prescriptions are the result of a growing consensus within the region and between the various factions in ECOWAS that conflict is self-defeating. As a result, states in the region were able to demonstrate considerable flexibility, redefining their positions in order to promote consensus regarding the nature of regional security mechanisms. For the region, the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have been a traumatic experience, conferring both a sense of its vulnerability as well as its ‘regionness’. After years of myopic focus on national sovereignty and security, West African states now see the connection between domestic anarchy and regional political instability much more clearly. States are ready to concede that ‘my neighbour’s business is my business’ and, correspondingly, accepting the necessity of acting collaboratively within a regional framework to tackle these problems rather than attempting to seek favoured status and arrangements with external powers.
Notwithstanding this consensus, which helped to facilitate an end to the Liberian crisis, the ECOMOG experience teaches the important lesson that one should not conflate regional security and human security.
CONCLUSION
ECOMOG has created awareness among West African leaders, intellectuals and military experts that the force is a positive security development that requires some fine-tuning. Given the growing number of conflicts on the African continent, ECOMOG is a reminder of the fact that the right tool for conflict resolution can be found from within the continent, if African countries are prepared to pool their resources. ECOMOG is therefore a lesson which should not be forgotten, because it also points to the fact that there is no need to wait for outsiders to help if Africa itself can address its problems effectively.















References
1. Comfort Ero, ‘ECOWAS and the Sub-regional Peacekeeping in Liberia’, in The
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, first posted on the web on 25 September 1995.
2. MA Vogt, ‘The OAU and Conflict Management in Africa, paper presented at the
International Resource Group Conference, Mombasa, Kenya, November 1996.
3. ibid
4. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, ‘ECOWAS Evolving Conflict Management System’
5. ET Dowyaro, ‘ECOMOG Operations in West Africa: Principles and Praxis’,
published in Monograph No.44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.
6. ECOWAS Peace Operations from 1990 to 2004: Synopsis of Lessons Noted and
Key Recommendations, A background paper for the ECOWAS ‘Lessons Learned’’
Workshop, held at Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, from
10-11 February 2005.
7. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, op cit.

The just war theory has both Religious and Secular proponents. Discuss the background and main sources of just war theory.

INTRODUCTION
War is an armed conflict between belligerent states, nations, or other parties whose aim is to enforce the political will of the victor upon the defeated belligerent.
A war usually is an attempt to alter the political balance of power of either the psychological or the material hierarchy of domination against equality, between and among the belligerents. Ideologically, one of the belligerents usually perceives an imperative political requirement to strategically dominate the other belligerent state, nation, or party
One of the perennial realities of human existence is war. From the earliest recorded events of human history all the way through to modern times, human communities have engaged in armed conflict as a method of dispute resolution. While war has been a constant part of the human experience, there has also been a tendency within virtually all human civilizations to limit the extent of war and the methods by which warfare may be conducted. In Western civilization, this limitation on warfare has taken shape as an effort to limit both the determination of when war is appropriate and the means used in battle.
Within the Western moral, legal, and political arena, the connected questions of when war is appropriate and what means are acceptable in warfare has been the subject of a great deal of examination. The basic theory which has arisen within Western culture to evaluate the legitimacy of military action is called just war theory.(4) The just war theory has received widespread acceptance both within Western culture and in the international community as a means by which a war may be determined to be justified or not.(5) Just war theory, which has both religious and secular proponents, is perhaps the most universally recognized moral theory by which the use of force may be evaluated.
The concept of justification for war under certain conditions goes back at least to Cicero. However its importance is connected to Christian medieval theory beginning from Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. The first work dedicated specifically to it was De bellis justis of Stanisław of Skarbimierz, who justified war of the Kingdom of Poland with Teutonic Knights. Francisco de Vitoria criticized the conquest of America by the Kingdom of Spain. With Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius just war theory was replaced by international law theory, codified as a set of rules, which today still encompass the points commonly debated, with some modifications. The importance of the theory of just war faded with revival of classical republicanism beginning with works of Thomas Hobbes.
The Just War theory is an authoritative Catholic Church teaching confirmed by the United States Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, issued in 1983. More recently, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, in paragraph 2309, lists four strict conditions for "legitimate defense by military force":
• The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
• All other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
• There must be serious prospects of success;
• The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power as well as the precision of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.
While Nicholas Adams claims such views have a long tradition, critics claim the application of Just War is only relativistic, and directly contradicts more universal philosophical traditions such as the Ethic of reciprocity.[citation needed]
Just War theorists combine both a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just war tradition act as an aid to determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just War theories are attempts "to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice.
The Just War tradition addresses the morality of the use of force in two parts: when it is right to resort to armed force (the concern of jus ad bellum) and what is acceptable in using such force (the concern of jus in bello). In more recent years, a third category — jus post bellum — has been added, which governs the justice of war termination and peace agreements, as well as the prosecution of war criminals.
Anarcho-capitalist scholar Murray Rothbard stated, "a just war exists when a people tries to ward off the threat of coercive domination by another people, or to overthrow an already-existing domination. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to retain an already existing coercive rule over them.
BACKGROUND ON JUST WAR THEORY
Just war theory has a varied and diverse background. The just war tradition includes the contributions of philosophers and theologians dating back to Roman times. As James Tuner Johnson has pointed out,
Just war is an historical tradition formed by experience and reflection, including much that is neither specifically theological (or even religious), nor philosophical. It has been strongly influenced by international law, the traditions of chivalry, and soldierly practices derived from the experience of many battles.
Just war theory as a method of evaluating military actions has been recognized historically by thinkers as varied as Cicero, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, and Daniel Webster. It is a theory which has been used by Christians and non-Christians alike to determine whether or not the decision to go to war and the means used to prosecute that war are just. It is crucial to keep this varied and complex pedigree of the just war tradition in mind when dealing with just war theory, otherwise it becomes possible to restrict the "breadth and diversity of the tradition," which could in turn lead to a serious misapplication of the theory in a particular circumstance. Understanding, then, that the theory of just war is one in which many sources mingle over the course of centuries, it is helpful to make a brief overview of those sources before delving into the main task of explaining and applying just war theory to the particular problem raised in this article, namely, whether the recent use of force by the United States against Iraq is justified under the theory.

MAIN SOURCES OF JUST WAR THEORY
The Religious Sources of Just War Theory
Many of the key thinkers who have expounded on just war theory through the centuries have identified themselves with the Christian faith, both in its Catholic and Protestant varieties. Just war theory has also gained a general acceptance among Christian theologians, philosophers, and jurists as a method of passing judgment on the morality or immorality of a particular conflict. The general Christian conception of just war theory forms the core of secular just war theory and as such has had a tremendous influence on the secular conception of the just war.
Early Christian approaches to war were largely pacifistic in nature, due to a focus in the early Church to the notion that Christians were distinct from the rest of society. However, with the growing Christianization of the Roman Empire, and the increasing political and social influence of the Christian Church, Christian theologians during the fourth and fifth centuries began to develop justifications for the use of force which would eventually take shape over time as just war theory.
The first major Christian theologian to address himself to the task of determining the circumstances under which war is legitimate was St. Augustine of Hippo. Augustine held that "[t]he natural order, which is suited to the peace of moral things, requires that the authority and deliberation for undertaking war be under the control of a leader." For Augustine, war is a permissible part of the life of a nation, and the power of prosecuting a war was part of the natural powers of a monarch, ordained to uphold peace.(15) War, far from being something which Christians should shun, is part of the life of a nation, ordained by natural law, a law which according to the New Testament is ordained by God.
Augustine's conception of the just war did not create a carte blanche for bloodshed.(17) In formulating his ideas on war, St. Augustine was careful to state the purposes for which war may be fought, and the procedural means which must be satisfied in order for a war to be just. "For it makes a great difference," he wrote, "by which causes and under which authorities men undertake the wars that must be waged." For Augustine, for a war to be just, it must be fought for the right reasons, and it must be waged under rightful authority.
Augustine held that the only reason which justified war was the desire for peace. "Peace is not sought in order to provide war, but war is waged in order to attain peace. Augustine criticizes other motives for war, such as "the desire for harming, the cruelty of revenge, the restless and implacable mind, the savageness of revolting, the lust for dominating, and similar things,"(21) and refers to them as things which are "justly blamed in wars."(22) In fighting a war, the goal must be to do that which is necessary to obtain peace; let necessity slay the warring foe, not your will. Augustine also includes under the subject of necessity the just treatment of prisoners and conquered peoples, making it clear that mercy should be shown to the vanquished, particularly if they are no longer a threat to peace.
Besides right intention, St. Augustine also held that it was necessary for a war to be waged under lawful authority. The purpose of the war-making powers of the state is to ensure peace, which in turn helps to foster the common-good of those in society. Augustine recognized that it was necessary for the authority and decision to undertake war to be made by a recognized leader. In addition, the soldiers who serve under the leader must serve the peace and common-good of society. Warfare which is declared by unlawful authority therefore fails to meet this criteria, as does warfare which is not directed toward peace and the common good.
The second major Christian thinker to deal with the issue of war is St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Aquinas based himself upon St. Augustine's view of war, elaborating on the teachings of the bishop of Hippo. In explicating his theory regarding the justness of a war, Aquinas focused on defining the right to make war and the importance of the intent which stands behind the decision to go to war In his attempt to formulate a simple rule which would give guidance on these issues, Aquinas argued that a war is justified when three basic, necessary conditions were met:
1. The war was prosecuted by a lawful authority with the power to wage war;
2. The war was undertaken with just cause;
3. The war was undertaken with the right intention, that is, to achieve some good or to avoid some evil. Together with St. Augustine, Aquinas' views on the justification of war form the basic core of just war theory, and it is from their concepts that the theory of just war is adapted and expanded by later thinkers.
Secular Sources of Just War Theory
The secular sources for just war theory span a considerable length of time. They include such philosophers as the ancient Roman Cicero and the Dutch Protestant Hugo Grotius. In addition, modern decrees on justifiable warfare, such as the commission to the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and the United Nations Charter also act to flush out the modern conception of just war theory.
Cicero, the great Roman orator, jurist, and philosopher was one of the first to deal with the questions of justifiable war. Cicero held that the use of force was justifiable only when the war was declared by an appropriate governmental authority acting within specific limits. For Cicero, the ability to wage war rested with the state, and the state alone, and could be lawfully waged only "after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made." In addition, Cicero also proposed the existence of a universal norm for human behavior which transcended the laws of individual nations and governed their relations with each other Cicero's belief in this universal norm was grounded in his view that there was a humani generis societas, a "society of mankind rather than of states." This view of a universal standard of behavior for nation-states which exists outside of promulgated law would have a profound impact on later just war theorists, particularly on Hugo Grotius.
Grotius was a 16th century Dutch Protestant who is sometimes referred to as the father of international law. Grotius, who lived in the aftermath of the brutal Thirty-Years War in Europe, wrote extensively on the right of nations to use force in self-defense in his book Jure Belli ac Pacis ("On the Rights of War and Peace"), which was published in 1625.It was largely Grotius who secularized just war theory, making the theory more acceptable for the age of the Enlightenment. For Grotius, a war is just if three basic criteria were met:
1) The danger faced by the nation is immediate;
2) the force used is necessary to adequately defend the nation's interests;
3) The use of force is proportionate to the threatened danger.
Grotius grounded his agreement with Cicero's notion of the need for a declaration of war in the natural law, and also argued that the purpose of just war theory is to provide "succor and protection for the sick and wounded in war, combatants and civilians alike. A result of this view is the notion that just war theory exists externally of any recognized legal system, that it is a part of the "law of nations" which is followed by all civilized nations. For Grotius, it is not necessary to prove just war theory by consulting with any of the established laws of the nations of Europe, or their customs. Rather, those laws are known through the universal medium of the natural law, a law which transcends nations and their own particular legal codes, a law which is binding on all human societies in their interactions with each other.(
After Grotius, just war theory underwent relatively few modifications until the nineteenth century. During the first century of it's existence, the United States' government came to acknowledge the legitimacy of just war theory. In 1842, the U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, acknowledged the legitimacy of the customary norms employed by Grotius to define the just war. This recognition occurred as a result of attempts to resolve the so-called "Caroline Incident."
The Caroline Incident occurred when the British attempted to prevent supplies from reaching Canadian rebels. In their attempts to restrict the flow of material to the rebels, the British burned the U.S. ship Caroline and killed several U.S. citizens. When the United States protested, the British government responded that its actions were justified as a matter of self-defense.(51) Webster responded by stating that the only way for the British claim to self-defense to stand was if it met the traditional elements of just self-defense.(52) Webster outlined those elements as consisting of necessity of self-defense, and the reasonable and not excessive use of force.(53) In essence, this definition of just self-defense mirrors that proposed by Grotius.
During the remainder of the 19th and early 20th centuries, just war theory underwent modest development. There were treaties, such as the Hague Conventions, which codified just war theory, but there was little major development in just war theory. That changed with the end of the Second World War. As a result of World War II, two basic documents were issued which resulted in increased recognition of just war theory in the international arena. The first document is the charter for the Nuremberg war crimes trials, and the second is the United Nations Charter. The Nuremberg Charter encapsulated the reigning notion of just war theory as represented by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Grotius. The Nuremberg Tribunal established that just war theory, as Grotius understood it, is universally binding customary law.
The United Nations Charter also has contributed to just war theory by recognizing the inherent right of each sovereign nation to self-defense.(56) Article 51 of the U.N. Charter affirms the right of each nation to self-defense, until the Security Council can take action in order to restore and stabilize international peace and security.(57) Article 51 states two key points in regard to international relations and the rightful use of force in international disputes:
1) The regulation of the use of force;
2) Collective security.
The U.N. Charter effectively outlaws the use of military force as a method of resolving international conflicts between nation-states. At the same time, the charter recognizes the inherent right of each nation to defend itself from an attack from an exterior foe which is by its very nature unlawful. This right of a nation to engage in defensive military actions has also been upheld by the International Court of Justice in its ruling in the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America. In that case, Nicaragua brought action against the United States for its support of insurgency forces attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.(62) The International Court of Justice in its ruling held that the right of a nation to engage in self-defense, as customarily understood, was incorporated into Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.(63) As the Court stated, "[i]n the language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right (or droit naturel) which a State possesses in the event of an armed attack, covers both collective and individual self-defense."

GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF JUST WAR THEORY
As the proceeding section has demonstrated, just war theory, despite its diverse sources and historical development, has several commonly recognized elements. These elements are traditionally divided into two basic categories which deal with the two basic fundamental issues regarding the legitimacy of war. The first issue, sometimes referred to in Latin as the jus ad bellum (literally, "that which is right or just to engage in resort to war", concerns when it is appropriate to resort to war as a method of conflict resolution. The second issue, jus in bello (literally, "that which is right or just within war" deals with what methods of warfare are permissible within the context of a war which meets the criteria of the jus ad bellum. Since this article is interested only in evaluating the validity of the decision made by the U.S. government to launch air strikes against Iraq, it will limit its discussion on just war theory to the jus ad bellum.
The core elements of the jus ad bellum consist of those principles which were originally recognized by the medieval commentators on just war theory as being most central to the whole doctrine of just war. As elucidated by St. Thomas Aquinas, the core principles consist of the following three elements:
1) Just cause;
2) Competent authority;
3) Right intention.
Just cause is classically understood to refer to self-defense. The use of military force is justified when it is used to repel an unjust aggressor and to retake that which the unjust aggressor has taken. It is generally acknowledged that a nation may use force to protect a neighboring state from attack from an outside hostile power. Thus, defense of self, or defense of another, are legitimate reasons for a nation-state to resort to military force.
The second element of jus ad bellum is that the war must be declared by competent authority. As recognized by theorists like Cicero and Aquinas, for a war to be just, the decision to go to war must be lawfully made. If an illegal or non-legal authority within an nation made the decision to go to war, such a decision would be unjust, for it would violate the basic principles of how a given society is governed.
Finally, the war must be fought with right intention, meaning that the motives for the war must not be to inflict undue suffering on the enemy state; the defending nation must use only that amount of force which is necessary for it to achieve its just cause. The motives of those engaged in making the decision to go to war must not be tinged with vengeance or a desire for retribution. Rather, the decision to go to war must be essentially protective; the goal of war is to obtain a just and durable peace. Such a peace is unlikely if the war is waged out of hateful or vengeful motives, with a desire not solely for self-protection but the total destruction of the enemy.(80) If in it's actions, the defending state's use of force exceeds what is necessary for the success of its just cause, the defending state's right intention is problematic. Seen this way, right intention serves to reinforce the requirement that the state which seeks to justly use force be acting in a truly defensive capacity, rather than engaging in military adventurism on the pretext of self-defense.

Conclusion
I can say that a just war has its principles which are inherent and obvious. However, their interpretation can vary a lot, as some of them are vague or subjective, leading to perhaps very different views on the justification of the war. Still, these integral things must take place in order for the war to be justified. The war has to be fought out of a good and just intention, only as a last resort, having a reasonable change of success and being proportional to the attack or aggression that predated it, and declared and notified to the proper parties.

While there could be some disagreement in terms of how to interpret these, the main logic and pillars of this are well understood and accepted, and remain the principles of a just war today as it has for many years.
Otherwise, the Just war theory is an attempt to think morally about war. The theorists who have recognized and shaped just war theory throughout Western civilization have included both secular and religious writers, including some of the greatest names of Western philosophy and legal theory. Just war theory has been recognized and used widely in the 20th century in an attempt to limit the horrors of war, and has been incorporated into international law through the United Nations Charter, the Nuremberg Charter, and the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. Generally construed, just war theory consists of two basic categories: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. This article examined U.S. decision to use force under the jus ad bellum requirements of just war theory. Those requirements are:
1) Just cause;
2) Competent authority;
3) Right intention. The U.S.'s recent military action against Iraq fails to meet the necessary requirements of the jus ad bellum. For this reason, the American air strikes against Iraq in September, 1996 were unjust.
























REFERENCES
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Brough, Michael W., John W. Lango, Harry van der Linden, eds(2007): Rethinking the Just War Tradition Albany, NY: SUNY Press..

Dr Mark Evans/(2005): Just War Theory: A Reappraisal (Edinburgh University Press,

Fotion, Nicholas. (2007). War and Ethics (London, New York: Continuum


O'Donovan, O.(2003): The Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steinhoff, Uwe(2007):. On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Walzer, Michael(1977): Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed., (New York: Basic Books.

Walzer, Michael(2004). Arguing about War, (London: Yale University Press
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