Governance and Conflict Resolution; Challenges of Resolving the Northern Uganda Conflict.
Abstract
The research explored Governance and Conflict Resolution, Challenges of resolving the northern Uganda conflict. The causes of the conflict were identified as being historical factors, North-South divide, atrocities committed by the NRA, opposition to Museveni’s rule, spiritual element and beliefs, fear of revenge, sense of betrayal on the part of the NRA/M after the Nairobi Peace Accord, loss of jobs, unequal distribution of the national cake, poverty, loss of cattle, marginalisation of the north- economically and politically, and finally the question of national identify.
The challenges of resolving the conflict include; -lack of genuine political will on the government side, lack of trust between the two parties to the conflict, the politicians in the area, lack of clear mediation strategy put in place by the government, the spiritual dimension of the LRA, many ‘voices’ involved in the conflict, lack of support in form of resettlement packages for the former abductees and rebels.
Other factors include; -LRA’s lack of territorial control and political wing to facilitate negotiations, conflicting approaches used in resolving the conflict, LRA’s irrational ideology and strategic thinking, opportunists who are benefiting from the war, and local, national and regional factors. At the national level, the conflict is seen as an Acholi affair while regionally, Sudan has remained a breeding ground for LRA’s continued activities.
Some of the factors why the military approach has not yielded much success include; corruption in the army and lack of government will to end the conflict. The external factors behind the continued warfare in the North among others included Sudan, United States of America, Britain, DRC, and the Acholi community in the diaspora.
Possible alternative approaches to the resolution of the conflict mentioned included need for more time allocation to cultural and religious leaders to negotiate with LRA rebels, Joseph Kony should be relocated to another, country need for national reconciliation, and finally negotiations should be held out side Uganda.
There is no one agreed solution to the resolution of the conflict instead different approaches were suggested by the respondents. The government should address the problem of resettlement package for the internally displaced persons who are living in miserable conditions. Government should begin thinking of decongesting the camps but also put into consideration the resettlement packages for the victims of this conflict.
Cattle rustling, which are blamed on the NRM government, created poverty gap, which saw many people mostly the youth joining the ranks of the LRA with the prospects of better life should be restocked.
Lastly, at a regional level, there is a need to come up with a comprehensive framework aimed at entrenching cooperation and confidence building among countries in various regions.
Introduction
The role that democracy and governance play in transitional development and good governance is to enhance equal opportunities and facilitate access to a broad range of social services to the citizens.
For some time, ‘democracy’ as a form of governance has been over used as a bait currency in the political market place. It is a catch word for contemporary political discourse. It is a word that resonates in people’s minds and springs from their lips as they struggle for freedom and better life. It is also peddled by discredited politicians in attempt to cleanse their tarnished records in the struggle to gain power.
The origin of the term democracy as a component of governance can be traced back to the ancient Greece. It is derived from the Greek word ‘kratos’ meaning power or rule. Democracy therefore, means governance by the ‘demos’ referring to the people. Since the Greek period, several meanings have been attached to the concept of democracy.
Others regard it as a system of decision making based on the principle of majority rule, while others think it’s a system of filling public office through a competitive struggle for the popular vote.
Schumpter (1947) defined democracy to imply a political system / formula or a body of beliefs specifying institutions such as political parties, free press and free movements for the observation and protection of human rights and individual rights which are legitimate and acceptable by all.
To Bernard Cricks (1993), democracy is defined as a system of rule by the poor and disadvantaged. He contends that it is a form of government in which people rule themselves directly and continuously without the need of representation. In modern democracies however, representative democracy has taken over which is based on elected officials who represent citizens.
Attributes of a Democratic Political System: Periodic elections which are free and fair, Political participation in the decision- making, Constitutionalism and rule of law, Separation of powers between the three main organs of government, notably, the executive, legislature, and the judiciary , Respect for human rights such as the right to life, freedom of speech, movement, association. Respect for human rights also mean respect for the rights of the minority groups, Transparency and political accountability, and finally, the existence of autonomous civil society, free from state control.
Human rights abuses were important in the origins of the war in Northern Uganda, especially in Acholiland. When the victorious National Resistance Army (NRA) arrived in Gulu and Kitgum in March 1986, it called on former Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers who had settled in their villages to hand over their weapons. Some did so, reporting directly to the NRA, while others reported to the then established Resistance Councils - now Local Councils.
At first, NRA soldiers in Gulu and Kitgum were well disciplined and respectful, serious breakdowns in discipline occurred among troops supervising the surrender of firearms. Some former UNLA soldiers were arrested and mistreated, and torture was alleged to be wide spread. Killings were reported, although the number of the dead is not known. Some former soldiers were taken a way for “political re-education” and never seen again. Fears in Acholiland were further fuelled by the order on 10th May 1986 for all former UNLA soldiers to report to NRA military headquarters in Kampala. Few could forget a similar order during the Amin era that led to the massacre of Acholi and Langi soldiers.
The Uganda Peoples’ Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A) was in fact a coalition of forces opposed to the NRM/A government. Its overall military commander was Brigadier Odong Latek. In 1987, the UPDA outlined their grievances as: “violation of the 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord, human rights abuses by the NRA in Acholi, NRM Communist dictatorship and foreign elements of Rwandan refugees in the NRA and the government. The UPDA was predominantly Acholi in composition, but eventually included other northern people from West Nile, Lango and Teso. It enjoyed popular support in the region at the height of the rebellion in 1987 and 1988. The UPDA was seriously weakened and demoralized by a heavy defeat at Corner Kilak in August 1987 where a number of its most experienced leaders were killed. (Gersony 1997).
Statement of the Problem.
For the last 20 years, the conflict has displaced 1.8 people, unknown number of abducted, mostly children, hundreds maimed and killed mostly children. The social fibres of Acholi society have been destroyed. The rate of HIV/AIDS infection is the highest in the region, with widespread poverty. Millions of United States of America dollars have been spent to resolve this conflict.
Despite several attempts and huge military expenditures in resolving the conflict, there are no clear signs that the conflict may not come to an end soon. This study sought to examine Governance and Conflict Resolution with specific focus on the challenges of resolving the Northern Uganda conflict.
Objectives of the Study
(i) To find out the causes of the northern Uganda conflict.
(ii) To find out the challenges to peaceful settlement of the conflict in since 1986.
(iii) To find out why the military approach by the government against the LRA has not yielded much success.
(iv) The obstacles to the settlement of the Northern Uganda conflict.
(v) To seek possible solutions to the resolution of the conflict.
Methodology
During the research in Gulu and Kampala, qualitative approach was used. This method was chosen because the researcher was interested in qualitative data, that is, the type of information that respondents say in their own words about their experiences and interaction in natural settings. Qualitative research is the study that produces results that are not obtained by statistical procedures or other method of quantification (Bouma 1995.) In other words, qualitative approach is a method that refers to a range of techniques including participant observation and intensive interviewing. Due to the nature of the study, the researcher opted for interviews and Focus Group Discussion as the methods of data collection in order to suit qualitative approach.
Research Design.
A research design is a plan showing how the problem of investigation will be solved. In this case, the researcher opted for a longitudinal comparison as the research design. Since the data collected covered a period of 20 years, exploratory study was necessary to examine the case for military approach and the argument for negotiation.
The research design led to exploratory study in which the information gathered helped in explaining the causes of the conflict in northern Uganda and its persistence up to date. The research also led to finding the alternative approaches in resolving the conflict.
Study Population.
The study population comprised of samples from internally displaced people’s camps, district officials, Members of Parliament, Uganda People’s Defense Forces, religious leaders, former abductees and rebels, diplomats and NGOs. Religious leaders were interviewed because they are in constant touch with the people through church activities at the same time engaged in negotiations with the rebels. The NGOs have been very vital in helping the victims of this conflict through provision of material goods and services like food, shelter and medical care. The samples from these categories were vital for the study since they are both victims of the war and are involved in its resolution.
Sample Size.
Initially sixty (60) respondents however, due to time constraints and security concerns especially in Gulu coupled with the same responses, the sample size was reduced to forty four (44).
Sampling Procedure/Sample Selection.
Purposive sampling was used for respondents with informed opinions on the subject of study. In purposive sampling, a researcher selects a sample that is convenient without going through random sampling. The researcher also opted for purposive sampling because it would be difficult to use random sampling for the various NGOs, district officials, religious leaders, Members of Parliament, former abductees and rebels, diplomats, and soldiers engaged in resolving the conflict.
Therefore, purposive sampling was viewed as the best option to employ in sampling the study. Since the key informants could easily be located in Gulu and Kampala, purposive sampling was expected to provide the best quality of respondents. With the help of the Camp Commandant, the researcher selected respondents for Focus Group Discussion from the camp purposively. The criteria used for selection was based on three variables, namely, age, sex and level of education. Along the criterion of age, there were 5 respondent aged between 20 -29, 7 aged between 30-39, and 8 aged from 40 and above. The rational behind using age brackets was because the researcher felt that age gave the respondents different perspectives into looking at the conflict. On the basis of sex, there were 11 women and 9 men while the level of education was necessary for direct communication as opposed to interpretation.
Data Collection Methods.
Both primary and secondary methods of data collection were used in this research. The primary data collection methods included interviews of individuals, focus group discussions, and observation. Interviews were used for the district officials, Members of Parliament, religious leaders, diplomats and NGOs. Interviews were suitable for these categories since each person was able to give in-depth answers due to their positions and experiences at their places of work. Interviews were carried out with the help of an interview guide to ascertain individual opinions on the resolution of the conflict in northern Uganda. The purpose of the interviews therefore was to probe the ideas of the respondents about the continued warfare in northern Uganda. A documentary analysis by the Ministry for Defence and UPDF was consulted since getting audience with the army PRO in Gulu and Kampala proved challenge to the researcher.
There were two Focus Group Discussions, one for residents of IDP Camp and another for former abductees and rebels. FGD for the IDP Camp consisted of 20 respondents while that for the former abductees and rebels consisted of 15 respondents. FDG was employed in the IDP Camp because the respondents faced similar problems and largely shared the same views on the topic with little differences while the former abductees and rebels went through different experiences in the bush but had similar opinions on why the war has dragged on. FGD offers an opportunity to corroborate group members responses and generates discussions. FGD also raised the confidence of some members to contribute freely on the topic, some of who would otherwise feel shy if they were interviewed individually. Observation was applied to all categories of respondents who were chosen for either FGD or interviews. Observation was important because it made it easy for the researcher to see respondents’ reactions, body language, and the general conditions of the study area especially the camp.
Secondary data collection methods involved collection of information from books, reports, documents, magazines and newspaper. In this study the researcher obtained data from Makerere University Main Library, Women and Gender Studies Library, Department of Political Science and Public Administration Library, NGO Forum materials in Gulu, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative library, Internet and Bulletin of Justice and Peace Commission of Gulu Archdiocese. The researcher also consulted news reports of the army Public Relations Officer.
Data Analysis.
In this research, data was presented mainly in descriptive form. From interviews, Focus Group Discussion and observation, themes and categories were identified in relations to the objectives of the research. Relationships between themes were sought thus leading to identification of sub themes. Where necessary quotations from respondents were used to back up the research findings. Then there was analysis geared towards tracing the socio- economic and political factors regarding the conflict in northern Uganda.
Research Findings
Causes of the northern Uganda conflict.
The rebellion in Acholi sub-region started on 20th August 1986 by the UNLA soldiers who were overthrown by the NRA/M to regain power. According to one of the Local Council Five members in Gulu district:
The northern conflict has an historical background. Right from colonial period to post colonial era, there has been North- South rift. When the NRA/M took over power in 1986, the way the army (NRA/M) handled Acholi was lamentable. This mistreatment forced the UNLA to wage war against the NRM government.
(Interview, September 2005)
A number of atrocities committed by NRA in Acholi land is also said to be one of the causes for the outbreak of the northern conflict, the famous incident being at Namukora where many civilians were allegedly massacred by the army. Another cause, according to a district official in Gulu, was opposition to Museveni’s rule. The Acholi soldiers who had been in power for only six months thought they would fight and topple the NRM government.In 1988, the rebels then (UPDA) entered into peace agreement with the NRM ending the first phase of the conflict. The spiritual element of this conflict came in around 1988 through Alice Lakwena. According to the same district official the causes of this conflict have not been the same; they have been varying over time.
According to a Catholic missionary working in Gulu, there were fears from the northerners that the NRA would take revenge on them for the Luwero atrocities allegedly committed by the UNLA, which was composed mainly by northern tribes, Acholi being one. This forced them to oppose the NRM government. He added that there was a sense of betrayal on the side of the NRM/A due to the inability to respect the Nairobi Peace Accord of 1985 between the Okello Lutwa government and the NRM. This forced the Acholi to keep on fighting the NRM even after they (UNLA) lost power to the NRM in 1986.
Loss of jobs in the armed services as well as in government ministries which for long had employed the northerners, coupled with disgruntlements and frustration on the part of the youth culminated into the outbreak of the conflict. Later on the remnants of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) rebels understood that they were not going to get anywhere with this war so they decided to enter into peace talks with the government, which however, never worked as agreed thus forcing those who had refused the idea of peace talks to remain in the bush and joined by those who fled back after the break down of the peace talks with the government.
According to a Catholic Priest working in Gulu, many of these rebels ‘had no political aims’ but were dominated with religious cults. That is how the LRA came to be born.
Neglect of the north and unequal distribution of the national cake was identified as one of the causes of the conflict in northern Uganda, by the research assistant, NGO Forum Gulu. She added that the Acholi in the diaspora supported the rebellion against the NRM soon after it took power. In her own opinion, there was a mental construction by the Acholi that, to get rich you need to capture state power.
In a Focus Group Discussion in Unyama Camp, the IDPs on their part attributed the causes of the conflict to politicians and ex-soldiers of Tito Okello who wanted to regain power due to fear of revenge from the NRA soldiers and loss of cattle a major a source of livelihood, which they blamed on the government of Yoweri Museveni. Marginalization of the north economically and politically coupled with poverty resulting from cattle rustling, as well as the question of revenge for the alleged atrocities committed in Luwero triangle by UNLA soldiers were part of the causes of the conflict. A district official asserted that the 1966 crisis, which sparked off political turmoil in the country, was perceived as if the north was fighting the south. In 1966, Dr Apollo Milton Obote abolished kingdoms and assumed the Presidency, which was held by the Kabaka (King) of Buganda Kingdom under the 1962 Constitution sparking off violent confrontation between the central government and Buganda kingdom. This forced the King to flee to exile from where he died, leading to the political and social hatred between the Baganda and the northerners. It is interesting to note that Milton Obote married a Muganda woman, but the unfortunate part of it is that when he died in 2005, many Baganda celebrated his death. According to him, the mistrust, which resulted from the 1966 crisis, is very strong between the north and south especially in Buganda to date.
The Programme Officer in charge of Governance and Civil society at the European Union intimated that the cause of the conflict is ‘the question of national identity’ and the struggle inside Acholiland on how to live among themselves and at the national level on how to solve the situation in their area.
The Challenges to Peaceful settlement of thenorthern Uganda conflict.
Despite this bleak picture, or because of it, there have been several attempts made by various agencies to bring peace and reconciliation to the region. Tiberio Okeny Atwoma, Peter Odok and the late Bishop Cyprian Kiangire of Gulu Diocese made the first attempt. In the process, the first two risked their lives by going into Sudan to negotiate with the leaders of the Uganda Peoples Defence Army (UPDA). Their effort resulted in the signing of the Peace Accord in December 1988 between the UPDA and the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) government (Kacoke Madit 2000:5)
By 1994, the situation had once again reached a state where the government felt it was necessary to attempt to bring peace to the north. Thus in 1994, peace talks, under the umbrella of Acholi Pacification Committee (APC) were held between LRA and the government. Betty Bigombe was the Minister for Pacification of the North and her efforts nearly came to fruitation, facilitated these talks. “We have had moments in which we thought that the nightmare was coming to an end, only to see our hope vanish,” says John Baptist Odama, the archbishop of Gulu on the peace talks attempts tried so far (The Sunday Vision August 2002:26). Bigombe’s peace talks ended badly when President Museveni announced one day that he had given the LRA ten days to abandon the rebellion, or else the NRA would go on the offensive (The Monitor, Wednesday, October 2nd 2002:21). Museveni has been making such threatening statements thereby making all the peace talks attempts unsuccessful. (The Monitor, Monday, March 17th 2003: 1-2). As peace agreements are reached, the implementation skills and political flexibility become more critical. Understandably, security fears reach their peak during the implementation phase. Negotiated agreements are often fragile and difficult to put into effect. Parties to the conflict suffer anxieties that opponents will cheat on their commitments. It is therefore important that mediators must act imaginatively to encourage all parties to live up to the agreements, and therefore produce an environment that promotes credible commitment. Perhaps this was missing during the 1994 peace talks between Betty Bigombe and the LRA.
In yet another major effort, Acholi people living in the Diaspora sought to bring about peace and reconciliation through dialogue. In the process, Kacoke Madit organized conferences in April 1997 and July 1998 in London and in 2000 in Nairobi to transform the international community’s attitudes about the conflict in Northern Uganda. The other peace talks attempts at mediation have been through the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). ARLPI was formed specifically in response to the violent conflict that has caused much devastation in Acholiland. The urgent need for peace has brought the Christians and Moslems together in prayers for peace and reconciliation. The ARLPI has played a significant role in the formation of the Amnesty Bill 1998, which became an Act of Parliament in December 1999.
Several peace initiatives, starting with the fateful turning point of 1994 spearheaded by Betty Bigombe, have been tried with little successes. Today in Gulu, there is a district peace and reconciliation team composed of councillors, religious leaders, MPs, NGOs, UPDF, former rebels or collaborators, and traditional leaders. At another level, there is the Amnesty Act that pardons all the rebels who have picked up arms to fight the NRM government since it came to power in 1986. Then there is the Uganda-Sudan Religious Leaders Consultative Forum, the Sant Egidio Community and the Acholi Parliamentary Group. All these initiatives have one agenda: to restore peace and stability in the region. But the Acholi politicians and the military have their fences to mend. (Sunday Vision, August 4th 2002:27).
But the Ministry of Defence and UPDF spokesperson, maintains that the Government’s decision to look for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict has always been influenced by other stakeholders, who believed the military option alone could not end the LRA problem. When the 1994 negotiations failed to yield fruits, the government decided on the approach of fighting and talking at the same time. This was because, given all the other avenues discussed above, the LRA continued to attack innocent civilians and these were mainly the hard-core criminals who have deliberately refused those other opportunities of giving up rebellion and have made it difficult for those who may want to surrender.
The UPDF Public Relations Officer was concerned by the fact that, the LRA chief peace negotiator who was also the LRA spokesman, Sam Kolo was forced to surrender to the UPDF in February 2005, following a directive of LRA leader, Joseph Kony, to have him killed because he (Kolo) wanted the LRA leadership to give peace talks serious attention. He concluded that for keen followers of the trend of the conflict since 2002, it could not be questioned that Operation Iron Fist was an immense strategic and tactical success. The loss of territory by the LRA in southern Sudan was a stab in their back from which they will never recover. He therefore advocated for military option to end this conflict.
A diplomat working with the European Union in the Governance and Civil Society section attributed the failure of peace talks to “lack of space outside Uganda for negotiations”. The kinds of options possible as demanded by the rebels, for example ruling Uganda by the Ten Commandments in the Holy Bible and purification of Acholi land, are unimaginable. The terms set by the government for negotiations with the rebels are quite high, explaining that “in most cases the government set the conditions for negotiations leaving the rebels with few or no options apart from going by those terms, which end up failing”. Therefore, he concurred that at the “moment there was need to widen activity from the various actors in this conflict away from the pure option of settlement, or agreement”, but to widen the development agenda for Acholiland. This would involve working on improving the livelihood for the people in Acholiland with development intervention and setting a long-term process on peace but not making it a condition for development.
The spiritual element of Kony affects negatively on the peace process. According to the former abductees and rebels, there is every reason to believe that Kony has the spiritual powers to foresee what each of the commanders is planning. This has made it hard for the commanders to effectively negotiate without having to make consultations with Kony. During Focus Group Discussion with the former abductees and rebels, they complained that the government “dictates all the terms for peace talks like setting deadlines for peace talks”, which is a problem. To them both sides, LRA and government, “are not committed to peace talks because there is no trust from either side”. They suggested that “there should be unconditional ceasefire and the international community, probably a third party/country should be involved in the peace process”. To them the presence of International Criminal Court (I.C.C) is an obstacle to peace initiatives, as most LRA will not come out of the bush.
He said that in 2002, a “high-powered” Presidential Team (PPT) led by the then First deputy prime minister, Eria Kategaya was formed to pursue peace talks with the LRA leadership. The PPT became redundant because the LRA did not name their peace team and instead continued with its atrocities, including the butchering of a PPT emissary, Oketch Kulu, in Chwero, Gulu district, as he tried to deliver letters and mobile phones to them to enhance communication.
The former abductees and rebels think the LRA is interested in ending the conflict but the actions of the government have frustrated this purpose. They revealed that the majority of LRA are ready to talk to the government but the government wants to use both military and negotiation at the same time to end the conflict, which has complicated the situation. According to them, Kony prefers the ‘Rwoth’ and elders in the settlement of the conflict. A research assistant working with NGO Forum Gulu, stated that the NGO is engaged in research, sensitisation, mobilization and capacity building in the peace process through workshops, seminars, information dissemination, distribution of photos/pictures on the events of the conflict which has helped in restoring hope and reforming the affected people.
A diplomat working with the European Union said that their role in resolving this conflict has been “providing instruments of development, improving on the livelihood of the people and infrastructure in the region as a means of peace building”. He added that it “was more and more common sense that development in whatever sector has an implication on peace”, so it was the concept of linking development with peace buildings.
The Military Approach in Resolving the Northern Uganda conflict.
When the NRM/A captured State power in January 1986, it was sure to eliminate ‘banditry’ in the next few months, according to President Museveni in his address to the Nation on the 25th Anniversary of Uganda’s Independence in October 9th, 1987. He said then that over the last 12 months the NRA had inflicted serious defeats on the bandits, eliminating them from many areas of Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Apac, Kotido, Moroto, Kapchorwa, Soroti and Kumi (The New Vision, October, Tuesday 13th, 1987:8). ‘There will be no round table conference with them. Never.’ Museveni declared on the 18th October 1986 in reference to the rebels fighting in northern Uganda.
In 1991, a major military operation code named ‘Operation North’ was launched. Spear headed by then General David Tinyefunza, the then Minister of State for Defence led a ruthless campaign to uproot and finish the rebels. The Defence ministry described it as a Cordon- and Search Operation. Operation North distinguished itself for its brutality, meted out against a civilian population suspected of collaborating with the rebels.
Gersony (1997) reports that at Buchoro in north-eastern Gulu several prisoners were tortured to death in a pit by the NRA. Operation North is said to have weakened the LRA and reduced them to ‘hundreds’ in 1992.Why the NRA did not at the time finish off the remnants of Kony’s forces remains a mystery (The Monitor, Thursday, April 1st 2004:17). Gersony quotes sources as saying that some of the commanders may have wanted the war to continue so that they would continue receiving operational allowances. Others suggested that the army did not want to risk its soldiers, since the LRA threat was considered all but over. Tinyefunza denies having committed atrocities against the population but maintains that his operation brought Kony to his knees. He says that was also the time that Kony went into exile and was armed by the ‘terrorists’ Sudan and Congo. ‘We were not fighting rag-tag army. Kony was now fighting a proxy war of the Sudanese regime’ (ibid: 17)
In June 1996, then Major General Salim Saleh was appointed, Presidential Advisor on Political and Military Affairs in northern Uganda. He was in charge of Operation Clean, which began on the 1st August 1996. The overall objective of this operation was to end the conflict in the north and would last for six months using ‘soft approach’ like denying rebels safe passage. According to Saleh, he believed that the war would soon end. To him the signs were; militarily they were improving on the capacity of the army, working on mobilization schemes for the population like seminars and initiating income generating projects, the international feeling and pressure was building up against the source of the problem and generally, government was giving the army more capacity and facilities.
He added that they were repairing the damage that might have been caused between the army and the civilians through discussions and that he was personally working on some other options which could resolve the problem peacefully, but which do not endanger long-term national interests (The New Vision, Monday, September 30th 1996).
After the failure of the 1994 Peace Talks initiative, there was, yet another attempt by the two protagonists to resolve the conflict by might. This was particularly illustrated by the Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security chaired by Honorable Gabbe, in 1997. This Report recommended the strengthening of the army as the focus of the government in resolving the armed conflict in Acholi. The Minority Report of Honorables Omara Atubo and Norbert Mao, on its part down played the role of the military and focused on dialogue and peaceful reconciliation. (Kacoke Madit 2000:29).
The military position taken by the Members of Parliament could have resulted from Museveni’s earlier statement in which he expressed his opposition to peace talks with the LRA rebels. He said he could forgive the ‘misled’ but not the ‘misleaders’ (The New Vision, Friday 15th 1996). In 1996, the Prime Minister then, Honorable Kintu Musoke in an interview with the New Vision journalist said that there was no need to talk to Kony. ‘What is there to talk about with Kony? . He is not a freedom fighter. He does not have a political programme’ he concluded (The New Vision, Wednesday August 21st 1996:19).
In March 2002, Sudan signed a protocol allowing the UPDF to enter Sudanese sovereign territory and ‘flush’ out Kony. Uganda in return pledged not to harbor or assist the Sudan People’s Liberation Army militarily. Barely three months after the operation started, the rebels returned to Uganda, and have since stepped up atrocities, and even expanded the zone of operation to Teso and Lango. In the meantime, the operation does not appear to have stopped the movement into and out of Sudan by the LRA top commanders. The UPDF defends the operation, saying it has driven the rebels from the expanse of southern Sudan back to Uganda. President Museveni and military officials insist that Sudan has continued to arm the LRA despite the agreement, accusation strongly denied by Sudan.
The President made public the details of Operation Iron Fist against Joseph Kony’s LRA rebels on August 25th 2002 outlining its achievements, listing the enemy losses, the UPDF casualties, and explained what remained to be done. In a 19-page document titled ‘Operation Iron Fist- The Balance Sheet’, Museveni maintained that sustaining the military pressure on the LRA was the only way to convince Kony to talk meaningful peace. He described LRA as nomadic. ‘We have been able to achieve all this in the rainy season when the grass is very tall in Southern Sudan and northern Uganda. You can be sure that this conflict will, definitely, be over, latest, by February, 2003 when the grass will have been burnt if it goes that far’ Museveni concluded. This Operation, however, has not ended the conflict.
The best option to end this war is to apply force according to the Ministry of Defence and army spokesperson. In a documentary analysis, he stated that:
Because the conflict in Northern Uganda was armed rebellion, it definitely had to be met with arms and therefore the military option. At the start of the rebellion, around August 1986, there was no terrorism like it later came to be, especially after 1989-1994 when the LRA got the [open] support of the Sudanese Government.
(The New Vision, Friday, June 17, 2005:18).
He stressed that the deterioration of the LRA from rebels or insurgents to rural terrorists called for an increased military expedition to stop the terrorism on innocent civilians. The military option no doubt, he said, has achieved tremendously against the LRA, especially with the start of ‘Operation Iron Fist’ in 2002, following an understanding between the governments of Sudan and Uganda allowing Uganda’s military, the UPDF to pursue the LRA inside southern Sudan. He rated the performance of the military operation as being effective. He concluded that, “what the army should do is to perfect these tactical approaches to deal with the small scattered remnants who are diehards. Otherwise, the LRA rebels have a significant role to play in ending the conflict, they have been offered a big menu to choose from Amnesty for those willing to give up rebellion, peace talks for those who want to achieve a win-win situation through negotiation, and fighting for those who think they can fight”.
But a significant number of civilians interviewed asserted that many soldiers look at the conflict as meaningless since they are fighting children and most of the soldiers in the field are Acholi and sometimes they feel that they are killing their own brothers.
The war is also seen by some soldiers as posing no threat to the establishment in Kampala as observed by a district official:
Soldiers do not see LRA as a threat to the authority in Kampala, so the UPDF are here because life and property are being destroyed; otherwise, the willingness to end the war is not there. To me I support both options, which are peace and military approaches. We have tried to talk to Kony but he is not ready to listen. Many of the LRA see the gun as a means of survival.
(Interview, September 2005).
One of the district official interviewed believed that the approach had contributed fifty-fifty in both peace and dialogue forcing the rebels to talk peace at sometimes and has reduced their military strengths. He was optimistic that the regional arrangement between Sudan and Uganda may hopefully bring peace to both countries if the death of John Garang, the ex- leader of the SPLA/M does not affect the agreement between the two countries and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by Sudan government and SPLM/A.
Other respondents are opposed to the military option because Kony abducted innocent children whom he took to the bush and trained to become rebels. One respondent emphasized that:
The reason why we wanted to talk to the rebels is not that we think they are very nice people with nice ideas that they should be given recognition. No! That is not the reason. The reason is that 80% of the LRA is made up of children who were abducted, so we are dealing with a huge hostage crisis. Therefore, the government has to recognize that when they say they have killed thousands of rebels, 80% of them … were abducted children, so it is a moral issue. On one hand you have failed to protect children, on the other hand the solution you are giving is to kill them.
(Interview, September 2005)
The negative aspect of the military approach according to some respondents is related to the destruction of property and lives. Some claimed the option has drained resources, which could have been used for other development projects. During FGD in Unyama IDP there were mixed feelings about the military approach. In a low tone, one respondent had this to say:
To me this war is a business. When there was war in Congo (DRC), Ugandan soldiers were sent there, Rwanda also sent theirs (soldiers). When war broke out in Kasese (ADF rebels), the government also sent the army there and the war ended. But here the military approach has not yielded anything. The government should seek for peaceful resolution. War does not bring peace.
(Focus Group Discussion, September 2005)
Some members suggested that both sides, the government and the LRA, should accept that in one-way or another, they have been defeated. They said the war could no longer end through military approach urging the government to have good will to talk peace.
A diplomat at the European Union based in Uganda disagreed on the military option arguing that when looking at the past 18 years, the military approach has been the dominant one, but had failed to resolve the conflict. He said that he has always objected the military solution or military strategy alone, aware that it will not end the war. He said there was need to develop a culture of analysis and negotiated solutions to this conflict.
Explaining why the military option has failed to resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda despite Parliament’s recommendation in 1997 in support of the military option, an MP from Gulu district attributed the persistence of LRA to a number of factors:
There were no soldiers deployed in the north, they deployed 10,000 ghost soldiers. 18 soldiers guarded Paboo Camp of 60,000 people. Government procured junk helicopters, supplies to officers in the north were miserable and the state of their morale to wage war was low.
Secondly, the bases of the LRA were not the same. LRA had bases in Sudan. This forced the government to try to negotiate with Sudan to pursue LRA inside Sudan under ‘Operation Iron Fist’.
(Interview, September 2005)
He concluded by asserting that there was no serious commitment on the military option a part from threats from the government ‘we will kill them, we will destroy them-with ghosts you can’t do that’. However, the spokesperson for Defence and the UPDF does not agree with the above argument. He asserted that UPDF commanders are not benefiting from the conflict:
Why is it that it is only the LRA conflict that is beneficial and not the others that have been defeated? Economic sense says that the more investments you have the more revenue you get. If war is an investment for the commanders, then West Nile Bank Front should be here, UNRF II, UNRF I, UPA, ADF should all be here so that all of us can benefit. It makes no economic sense.
(The Monitor, Tuesday, February 24 2004:18)
The obstacles to the settlement of the Northern Uganda conflict.
There was a general feeling by the respondents interviewed that, there was no genuine political will to talk peace on the government side as well as the LRA, and therefore there was no trust between the two parties. Another respondent argued that illiterate people, LRA rebels, are leading the rebellion and as such it is very difficult to discuss with them and come out with a consensus. For example, Kony’s political agenda, other than ruling on the Ten Commandments, which he has himself not respected, is not clear.
Some respondents asserted that politicians are part of the problem by ‘talking on the ground but not ending the war’. As mentioned later on, some people are gaining from the war and as such are not willing to see the war end as observed by one respondent: “The conflict has been economic capital to the army in form of ‘‘classified expenditures’’ which are not accounted for (Interview, September 2005)
In an interview with the a district Official in Gulu, that there is no clear mediation strategy put in place by the government in terms of framework and time frame. What is there are the ‘running errands’. He reasoned that civilians cannot talk/negotiate peace with armed rebels, instead they have been lamenting, and Government should have created a military mediation team with observers from international community. The spiritual dimension of Kony war, which is a big obstacle in resolving this conflict, calls for prayers to counteract his evil powers’ according to a district official. He said that there is need for a ‘spiritual front’ to act as a task force. There is need for one voice, one approach as observed by one respondent that “some members of the district council talk about fighting today, then tomorrow they are talking of negotiation”.
In a Focus Group Discussion with the former abductees and rebels on the above issue, one complained that there are too many groups in the peace negotiation, for instance, the Presidential Peace Team, Betty Bigombe’s team, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, Members of Parliament, Elders/traditional leaders- all of whom want recognition. They also complained about the negligence by the authorities when they return from the bush:
There are no resettlement packages given to former abductees and rebels to begin a new life a part from top commanders and child mothers forcing some of them to return to the bush and those in the bush fear to come out on that ground. The male returnees and children are given nothing.
(Focus Group Discussion, September 2005).
Another obstacle in resolving the conflict is the fact that the LRA is scattered without territorial control and lacks a political wing where they can be contacted. Normally in a country where there are rebels fighting the government, rebels control a part of the territory where negotiators can stay with them and is quite safe.
According to a Member of Parliament from Gulu district, there are conflicting approaches in resolving the conflict, namely peace talks (traditional mechanisms inclusive), Amnesty, Military approach and International Criminal Court (ICC).These conflicting approaches some times slows down the peace process rendering others irrelevant at times.
A diplomat at the European Union summed up the obstacles and challenges that “LRA is very irrational in their ideological and strategic thinking”, and secondly, “the Acholi society was in a strong transition period to be fully accepted in Uganda compounded with the government’s inflexibility”. A Church Missionary Priest working in the North supported the above point arguing that “there has been a bit of inconsistency on the part of the government in the sense that if government is challenged by the international community on peace talks their response is that they are very much interested in peace talks” making reference to religious leaders and Bigombe’s attempts. In other words, the government is ‘committed to peace talks but it is not consistent’.
This conflict has attracted ‘opportunists’ who pose as rebel commanders demanding for money from the peace team negotiators. One respondent looked at the obstacles and challenges from three levels saying that at the local dimension, the war brought division among the people in the area with some people supporting the rebels by providing them with information as well as material assistance like food and medicines, while other people were against the rebellion. At the National level, the government looked at the war as an Acholi affair stressing that for a long time the government never looked at the war critically to get a permanent solution to it. Regionally there is the Sudan support, which was in return for Uganda’s support to the SPLA/M while intervention from International Community never came early enough.
There was a strong belief by most of the respondents interviewed that corruption is one of the factors why the conflict has dragged on to date. According to a top Local council five member of Gulu district, “there were ghost soldiers in the region through which the top army commanders are enriching themselves. Fat field operation allowances, which are given to the commanders, act as a motivation to keep the war going. There are commanders who are engaged in serious business in the region and getting rich from the war, which is a business like venture to them. There are collaborators within the Acholi sub-region who are reaping from the conflict and would not therefore, wish the war to end’’ (Interview, September 2005).
When asked whether corruption is the reason behind the prolonged war in the north, a diplomat at the European Union said that:
Whenever there is money involved, people are involved. We have to know the role of the army in conflict situations, whether the army is there to solve the conflict or the conflict keeps the army in place with all interests, which are there. People who have served in the military force for a long time and are part of the conflict, whether they want it or not, have their personal interests in that conflict.(Interview, September 2005.)
A Member of Parliament from Gulu district summed it up that the government deployed 10,000 ghost soldiers, with only 18 soldiers guarding 60,000 Internally Displaced Persons in Paboo camp adding that the supplies to officers in the North were miserable .
On the huge military (defence) budget allocated to the Ministry of Defence by Parliament to purchase military hardware to defeat the LRA, he responded that it went to procure junk helicopters, security roads became a huge a huge project for the army to pocket money from the government. In other words, the war became a huge business venture for the officers of the UPDF.
However, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence and UPDF in a documentary analysis admits that corruption in the army is part of the corruption in the country, which is not only confined in the army:
The problem of ghost soldiers arose from the burning our records in 1989 in Republic House, where we had our headquarters. After that, the Rwandese left some of the Rwandese who left stayed on the pay roll. Those who kept them on the pay roll realised that it was attractive earning salaries for those who were not there. Coupled with the burning of records, people started having ghost soldiers. You declare 580 soldiers when you have 500.You have had of ghost teachers in schools, ghost nurses, so this is part of the corruption in the country. (The Monitor, Tuesday, February 2004:18).
Over the years, the LRA lost all political and military credibility and it would not have survived for so long if it had not enjoyed the support and sanctuary of Sudan. Sudan’s support was initially low key. It involved the provision of arms, often in exchange for ivory and children. After 1994, Sudan put itself squarely behind the LRA by giving them space to build their camps, weapons and uniforms. Kony was given £ 7000 per month. (Simba quoted in Mugaju & Oloka 2000:115). Simba further notes that the camps over the border provided the rebels with safe haven needed to train and equip large numbers of captives. In return, the LRA was expected to fight the SPLA inside Sudan. It was also supposed to mine northern roads that Sudan believed was being used to supply the SPLA (Ibid: 115).
Gersony (1997:37) alludes to the above facts. He notes that following the collapse of the peace talks, LRA forces withdrew to Southern Sudan, where they regrouped, retrained and were equipped with weapons, ammunition and land mines provided by the government of Sudan. In the resumed operations, which begun soon after the peace talks collapsed, LRA seemed more focused on the abduction of youngsters, perhaps because the availability of military supplies was no longer a constraint.
The war in northern Uganda is not only affected by the war in Sudan, but broader regional and international relations. In the early and mid-1990s, United States of America policy in the region revolved around supporting an alliance of the so called “frontline States” against the NIF government in Sudan, including Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda. It was also involved in supporting the SPLA/M. The NIF’S radical Islamic agenda was perceived as a threat to regional security after NIF ideologue Hassan el-Turabi famously spoke about the spreading of Islam to the Cape of Good Hope in 1993.
The government of Uganda considers the war with the LRA as a function of political developments in Sudan and has sought assurances that Sudan has ended its backing for the LRA. For its part the, Sudanese government, under President Omar al –Bashir wishes to see Uganda stop its backing for the SPLM/A. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed in 1995 and only restored in 2001 because of the implementation of The Carter Centre mediated in Nairobi agreement, December 1999. The change in strategy from confrontation to engagement comes because of international pressure, internal political changes and the intense diplomatic initiatives by the government of Sudan to improve its image.
The way forward.
There is no one agreed approach to end the conflict. A senior district official suggests that the cultural leaders who are trying to negotiate with LRA should be given the chance and freedom to try their luck while another suggested that Kony should be relocated to another country with the assistance of international community and called for national reconciliation.
The district disaster officer of Gulu suggested that ‘amnesty, with its weaknesses aside, should remain open for the few rebels who may come out. He emphasized the need for reconciliation, harmony and respect for the returnees because their lives were ruined by being taken away from ordinary life and trained there to kill so many people, because of the authority’s failure to protect them. Having come back home, calling of names like ex-combatants, child soldiers, rebels etc should end.
The former abductees and rebels suggested that the environment for peace talks should be conducive and if possible, out side Uganda because of the mistrust between the government and the rebels, which have developed over the past years.
Recommendations and the Way forward.
United Nations involvement in resolving conflicts in Africa has recorded success stories in some cases. Many countries, which have under gone civil wars like Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan, have partially been stable while others have attained full peace. In Angola, for example the intervention of UN after a prolonged conflict between the ruling party and UNITA rebels, resulted into the establishment of the Security Council Resolution 1118(1997) of 30 June 1997 of United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). Its main function was to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country. UN intervention was instrumental in restoring democracy and peace in Liberia. It would be a welcome move if the UN takes interest in finding lasting solutions to the conflict in northern Uganda as it has done in many countries in Africa.
Politically, the government should encourage and promote peaceful means to resolve this conflict. This involves creating a conducive environment, which will allow the rebels to be incorporated in the negotiation process and the national army for the sake of peace. The government has applied all the maximum force it has within her means for all these years but the rebellion continues to date. It is wise for any right-thinking person that genuine peace talks should be given a chance with the involvement of the third party in a foreign country.
There should be a deliberate government policy of promoting economic development in Acholi sub region. Since poverty in Acholi region drives many youth into rebellion, which contributes to insecurity in the region, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the local people. The government can lead the way in initiating development programmes in the area. Other local and international agencies should be encouraged to establish development projects in the area.
There is need for regional cooperation in order to get rid of Joseph Kony’s bases in Sudan as well as DRC. The urgency to minimize the arms trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region, requires all the neighbouring countries to work together to address the arms trade. The regional groupings like SADAC, though Uganda is not a member, East African Community (EAC), Common Market for East and Central Africa (COMESA) and the African Union (AU) should be vigorously involved.
The cultural and religious leaders in Acholi sub region and Uganda at large should take the lead in trying to make contacts with the rebels in the north. The beginning of this conflict and its continuity according to some respondents in Gulu are connected to religious and cultural norms of the Acholi. Indigenous conflict resolution may be one of the ways in resolving this conflict.
The government and aid agencies should relocate the Internally Displaced People from the camps to safer areas. These camps act as a reservoir for the rebels to abduct children, loot food and medicines, and their propaganda campaign against the government. The living conditions in these camps are very appalling. Secondly, these camps are very prone to attacks from LRA. It would be better if these camps were relocated to peaceful areas like Nakasongola or any region of Uganda to ensure the security of the IDPs.
The ICC arrest warrant should be withdrawn in the interest of peace in Acholi sub region.
Suggestions for further study.
Future research on the northern conflict should focus on the costs, both human and material of this conflict.
There should be research on the role and relevance of regional and international organizations as well as international community as far as resolving internal conflicts in developing countries are concerned.
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The Monitor, Monday, 17th March 2003, Kampala, Uganda
The Monitor, Thursday, April 1st 2004, Kampala, Uganda
The Sunday Monitor, March 23rd, 2003, Kampala, Uganda
The Monitor, Monday, March 17th 2003, Kampala, Uganda
The Monitor, Wednesday, October 2nd 2002, Kampala, Uganda
The New Vision, Tuesday 13th 1987, Kampala, Uganda
Web Resources.
Official Uganda Government Website, http://www.uganda.co.ug/government
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives, www.acholipeace.org
Kacoke Madit www.km-net.org
The Carter Center www.cartercentre.org
The New Vision www.newvision.co.ug
The Monitor www.monitor.co.ug
The research explored Governance and Conflict Resolution, Challenges of resolving the northern Uganda conflict. The causes of the conflict were identified as being historical factors, North-South divide, atrocities committed by the NRA, opposition to Museveni’s rule, spiritual element and beliefs, fear of revenge, sense of betrayal on the part of the NRA/M after the Nairobi Peace Accord, loss of jobs, unequal distribution of the national cake, poverty, loss of cattle, marginalisation of the north- economically and politically, and finally the question of national identify.
The challenges of resolving the conflict include; -lack of genuine political will on the government side, lack of trust between the two parties to the conflict, the politicians in the area, lack of clear mediation strategy put in place by the government, the spiritual dimension of the LRA, many ‘voices’ involved in the conflict, lack of support in form of resettlement packages for the former abductees and rebels.
Other factors include; -LRA’s lack of territorial control and political wing to facilitate negotiations, conflicting approaches used in resolving the conflict, LRA’s irrational ideology and strategic thinking, opportunists who are benefiting from the war, and local, national and regional factors. At the national level, the conflict is seen as an Acholi affair while regionally, Sudan has remained a breeding ground for LRA’s continued activities.
Some of the factors why the military approach has not yielded much success include; corruption in the army and lack of government will to end the conflict. The external factors behind the continued warfare in the North among others included Sudan, United States of America, Britain, DRC, and the Acholi community in the diaspora.
Possible alternative approaches to the resolution of the conflict mentioned included need for more time allocation to cultural and religious leaders to negotiate with LRA rebels, Joseph Kony should be relocated to another, country need for national reconciliation, and finally negotiations should be held out side Uganda.
There is no one agreed solution to the resolution of the conflict instead different approaches were suggested by the respondents. The government should address the problem of resettlement package for the internally displaced persons who are living in miserable conditions. Government should begin thinking of decongesting the camps but also put into consideration the resettlement packages for the victims of this conflict.
Cattle rustling, which are blamed on the NRM government, created poverty gap, which saw many people mostly the youth joining the ranks of the LRA with the prospects of better life should be restocked.
Lastly, at a regional level, there is a need to come up with a comprehensive framework aimed at entrenching cooperation and confidence building among countries in various regions.
Introduction
The role that democracy and governance play in transitional development and good governance is to enhance equal opportunities and facilitate access to a broad range of social services to the citizens.
For some time, ‘democracy’ as a form of governance has been over used as a bait currency in the political market place. It is a catch word for contemporary political discourse. It is a word that resonates in people’s minds and springs from their lips as they struggle for freedom and better life. It is also peddled by discredited politicians in attempt to cleanse their tarnished records in the struggle to gain power.
The origin of the term democracy as a component of governance can be traced back to the ancient Greece. It is derived from the Greek word ‘kratos’ meaning power or rule. Democracy therefore, means governance by the ‘demos’ referring to the people. Since the Greek period, several meanings have been attached to the concept of democracy.
Others regard it as a system of decision making based on the principle of majority rule, while others think it’s a system of filling public office through a competitive struggle for the popular vote.
Schumpter (1947) defined democracy to imply a political system / formula or a body of beliefs specifying institutions such as political parties, free press and free movements for the observation and protection of human rights and individual rights which are legitimate and acceptable by all.
To Bernard Cricks (1993), democracy is defined as a system of rule by the poor and disadvantaged. He contends that it is a form of government in which people rule themselves directly and continuously without the need of representation. In modern democracies however, representative democracy has taken over which is based on elected officials who represent citizens.
Attributes of a Democratic Political System: Periodic elections which are free and fair, Political participation in the decision- making, Constitutionalism and rule of law, Separation of powers between the three main organs of government, notably, the executive, legislature, and the judiciary , Respect for human rights such as the right to life, freedom of speech, movement, association. Respect for human rights also mean respect for the rights of the minority groups, Transparency and political accountability, and finally, the existence of autonomous civil society, free from state control.
Human rights abuses were important in the origins of the war in Northern Uganda, especially in Acholiland. When the victorious National Resistance Army (NRA) arrived in Gulu and Kitgum in March 1986, it called on former Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers who had settled in their villages to hand over their weapons. Some did so, reporting directly to the NRA, while others reported to the then established Resistance Councils - now Local Councils.
At first, NRA soldiers in Gulu and Kitgum were well disciplined and respectful, serious breakdowns in discipline occurred among troops supervising the surrender of firearms. Some former UNLA soldiers were arrested and mistreated, and torture was alleged to be wide spread. Killings were reported, although the number of the dead is not known. Some former soldiers were taken a way for “political re-education” and never seen again. Fears in Acholiland were further fuelled by the order on 10th May 1986 for all former UNLA soldiers to report to NRA military headquarters in Kampala. Few could forget a similar order during the Amin era that led to the massacre of Acholi and Langi soldiers.
The Uganda Peoples’ Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A) was in fact a coalition of forces opposed to the NRM/A government. Its overall military commander was Brigadier Odong Latek. In 1987, the UPDA outlined their grievances as: “violation of the 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord, human rights abuses by the NRA in Acholi, NRM Communist dictatorship and foreign elements of Rwandan refugees in the NRA and the government. The UPDA was predominantly Acholi in composition, but eventually included other northern people from West Nile, Lango and Teso. It enjoyed popular support in the region at the height of the rebellion in 1987 and 1988. The UPDA was seriously weakened and demoralized by a heavy defeat at Corner Kilak in August 1987 where a number of its most experienced leaders were killed. (Gersony 1997).
Statement of the Problem.
For the last 20 years, the conflict has displaced 1.8 people, unknown number of abducted, mostly children, hundreds maimed and killed mostly children. The social fibres of Acholi society have been destroyed. The rate of HIV/AIDS infection is the highest in the region, with widespread poverty. Millions of United States of America dollars have been spent to resolve this conflict.
Despite several attempts and huge military expenditures in resolving the conflict, there are no clear signs that the conflict may not come to an end soon. This study sought to examine Governance and Conflict Resolution with specific focus on the challenges of resolving the Northern Uganda conflict.
Objectives of the Study
(i) To find out the causes of the northern Uganda conflict.
(ii) To find out the challenges to peaceful settlement of the conflict in since 1986.
(iii) To find out why the military approach by the government against the LRA has not yielded much success.
(iv) The obstacles to the settlement of the Northern Uganda conflict.
(v) To seek possible solutions to the resolution of the conflict.
Methodology
During the research in Gulu and Kampala, qualitative approach was used. This method was chosen because the researcher was interested in qualitative data, that is, the type of information that respondents say in their own words about their experiences and interaction in natural settings. Qualitative research is the study that produces results that are not obtained by statistical procedures or other method of quantification (Bouma 1995.) In other words, qualitative approach is a method that refers to a range of techniques including participant observation and intensive interviewing. Due to the nature of the study, the researcher opted for interviews and Focus Group Discussion as the methods of data collection in order to suit qualitative approach.
Research Design.
A research design is a plan showing how the problem of investigation will be solved. In this case, the researcher opted for a longitudinal comparison as the research design. Since the data collected covered a period of 20 years, exploratory study was necessary to examine the case for military approach and the argument for negotiation.
The research design led to exploratory study in which the information gathered helped in explaining the causes of the conflict in northern Uganda and its persistence up to date. The research also led to finding the alternative approaches in resolving the conflict.
Study Population.
The study population comprised of samples from internally displaced people’s camps, district officials, Members of Parliament, Uganda People’s Defense Forces, religious leaders, former abductees and rebels, diplomats and NGOs. Religious leaders were interviewed because they are in constant touch with the people through church activities at the same time engaged in negotiations with the rebels. The NGOs have been very vital in helping the victims of this conflict through provision of material goods and services like food, shelter and medical care. The samples from these categories were vital for the study since they are both victims of the war and are involved in its resolution.
Sample Size.
Initially sixty (60) respondents however, due to time constraints and security concerns especially in Gulu coupled with the same responses, the sample size was reduced to forty four (44).
Sampling Procedure/Sample Selection.
Purposive sampling was used for respondents with informed opinions on the subject of study. In purposive sampling, a researcher selects a sample that is convenient without going through random sampling. The researcher also opted for purposive sampling because it would be difficult to use random sampling for the various NGOs, district officials, religious leaders, Members of Parliament, former abductees and rebels, diplomats, and soldiers engaged in resolving the conflict.
Therefore, purposive sampling was viewed as the best option to employ in sampling the study. Since the key informants could easily be located in Gulu and Kampala, purposive sampling was expected to provide the best quality of respondents. With the help of the Camp Commandant, the researcher selected respondents for Focus Group Discussion from the camp purposively. The criteria used for selection was based on three variables, namely, age, sex and level of education. Along the criterion of age, there were 5 respondent aged between 20 -29, 7 aged between 30-39, and 8 aged from 40 and above. The rational behind using age brackets was because the researcher felt that age gave the respondents different perspectives into looking at the conflict. On the basis of sex, there were 11 women and 9 men while the level of education was necessary for direct communication as opposed to interpretation.
Data Collection Methods.
Both primary and secondary methods of data collection were used in this research. The primary data collection methods included interviews of individuals, focus group discussions, and observation. Interviews were used for the district officials, Members of Parliament, religious leaders, diplomats and NGOs. Interviews were suitable for these categories since each person was able to give in-depth answers due to their positions and experiences at their places of work. Interviews were carried out with the help of an interview guide to ascertain individual opinions on the resolution of the conflict in northern Uganda. The purpose of the interviews therefore was to probe the ideas of the respondents about the continued warfare in northern Uganda. A documentary analysis by the Ministry for Defence and UPDF was consulted since getting audience with the army PRO in Gulu and Kampala proved challenge to the researcher.
There were two Focus Group Discussions, one for residents of IDP Camp and another for former abductees and rebels. FGD for the IDP Camp consisted of 20 respondents while that for the former abductees and rebels consisted of 15 respondents. FDG was employed in the IDP Camp because the respondents faced similar problems and largely shared the same views on the topic with little differences while the former abductees and rebels went through different experiences in the bush but had similar opinions on why the war has dragged on. FGD offers an opportunity to corroborate group members responses and generates discussions. FGD also raised the confidence of some members to contribute freely on the topic, some of who would otherwise feel shy if they were interviewed individually. Observation was applied to all categories of respondents who were chosen for either FGD or interviews. Observation was important because it made it easy for the researcher to see respondents’ reactions, body language, and the general conditions of the study area especially the camp.
Secondary data collection methods involved collection of information from books, reports, documents, magazines and newspaper. In this study the researcher obtained data from Makerere University Main Library, Women and Gender Studies Library, Department of Political Science and Public Administration Library, NGO Forum materials in Gulu, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative library, Internet and Bulletin of Justice and Peace Commission of Gulu Archdiocese. The researcher also consulted news reports of the army Public Relations Officer.
Data Analysis.
In this research, data was presented mainly in descriptive form. From interviews, Focus Group Discussion and observation, themes and categories were identified in relations to the objectives of the research. Relationships between themes were sought thus leading to identification of sub themes. Where necessary quotations from respondents were used to back up the research findings. Then there was analysis geared towards tracing the socio- economic and political factors regarding the conflict in northern Uganda.
Research Findings
Causes of the northern Uganda conflict.
The rebellion in Acholi sub-region started on 20th August 1986 by the UNLA soldiers who were overthrown by the NRA/M to regain power. According to one of the Local Council Five members in Gulu district:
The northern conflict has an historical background. Right from colonial period to post colonial era, there has been North- South rift. When the NRA/M took over power in 1986, the way the army (NRA/M) handled Acholi was lamentable. This mistreatment forced the UNLA to wage war against the NRM government.
(Interview, September 2005)
A number of atrocities committed by NRA in Acholi land is also said to be one of the causes for the outbreak of the northern conflict, the famous incident being at Namukora where many civilians were allegedly massacred by the army. Another cause, according to a district official in Gulu, was opposition to Museveni’s rule. The Acholi soldiers who had been in power for only six months thought they would fight and topple the NRM government.In 1988, the rebels then (UPDA) entered into peace agreement with the NRM ending the first phase of the conflict. The spiritual element of this conflict came in around 1988 through Alice Lakwena. According to the same district official the causes of this conflict have not been the same; they have been varying over time.
According to a Catholic missionary working in Gulu, there were fears from the northerners that the NRA would take revenge on them for the Luwero atrocities allegedly committed by the UNLA, which was composed mainly by northern tribes, Acholi being one. This forced them to oppose the NRM government. He added that there was a sense of betrayal on the side of the NRM/A due to the inability to respect the Nairobi Peace Accord of 1985 between the Okello Lutwa government and the NRM. This forced the Acholi to keep on fighting the NRM even after they (UNLA) lost power to the NRM in 1986.
Loss of jobs in the armed services as well as in government ministries which for long had employed the northerners, coupled with disgruntlements and frustration on the part of the youth culminated into the outbreak of the conflict. Later on the remnants of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) rebels understood that they were not going to get anywhere with this war so they decided to enter into peace talks with the government, which however, never worked as agreed thus forcing those who had refused the idea of peace talks to remain in the bush and joined by those who fled back after the break down of the peace talks with the government.
According to a Catholic Priest working in Gulu, many of these rebels ‘had no political aims’ but were dominated with religious cults. That is how the LRA came to be born.
Neglect of the north and unequal distribution of the national cake was identified as one of the causes of the conflict in northern Uganda, by the research assistant, NGO Forum Gulu. She added that the Acholi in the diaspora supported the rebellion against the NRM soon after it took power. In her own opinion, there was a mental construction by the Acholi that, to get rich you need to capture state power.
In a Focus Group Discussion in Unyama Camp, the IDPs on their part attributed the causes of the conflict to politicians and ex-soldiers of Tito Okello who wanted to regain power due to fear of revenge from the NRA soldiers and loss of cattle a major a source of livelihood, which they blamed on the government of Yoweri Museveni. Marginalization of the north economically and politically coupled with poverty resulting from cattle rustling, as well as the question of revenge for the alleged atrocities committed in Luwero triangle by UNLA soldiers were part of the causes of the conflict. A district official asserted that the 1966 crisis, which sparked off political turmoil in the country, was perceived as if the north was fighting the south. In 1966, Dr Apollo Milton Obote abolished kingdoms and assumed the Presidency, which was held by the Kabaka (King) of Buganda Kingdom under the 1962 Constitution sparking off violent confrontation between the central government and Buganda kingdom. This forced the King to flee to exile from where he died, leading to the political and social hatred between the Baganda and the northerners. It is interesting to note that Milton Obote married a Muganda woman, but the unfortunate part of it is that when he died in 2005, many Baganda celebrated his death. According to him, the mistrust, which resulted from the 1966 crisis, is very strong between the north and south especially in Buganda to date.
The Programme Officer in charge of Governance and Civil society at the European Union intimated that the cause of the conflict is ‘the question of national identity’ and the struggle inside Acholiland on how to live among themselves and at the national level on how to solve the situation in their area.
The Challenges to Peaceful settlement of thenorthern Uganda conflict.
Despite this bleak picture, or because of it, there have been several attempts made by various agencies to bring peace and reconciliation to the region. Tiberio Okeny Atwoma, Peter Odok and the late Bishop Cyprian Kiangire of Gulu Diocese made the first attempt. In the process, the first two risked their lives by going into Sudan to negotiate with the leaders of the Uganda Peoples Defence Army (UPDA). Their effort resulted in the signing of the Peace Accord in December 1988 between the UPDA and the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) government (Kacoke Madit 2000:5)
By 1994, the situation had once again reached a state where the government felt it was necessary to attempt to bring peace to the north. Thus in 1994, peace talks, under the umbrella of Acholi Pacification Committee (APC) were held between LRA and the government. Betty Bigombe was the Minister for Pacification of the North and her efforts nearly came to fruitation, facilitated these talks. “We have had moments in which we thought that the nightmare was coming to an end, only to see our hope vanish,” says John Baptist Odama, the archbishop of Gulu on the peace talks attempts tried so far (The Sunday Vision August 2002:26). Bigombe’s peace talks ended badly when President Museveni announced one day that he had given the LRA ten days to abandon the rebellion, or else the NRA would go on the offensive (The Monitor, Wednesday, October 2nd 2002:21). Museveni has been making such threatening statements thereby making all the peace talks attempts unsuccessful. (The Monitor, Monday, March 17th 2003: 1-2). As peace agreements are reached, the implementation skills and political flexibility become more critical. Understandably, security fears reach their peak during the implementation phase. Negotiated agreements are often fragile and difficult to put into effect. Parties to the conflict suffer anxieties that opponents will cheat on their commitments. It is therefore important that mediators must act imaginatively to encourage all parties to live up to the agreements, and therefore produce an environment that promotes credible commitment. Perhaps this was missing during the 1994 peace talks between Betty Bigombe and the LRA.
In yet another major effort, Acholi people living in the Diaspora sought to bring about peace and reconciliation through dialogue. In the process, Kacoke Madit organized conferences in April 1997 and July 1998 in London and in 2000 in Nairobi to transform the international community’s attitudes about the conflict in Northern Uganda. The other peace talks attempts at mediation have been through the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). ARLPI was formed specifically in response to the violent conflict that has caused much devastation in Acholiland. The urgent need for peace has brought the Christians and Moslems together in prayers for peace and reconciliation. The ARLPI has played a significant role in the formation of the Amnesty Bill 1998, which became an Act of Parliament in December 1999.
Several peace initiatives, starting with the fateful turning point of 1994 spearheaded by Betty Bigombe, have been tried with little successes. Today in Gulu, there is a district peace and reconciliation team composed of councillors, religious leaders, MPs, NGOs, UPDF, former rebels or collaborators, and traditional leaders. At another level, there is the Amnesty Act that pardons all the rebels who have picked up arms to fight the NRM government since it came to power in 1986. Then there is the Uganda-Sudan Religious Leaders Consultative Forum, the Sant Egidio Community and the Acholi Parliamentary Group. All these initiatives have one agenda: to restore peace and stability in the region. But the Acholi politicians and the military have their fences to mend. (Sunday Vision, August 4th 2002:27).
But the Ministry of Defence and UPDF spokesperson, maintains that the Government’s decision to look for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict has always been influenced by other stakeholders, who believed the military option alone could not end the LRA problem. When the 1994 negotiations failed to yield fruits, the government decided on the approach of fighting and talking at the same time. This was because, given all the other avenues discussed above, the LRA continued to attack innocent civilians and these were mainly the hard-core criminals who have deliberately refused those other opportunities of giving up rebellion and have made it difficult for those who may want to surrender.
The UPDF Public Relations Officer was concerned by the fact that, the LRA chief peace negotiator who was also the LRA spokesman, Sam Kolo was forced to surrender to the UPDF in February 2005, following a directive of LRA leader, Joseph Kony, to have him killed because he (Kolo) wanted the LRA leadership to give peace talks serious attention. He concluded that for keen followers of the trend of the conflict since 2002, it could not be questioned that Operation Iron Fist was an immense strategic and tactical success. The loss of territory by the LRA in southern Sudan was a stab in their back from which they will never recover. He therefore advocated for military option to end this conflict.
A diplomat working with the European Union in the Governance and Civil Society section attributed the failure of peace talks to “lack of space outside Uganda for negotiations”. The kinds of options possible as demanded by the rebels, for example ruling Uganda by the Ten Commandments in the Holy Bible and purification of Acholi land, are unimaginable. The terms set by the government for negotiations with the rebels are quite high, explaining that “in most cases the government set the conditions for negotiations leaving the rebels with few or no options apart from going by those terms, which end up failing”. Therefore, he concurred that at the “moment there was need to widen activity from the various actors in this conflict away from the pure option of settlement, or agreement”, but to widen the development agenda for Acholiland. This would involve working on improving the livelihood for the people in Acholiland with development intervention and setting a long-term process on peace but not making it a condition for development.
The spiritual element of Kony affects negatively on the peace process. According to the former abductees and rebels, there is every reason to believe that Kony has the spiritual powers to foresee what each of the commanders is planning. This has made it hard for the commanders to effectively negotiate without having to make consultations with Kony. During Focus Group Discussion with the former abductees and rebels, they complained that the government “dictates all the terms for peace talks like setting deadlines for peace talks”, which is a problem. To them both sides, LRA and government, “are not committed to peace talks because there is no trust from either side”. They suggested that “there should be unconditional ceasefire and the international community, probably a third party/country should be involved in the peace process”. To them the presence of International Criminal Court (I.C.C) is an obstacle to peace initiatives, as most LRA will not come out of the bush.
He said that in 2002, a “high-powered” Presidential Team (PPT) led by the then First deputy prime minister, Eria Kategaya was formed to pursue peace talks with the LRA leadership. The PPT became redundant because the LRA did not name their peace team and instead continued with its atrocities, including the butchering of a PPT emissary, Oketch Kulu, in Chwero, Gulu district, as he tried to deliver letters and mobile phones to them to enhance communication.
The former abductees and rebels think the LRA is interested in ending the conflict but the actions of the government have frustrated this purpose. They revealed that the majority of LRA are ready to talk to the government but the government wants to use both military and negotiation at the same time to end the conflict, which has complicated the situation. According to them, Kony prefers the ‘Rwoth’ and elders in the settlement of the conflict. A research assistant working with NGO Forum Gulu, stated that the NGO is engaged in research, sensitisation, mobilization and capacity building in the peace process through workshops, seminars, information dissemination, distribution of photos/pictures on the events of the conflict which has helped in restoring hope and reforming the affected people.
A diplomat working with the European Union said that their role in resolving this conflict has been “providing instruments of development, improving on the livelihood of the people and infrastructure in the region as a means of peace building”. He added that it “was more and more common sense that development in whatever sector has an implication on peace”, so it was the concept of linking development with peace buildings.
The Military Approach in Resolving the Northern Uganda conflict.
When the NRM/A captured State power in January 1986, it was sure to eliminate ‘banditry’ in the next few months, according to President Museveni in his address to the Nation on the 25th Anniversary of Uganda’s Independence in October 9th, 1987. He said then that over the last 12 months the NRA had inflicted serious defeats on the bandits, eliminating them from many areas of Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Apac, Kotido, Moroto, Kapchorwa, Soroti and Kumi (The New Vision, October, Tuesday 13th, 1987:8). ‘There will be no round table conference with them. Never.’ Museveni declared on the 18th October 1986 in reference to the rebels fighting in northern Uganda.
In 1991, a major military operation code named ‘Operation North’ was launched. Spear headed by then General David Tinyefunza, the then Minister of State for Defence led a ruthless campaign to uproot and finish the rebels. The Defence ministry described it as a Cordon- and Search Operation. Operation North distinguished itself for its brutality, meted out against a civilian population suspected of collaborating with the rebels.
Gersony (1997) reports that at Buchoro in north-eastern Gulu several prisoners were tortured to death in a pit by the NRA. Operation North is said to have weakened the LRA and reduced them to ‘hundreds’ in 1992.Why the NRA did not at the time finish off the remnants of Kony’s forces remains a mystery (The Monitor, Thursday, April 1st 2004:17). Gersony quotes sources as saying that some of the commanders may have wanted the war to continue so that they would continue receiving operational allowances. Others suggested that the army did not want to risk its soldiers, since the LRA threat was considered all but over. Tinyefunza denies having committed atrocities against the population but maintains that his operation brought Kony to his knees. He says that was also the time that Kony went into exile and was armed by the ‘terrorists’ Sudan and Congo. ‘We were not fighting rag-tag army. Kony was now fighting a proxy war of the Sudanese regime’ (ibid: 17)
In June 1996, then Major General Salim Saleh was appointed, Presidential Advisor on Political and Military Affairs in northern Uganda. He was in charge of Operation Clean, which began on the 1st August 1996. The overall objective of this operation was to end the conflict in the north and would last for six months using ‘soft approach’ like denying rebels safe passage. According to Saleh, he believed that the war would soon end. To him the signs were; militarily they were improving on the capacity of the army, working on mobilization schemes for the population like seminars and initiating income generating projects, the international feeling and pressure was building up against the source of the problem and generally, government was giving the army more capacity and facilities.
He added that they were repairing the damage that might have been caused between the army and the civilians through discussions and that he was personally working on some other options which could resolve the problem peacefully, but which do not endanger long-term national interests (The New Vision, Monday, September 30th 1996).
After the failure of the 1994 Peace Talks initiative, there was, yet another attempt by the two protagonists to resolve the conflict by might. This was particularly illustrated by the Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security chaired by Honorable Gabbe, in 1997. This Report recommended the strengthening of the army as the focus of the government in resolving the armed conflict in Acholi. The Minority Report of Honorables Omara Atubo and Norbert Mao, on its part down played the role of the military and focused on dialogue and peaceful reconciliation. (Kacoke Madit 2000:29).
The military position taken by the Members of Parliament could have resulted from Museveni’s earlier statement in which he expressed his opposition to peace talks with the LRA rebels. He said he could forgive the ‘misled’ but not the ‘misleaders’ (The New Vision, Friday 15th 1996). In 1996, the Prime Minister then, Honorable Kintu Musoke in an interview with the New Vision journalist said that there was no need to talk to Kony. ‘What is there to talk about with Kony? . He is not a freedom fighter. He does not have a political programme’ he concluded (The New Vision, Wednesday August 21st 1996:19).
In March 2002, Sudan signed a protocol allowing the UPDF to enter Sudanese sovereign territory and ‘flush’ out Kony. Uganda in return pledged not to harbor or assist the Sudan People’s Liberation Army militarily. Barely three months after the operation started, the rebels returned to Uganda, and have since stepped up atrocities, and even expanded the zone of operation to Teso and Lango. In the meantime, the operation does not appear to have stopped the movement into and out of Sudan by the LRA top commanders. The UPDF defends the operation, saying it has driven the rebels from the expanse of southern Sudan back to Uganda. President Museveni and military officials insist that Sudan has continued to arm the LRA despite the agreement, accusation strongly denied by Sudan.
The President made public the details of Operation Iron Fist against Joseph Kony’s LRA rebels on August 25th 2002 outlining its achievements, listing the enemy losses, the UPDF casualties, and explained what remained to be done. In a 19-page document titled ‘Operation Iron Fist- The Balance Sheet’, Museveni maintained that sustaining the military pressure on the LRA was the only way to convince Kony to talk meaningful peace. He described LRA as nomadic. ‘We have been able to achieve all this in the rainy season when the grass is very tall in Southern Sudan and northern Uganda. You can be sure that this conflict will, definitely, be over, latest, by February, 2003 when the grass will have been burnt if it goes that far’ Museveni concluded. This Operation, however, has not ended the conflict.
The best option to end this war is to apply force according to the Ministry of Defence and army spokesperson. In a documentary analysis, he stated that:
Because the conflict in Northern Uganda was armed rebellion, it definitely had to be met with arms and therefore the military option. At the start of the rebellion, around August 1986, there was no terrorism like it later came to be, especially after 1989-1994 when the LRA got the [open] support of the Sudanese Government.
(The New Vision, Friday, June 17, 2005:18).
He stressed that the deterioration of the LRA from rebels or insurgents to rural terrorists called for an increased military expedition to stop the terrorism on innocent civilians. The military option no doubt, he said, has achieved tremendously against the LRA, especially with the start of ‘Operation Iron Fist’ in 2002, following an understanding between the governments of Sudan and Uganda allowing Uganda’s military, the UPDF to pursue the LRA inside southern Sudan. He rated the performance of the military operation as being effective. He concluded that, “what the army should do is to perfect these tactical approaches to deal with the small scattered remnants who are diehards. Otherwise, the LRA rebels have a significant role to play in ending the conflict, they have been offered a big menu to choose from Amnesty for those willing to give up rebellion, peace talks for those who want to achieve a win-win situation through negotiation, and fighting for those who think they can fight”.
But a significant number of civilians interviewed asserted that many soldiers look at the conflict as meaningless since they are fighting children and most of the soldiers in the field are Acholi and sometimes they feel that they are killing their own brothers.
The war is also seen by some soldiers as posing no threat to the establishment in Kampala as observed by a district official:
Soldiers do not see LRA as a threat to the authority in Kampala, so the UPDF are here because life and property are being destroyed; otherwise, the willingness to end the war is not there. To me I support both options, which are peace and military approaches. We have tried to talk to Kony but he is not ready to listen. Many of the LRA see the gun as a means of survival.
(Interview, September 2005).
One of the district official interviewed believed that the approach had contributed fifty-fifty in both peace and dialogue forcing the rebels to talk peace at sometimes and has reduced their military strengths. He was optimistic that the regional arrangement between Sudan and Uganda may hopefully bring peace to both countries if the death of John Garang, the ex- leader of the SPLA/M does not affect the agreement between the two countries and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by Sudan government and SPLM/A.
Other respondents are opposed to the military option because Kony abducted innocent children whom he took to the bush and trained to become rebels. One respondent emphasized that:
The reason why we wanted to talk to the rebels is not that we think they are very nice people with nice ideas that they should be given recognition. No! That is not the reason. The reason is that 80% of the LRA is made up of children who were abducted, so we are dealing with a huge hostage crisis. Therefore, the government has to recognize that when they say they have killed thousands of rebels, 80% of them … were abducted children, so it is a moral issue. On one hand you have failed to protect children, on the other hand the solution you are giving is to kill them.
(Interview, September 2005)
The negative aspect of the military approach according to some respondents is related to the destruction of property and lives. Some claimed the option has drained resources, which could have been used for other development projects. During FGD in Unyama IDP there were mixed feelings about the military approach. In a low tone, one respondent had this to say:
To me this war is a business. When there was war in Congo (DRC), Ugandan soldiers were sent there, Rwanda also sent theirs (soldiers). When war broke out in Kasese (ADF rebels), the government also sent the army there and the war ended. But here the military approach has not yielded anything. The government should seek for peaceful resolution. War does not bring peace.
(Focus Group Discussion, September 2005)
Some members suggested that both sides, the government and the LRA, should accept that in one-way or another, they have been defeated. They said the war could no longer end through military approach urging the government to have good will to talk peace.
A diplomat at the European Union based in Uganda disagreed on the military option arguing that when looking at the past 18 years, the military approach has been the dominant one, but had failed to resolve the conflict. He said that he has always objected the military solution or military strategy alone, aware that it will not end the war. He said there was need to develop a culture of analysis and negotiated solutions to this conflict.
Explaining why the military option has failed to resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda despite Parliament’s recommendation in 1997 in support of the military option, an MP from Gulu district attributed the persistence of LRA to a number of factors:
There were no soldiers deployed in the north, they deployed 10,000 ghost soldiers. 18 soldiers guarded Paboo Camp of 60,000 people. Government procured junk helicopters, supplies to officers in the north were miserable and the state of their morale to wage war was low.
Secondly, the bases of the LRA were not the same. LRA had bases in Sudan. This forced the government to try to negotiate with Sudan to pursue LRA inside Sudan under ‘Operation Iron Fist’.
(Interview, September 2005)
He concluded by asserting that there was no serious commitment on the military option a part from threats from the government ‘we will kill them, we will destroy them-with ghosts you can’t do that’. However, the spokesperson for Defence and the UPDF does not agree with the above argument. He asserted that UPDF commanders are not benefiting from the conflict:
Why is it that it is only the LRA conflict that is beneficial and not the others that have been defeated? Economic sense says that the more investments you have the more revenue you get. If war is an investment for the commanders, then West Nile Bank Front should be here, UNRF II, UNRF I, UPA, ADF should all be here so that all of us can benefit. It makes no economic sense.
(The Monitor, Tuesday, February 24 2004:18)
The obstacles to the settlement of the Northern Uganda conflict.
There was a general feeling by the respondents interviewed that, there was no genuine political will to talk peace on the government side as well as the LRA, and therefore there was no trust between the two parties. Another respondent argued that illiterate people, LRA rebels, are leading the rebellion and as such it is very difficult to discuss with them and come out with a consensus. For example, Kony’s political agenda, other than ruling on the Ten Commandments, which he has himself not respected, is not clear.
Some respondents asserted that politicians are part of the problem by ‘talking on the ground but not ending the war’. As mentioned later on, some people are gaining from the war and as such are not willing to see the war end as observed by one respondent: “The conflict has been economic capital to the army in form of ‘‘classified expenditures’’ which are not accounted for (Interview, September 2005)
In an interview with the a district Official in Gulu, that there is no clear mediation strategy put in place by the government in terms of framework and time frame. What is there are the ‘running errands’. He reasoned that civilians cannot talk/negotiate peace with armed rebels, instead they have been lamenting, and Government should have created a military mediation team with observers from international community. The spiritual dimension of Kony war, which is a big obstacle in resolving this conflict, calls for prayers to counteract his evil powers’ according to a district official. He said that there is need for a ‘spiritual front’ to act as a task force. There is need for one voice, one approach as observed by one respondent that “some members of the district council talk about fighting today, then tomorrow they are talking of negotiation”.
In a Focus Group Discussion with the former abductees and rebels on the above issue, one complained that there are too many groups in the peace negotiation, for instance, the Presidential Peace Team, Betty Bigombe’s team, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, Members of Parliament, Elders/traditional leaders- all of whom want recognition. They also complained about the negligence by the authorities when they return from the bush:
There are no resettlement packages given to former abductees and rebels to begin a new life a part from top commanders and child mothers forcing some of them to return to the bush and those in the bush fear to come out on that ground. The male returnees and children are given nothing.
(Focus Group Discussion, September 2005).
Another obstacle in resolving the conflict is the fact that the LRA is scattered without territorial control and lacks a political wing where they can be contacted. Normally in a country where there are rebels fighting the government, rebels control a part of the territory where negotiators can stay with them and is quite safe.
According to a Member of Parliament from Gulu district, there are conflicting approaches in resolving the conflict, namely peace talks (traditional mechanisms inclusive), Amnesty, Military approach and International Criminal Court (ICC).These conflicting approaches some times slows down the peace process rendering others irrelevant at times.
A diplomat at the European Union summed up the obstacles and challenges that “LRA is very irrational in their ideological and strategic thinking”, and secondly, “the Acholi society was in a strong transition period to be fully accepted in Uganda compounded with the government’s inflexibility”. A Church Missionary Priest working in the North supported the above point arguing that “there has been a bit of inconsistency on the part of the government in the sense that if government is challenged by the international community on peace talks their response is that they are very much interested in peace talks” making reference to religious leaders and Bigombe’s attempts. In other words, the government is ‘committed to peace talks but it is not consistent’.
This conflict has attracted ‘opportunists’ who pose as rebel commanders demanding for money from the peace team negotiators. One respondent looked at the obstacles and challenges from three levels saying that at the local dimension, the war brought division among the people in the area with some people supporting the rebels by providing them with information as well as material assistance like food and medicines, while other people were against the rebellion. At the National level, the government looked at the war as an Acholi affair stressing that for a long time the government never looked at the war critically to get a permanent solution to it. Regionally there is the Sudan support, which was in return for Uganda’s support to the SPLA/M while intervention from International Community never came early enough.
There was a strong belief by most of the respondents interviewed that corruption is one of the factors why the conflict has dragged on to date. According to a top Local council five member of Gulu district, “there were ghost soldiers in the region through which the top army commanders are enriching themselves. Fat field operation allowances, which are given to the commanders, act as a motivation to keep the war going. There are commanders who are engaged in serious business in the region and getting rich from the war, which is a business like venture to them. There are collaborators within the Acholi sub-region who are reaping from the conflict and would not therefore, wish the war to end’’ (Interview, September 2005).
When asked whether corruption is the reason behind the prolonged war in the north, a diplomat at the European Union said that:
Whenever there is money involved, people are involved. We have to know the role of the army in conflict situations, whether the army is there to solve the conflict or the conflict keeps the army in place with all interests, which are there. People who have served in the military force for a long time and are part of the conflict, whether they want it or not, have their personal interests in that conflict.(Interview, September 2005.)
A Member of Parliament from Gulu district summed it up that the government deployed 10,000 ghost soldiers, with only 18 soldiers guarding 60,000 Internally Displaced Persons in Paboo camp adding that the supplies to officers in the North were miserable .
On the huge military (defence) budget allocated to the Ministry of Defence by Parliament to purchase military hardware to defeat the LRA, he responded that it went to procure junk helicopters, security roads became a huge a huge project for the army to pocket money from the government. In other words, the war became a huge business venture for the officers of the UPDF.
However, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence and UPDF in a documentary analysis admits that corruption in the army is part of the corruption in the country, which is not only confined in the army:
The problem of ghost soldiers arose from the burning our records in 1989 in Republic House, where we had our headquarters. After that, the Rwandese left some of the Rwandese who left stayed on the pay roll. Those who kept them on the pay roll realised that it was attractive earning salaries for those who were not there. Coupled with the burning of records, people started having ghost soldiers. You declare 580 soldiers when you have 500.You have had of ghost teachers in schools, ghost nurses, so this is part of the corruption in the country. (The Monitor, Tuesday, February 2004:18).
Over the years, the LRA lost all political and military credibility and it would not have survived for so long if it had not enjoyed the support and sanctuary of Sudan. Sudan’s support was initially low key. It involved the provision of arms, often in exchange for ivory and children. After 1994, Sudan put itself squarely behind the LRA by giving them space to build their camps, weapons and uniforms. Kony was given £ 7000 per month. (Simba quoted in Mugaju & Oloka 2000:115). Simba further notes that the camps over the border provided the rebels with safe haven needed to train and equip large numbers of captives. In return, the LRA was expected to fight the SPLA inside Sudan. It was also supposed to mine northern roads that Sudan believed was being used to supply the SPLA (Ibid: 115).
Gersony (1997:37) alludes to the above facts. He notes that following the collapse of the peace talks, LRA forces withdrew to Southern Sudan, where they regrouped, retrained and were equipped with weapons, ammunition and land mines provided by the government of Sudan. In the resumed operations, which begun soon after the peace talks collapsed, LRA seemed more focused on the abduction of youngsters, perhaps because the availability of military supplies was no longer a constraint.
The war in northern Uganda is not only affected by the war in Sudan, but broader regional and international relations. In the early and mid-1990s, United States of America policy in the region revolved around supporting an alliance of the so called “frontline States” against the NIF government in Sudan, including Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda. It was also involved in supporting the SPLA/M. The NIF’S radical Islamic agenda was perceived as a threat to regional security after NIF ideologue Hassan el-Turabi famously spoke about the spreading of Islam to the Cape of Good Hope in 1993.
The government of Uganda considers the war with the LRA as a function of political developments in Sudan and has sought assurances that Sudan has ended its backing for the LRA. For its part the, Sudanese government, under President Omar al –Bashir wishes to see Uganda stop its backing for the SPLM/A. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed in 1995 and only restored in 2001 because of the implementation of The Carter Centre mediated in Nairobi agreement, December 1999. The change in strategy from confrontation to engagement comes because of international pressure, internal political changes and the intense diplomatic initiatives by the government of Sudan to improve its image.
The way forward.
There is no one agreed approach to end the conflict. A senior district official suggests that the cultural leaders who are trying to negotiate with LRA should be given the chance and freedom to try their luck while another suggested that Kony should be relocated to another country with the assistance of international community and called for national reconciliation.
The district disaster officer of Gulu suggested that ‘amnesty, with its weaknesses aside, should remain open for the few rebels who may come out. He emphasized the need for reconciliation, harmony and respect for the returnees because their lives were ruined by being taken away from ordinary life and trained there to kill so many people, because of the authority’s failure to protect them. Having come back home, calling of names like ex-combatants, child soldiers, rebels etc should end.
The former abductees and rebels suggested that the environment for peace talks should be conducive and if possible, out side Uganda because of the mistrust between the government and the rebels, which have developed over the past years.
Recommendations and the Way forward.
United Nations involvement in resolving conflicts in Africa has recorded success stories in some cases. Many countries, which have under gone civil wars like Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan, have partially been stable while others have attained full peace. In Angola, for example the intervention of UN after a prolonged conflict between the ruling party and UNITA rebels, resulted into the establishment of the Security Council Resolution 1118(1997) of 30 June 1997 of United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). Its main function was to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country. UN intervention was instrumental in restoring democracy and peace in Liberia. It would be a welcome move if the UN takes interest in finding lasting solutions to the conflict in northern Uganda as it has done in many countries in Africa.
Politically, the government should encourage and promote peaceful means to resolve this conflict. This involves creating a conducive environment, which will allow the rebels to be incorporated in the negotiation process and the national army for the sake of peace. The government has applied all the maximum force it has within her means for all these years but the rebellion continues to date. It is wise for any right-thinking person that genuine peace talks should be given a chance with the involvement of the third party in a foreign country.
There should be a deliberate government policy of promoting economic development in Acholi sub region. Since poverty in Acholi region drives many youth into rebellion, which contributes to insecurity in the region, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the local people. The government can lead the way in initiating development programmes in the area. Other local and international agencies should be encouraged to establish development projects in the area.
There is need for regional cooperation in order to get rid of Joseph Kony’s bases in Sudan as well as DRC. The urgency to minimize the arms trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region, requires all the neighbouring countries to work together to address the arms trade. The regional groupings like SADAC, though Uganda is not a member, East African Community (EAC), Common Market for East and Central Africa (COMESA) and the African Union (AU) should be vigorously involved.
The cultural and religious leaders in Acholi sub region and Uganda at large should take the lead in trying to make contacts with the rebels in the north. The beginning of this conflict and its continuity according to some respondents in Gulu are connected to religious and cultural norms of the Acholi. Indigenous conflict resolution may be one of the ways in resolving this conflict.
The government and aid agencies should relocate the Internally Displaced People from the camps to safer areas. These camps act as a reservoir for the rebels to abduct children, loot food and medicines, and their propaganda campaign against the government. The living conditions in these camps are very appalling. Secondly, these camps are very prone to attacks from LRA. It would be better if these camps were relocated to peaceful areas like Nakasongola or any region of Uganda to ensure the security of the IDPs.
The ICC arrest warrant should be withdrawn in the interest of peace in Acholi sub region.
Suggestions for further study.
Future research on the northern conflict should focus on the costs, both human and material of this conflict.
There should be research on the role and relevance of regional and international organizations as well as international community as far as resolving internal conflicts in developing countries are concerned.
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Web Resources.
Official Uganda Government Website, http://www.uganda.co.ug/government
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives, www.acholipeace.org
Kacoke Madit www.km-net.org
The Carter Center www.cartercentre.org
The New Vision www.newvision.co.ug
The Monitor www.monitor.co.ug
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