REFLECTION ON THE UGANDA ELECTORAL COMMISSION’S COMPLAINTS HANDLING MECHANISM IN THE 2006 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN UGANDA.

Introduction
The drudgery of election management carries with it the immense task of conflict resolution. The fundamental question arising therefrom is whether those administering the electoral process should be tasked to resolve conflicts, or whether elections should necessarily lead to the occurrence of conflicts. But common to the election period is a phenomenon of complaints among competing parties and other stakeholders. These may be against the way the election process is being conducted, or against their opponents. Whichever the case, complaints handling, becomes a central component of election administration. I use “complaints handling” interchangeably with “conflict resolution” albeit without pretence to implying that conflicts in the context of elections imply the broad concept of conflicts as used in the literature or other social studies. The concept “election complaints” here, implies disagreements and/or clashes that arise between or among competing political actors on the one hand; and between political actors, and other stakeholders, and election administrators on the other; which are brought on table for resolution, arbitration or advice on which course of action. Clashes between ‘political actors’[1], and their opponents may intensify and necessitate arbitration, resolution and, in extreme circumstances, result into punitive sanctions against the wrong party. Again, dissatisfaction among voters, political and non-political stakeholders, with the way the electoral process is administered, may result into complaints which call for explanation and certain actions by election administrators. Likewise, the role of security agencies and other state institutions in the electoral process may lead to complaints against their actions. Election administrators are expected to handle all these complaints because of their centrality in the election process.

The focus of this paper is the complaints handling mechanism used by the Uganda Electoral Commission in the 2006 general elections. In the proceeding part, the paper gives a brief historical reflection on election management in Uganda. Next is a theoretical viewpoint of election complaints handling with a focus on Uganda. The following part focuses on the experience in the 2006 elections, revealing the complaints handling mechanisms developed and used by the Commission. The second last part discusses the complaints management process, by analysing the extent of its effectiveness, and the missing link. Then in the concluding part, recommendations are made pertaining to how best election complaints can be handled in future. It is worth stating at this point, that election complaints handling in Uganda, has historically been haphazard and no visible mechanisms had been in place to resolve complaints. Both the government and the Commission were intertwined, and it was possible to have a complaint addressed to a government official who is not a Commission official. Therefore, the Commission had no complaints desk to receive, determine and resolve election complaints, until 2006. Now a brief historical overview.

Historical Reflections
The idea of elections in Uganda came with the colonialist. In pre-colonial Uganda, people held meetings to elect representatives to the King’s Court or the communal council. Rulers, sometimes, appointed their favorites to such councils. Where elections were conducted, it was by show of hands. The colonialist changed this. He introduced a form of civilization based on election of people’s representatives. Representation on the Legislative Council (LEGCO), a form of Parliament set up by the colonial government in 1921, was later necessary. The LEGCO had no African representative at all. The first three African representatives were appointed in 1945[2]. By 1958, the LEGCO had 63 members, half of whom were Africans (Bwengye, 1985:5-20). Increased African representation to the LEGCO led to more pressure for self-rule, both in the Council and outside. It was an independence struggle.

Political parties were formed as a means of securing political clout in the struggle for independence, and in search of electoral opportunities in the new arrangement[3], especially after independence. The first elections, which would result into increased African representation to the LEGCO, were held in October 1958[4]. These elections gave UNC five seats; Democratic Party (DP) one seat; and independents four seats plus Nkore and Bugisu’s three independents, making them seven. The position of Buganda, since the 1900 agreement, caused jealousy from the rest of the country. The colonial government too gave special treatment to Buganda. Anti-Buganda jealousy partly led, in January 1959, to the split of the Uganda National Congress[5]. Complaints handling mechanisms used during the 1958 elections remain unknown. Political confusion followed the 1958 elections. There was no constitution under which they were held, but laws enacted by the colonial government. Responding to the confusion, the Governor, announced a Constitutional Committee on January 4, 1959, led by J.V. Wild[6]. The Wild committee recommended that elections be held “throughout the whole protectorate on the common roll basis… as early as can be arranged in 1961” (Ibingira, 1973:69-70). Hence the 1961 elections. Buganda pressed for a federal status if she was to take part in these elections. Her demand was ignored by the colonial government. She boycotted the elections. Only 4% of eligible voters in Buganda had registered to vote amidst a campaign that emphasized that taking part in the registration exercise would imply disobeying the Kabaka. The Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) scored 494,954 while DP got 415,718 votes. But DP got 43 while UPC got 35 seats. The 4% voters in Buganda gave DP 20 out of 21 seats even when UPC had scored more votes than DP. This showed an imbalance in seats allocated to each region by the colonial government. UNC won one seat; independents got two. DP, led by Ben Kiwanuka, formed a government[7]. Complaints against the 1961 election malpractices were not handled. This bred future discontent.
The following developments leading to the pre-independence (including the February 1962 Lukiiko) elections were interesting. During the London conference (September-October 1961), UPC supported Buganda’s demands in a tactical move aimed at dislodging DP, to prevent a catholic-dominated party from forming the first independence government. Religio-political conflicts of the 1880s had thus resurfaced. UPC allied with Kabaka Yekka (King Alone) in the 1962 elections. The Lukiiko opted to appoint Buganda representatives to the National Assembly, while the rest of Uganda voted in April 1962. From these elections, DP won three out of the 68 seats. The KY/UPC alliance[8] helped the UPC to take the lead, and Apollo Milton Obote became Prime Minister. Uganda got independence on October 9, 1962, under a protestant-dominated party, but “what went wrong in Uganda after independence” was to pave way for further democratic and electoral complications (Karugire 1996:45-48).

Political complexions of societies that constituted Uganda differed significantly. The position and stand of Buganda was difficult to alter. A Constitutional Heads (Elections) Act No. 66 of 1963, sought to amend the independence constitution, and empower districts to elect Constitutional Heads equivalent to the heads of Kingdom areas. But candidates of President and Vice President were restricted to rulers of federal states (Kingdoms) and constitutional heads of districts. Complications that followed forced the UPC to create a post of vice president to give Nadiope, the Kyabazinga, a share in a government. Because his region strongly supported UPC. Crossings (termed ‘crossing the floor”) from other parties to UPC became commonplace as the alliance between KY and UPC dwindled. This soon degenerated into political and legislative maneuvers[9].

The 1966 Kabaka crisis and the subsequent events were to cripple further hopes of electioneering in Uganda for the next decade or so. The 1967 Republication Constitution abolished kingdoms. The former Prime Minister became President without being elected. Political and military complications that ensued led to the 1971 coup d'etat led by Idi Amin. Amin promised general elections but only after a new constitution had been worked out and accepted by the whole country. “Time to do this never came. Amin never referred to it again. Day after day, the promise of elections was forgotten” (Bwengye 1985: 36-8). Amin became dictatorial, until his fall in 1979 as a result of a military confrontation organised by Ugandan exilees with the help of Tanzania. Prof. Yusuf Lule became President after the fall of Amin, only to be overthrown by Godfrey L. Binaisa, 68 days later. The government of Binaisa organized elections to fill the 60 vacant seats of the National Consultative Council (NCC) (Aseka, 2005:332). Binaisa himself promised to bring elections forward in October/November 1980 (Bwengye, 1985:41-42)[10] under the umbrella of Uganda National Liberation Front. No party was allowed to contest under its own banner[11]. Paul Muwanga commanded control over the Military Commission that organized the 1980 elections. As elections drew nearer, Obote, who had been working closely with Muwanga while still in exile, returned. UPC used its legislative supremacy to pass through crucial legislations concerning the 1980 elections (Aseka, 2005:335). Obote and Muwanga trained their supporters to carry out the creeping rigging that riddled these elections (Bwengye 1985:91-92). Complaints against the workings of the UPC were raised by the opposition but were ignored. Elections “were actually won by DP which swept Buganda and Busoga with a landslide” (Aseka, 2005). But the December 11, 1980 decree “barred returning officers from declaring any results unless such results were approved by Muwanga personally”. Constituency results were to be submitted not to the Electoral Commission, but to Muwanga himself. Non-compliance with this decree carried a penalty of 70,000 dollars (Amaza, 1998:19). UPM, led by Yoweri Museveni, rejected these elections, and in 1981, the UPM (now transformed into the National Resistance Army/Movement), declared a guerrilla war, which lasted till 1986. Attempts by the Obote II government (and later in 1985, the Okello leadership) to end the war by peaceful means, were futile. On January 26, 1986, the NRM/A captured power. The NRM/A’s Ten Point Program developed during the bush war promised a restoration of democracy (Museveni, 1997; Aseka, 2005:375). Resistance Councils developed during the bush days became the mode of administration.

In 1987, elections of the Resistance Councils (RCs) were held at village level. Village nine-member committees were elected countrywide. Delegates to these elections built up to the district level. In 1989, the National Resistance Council (NRC) elections were held from village to the National level to form a Parliament. As one moved higher and higher, people’s involvement reduced, as these were collegial elections. Voting was by lining behind the candidate of one’s choice. These elections were not democratic but showed a drastic change - a fundamental change - for government did not interfere in the voting (Aseka, 2005:376). Though complaints were raised against this collegial arrangement, the government insisted it was still a transition period.

A Constitutional Commission, chaired by Justice Benjamin Odoki, was formed in 1988, and tasked to collect views countrywide to make a constitution for the country. It completed its work in 1993, and recommended that a Constituent Assembly be elected to debate the draft constitution. On March 28, 1994, Constituent Assembly (CA) elections were held countrywide. From the CA debates, a final constitution was adopted in October 1995 (Byarugaba 1997; Aseka 2005; Amaza, 1998; Kanyeihamba, 2002). The 1995 constitution, among other significant things: a) placed all power(including franchise powers ) in the hands of the people (article 1(1)-(4); b) limited presidential terms to two five-year terms (Article 105(2); c) put political parties and their activities in abeyance until a referendum is held on possible change of the political system, (Article 74); and d) established an independent, autonomous and impartial Electoral Commission charged with the duty of managing and conducting elections and referenda (Articles 60-68).

The first direct presidential elections were held in 1996 under the Movement system. During these elections, important aspects of election management were not properly executed. Several complaints were raised against the way voter registration, campaigns and creation of an additional 700 polling stations, a day to polling, were administered. The incumbent used state facilities as well as money donated by supporters. “Most serious in the 1996 presidential elections, was the use of money and bribery of voters” (Makara et al, (eds.) (2003:16-25). Complaints raised against all these were not attended to. The 1996 elections left a lot to be desired. Both the Electoral Commission and the government never attempted to ensure a democratic political dispensation, by handling complaints arising from the conduct of the electoral process.

Political parties and donors continued with their opposition to the no-party Movement system, arguing that this crippled democracy (Aseka, 2005). Government agreed to hold a referendum in 2000 on possible change of the political system. A Referendum Bill was passed in 1999, but was later challenged in Court. The opposition, led by P.K Ssemwogerere petitioned the Constitutional Court challenging the way Parliament had passed the 1999 Referendum Act[12]. Court ruled, in 2003, that Parliament had wrongfully passed the Act. But government appealed, and the decision of the Constitutional Court was reversed. This would otherwise have implied that the Movement system did not exist since the 2000 referendum. Thus, a constitutional crisis was looming. The referendum held in 2000 resulted into the continuation of the Movement system, under which the 2001 presidential elections were also held (Aseka, 2006).

The 2001 elections were hotly contested[13]. Dr. Kiiza Besigye paused the toughest electoral resistance against an incumbent president in the history of Uganda. Parliamentary and Local Government elections too, were a hot contestation in some areas, although the government side came out triumphant. The Electoral Commission faced a tough task of managing hotly contested elections. Indeed, several loopholes were recorded from the Commission’s work. The voters’ register cast a lot of doubts[14]. Harassment, intimidation, military involvement, beatings and unlawful arrests, riddled campaigns. Polling day activities were not well managed either (Makara et al, 2003:291). Complaints were raised against all these, but the Commission failed to handle them. Failures by the Electoral Commission to contain executive excesses and also manage their tasks well, led to a Presidential Election Petition, filed by Dr. Kiiza Besigye[15]. The Supreme Court was satisfied that the Commission had failed in voter registration, and that elections were “partially held in accordance with the principles laid down in the Presidential Elections Act 2000” (Tumwine-Mukuubwa, 2004:56-7, 99). Parliament produced a report on the 2001 elections, revealing many loopholes. The president disbanded this Commission and appointed a new one in November 2002. The “new” Commission was to conduct the 2005 referendum and the 2006 multiparty elections.

In 2002, the Movement’s National Conference sat in Kyankwanzi (where there is a school of Political Education training mainly Movement cadres) and agreed to open up the political space to allow a return to multipartysm. This followed pressure from the opposition and donors. A Constitutional Review Commission, led by Prof. Fredrick Ssempebwa, was also appointed to gather views nationwide on possible amendments to the constitution. The Commission produced its report in 2003. In response, government produced a White Paper in 2004, opposing/rejecting some of the recommendations made by this Commission. The White Paper, among others, emphasized the holding of a referendum to change the political system; suggested the lifting of presidential terms; and spelt out the possible amendments to the constitution to be undertaken by Parliament (Republic of Uganda, 2004). Consequently, amidst opposition from donors and the opposition parties, the referendum was held on July 28, 2005. The 47% turn up in the referendum voted for a return to multiparty politics (Makara and Rwengabo, 2005)[16]. Among other constitutional amendments undertaken by Parliament in 2005, Article 105(2) of the constitution was amended and presidential terms lifted.

Four issues were clear from the July 28, 2005 referendum and the amendments to the constitution. a) The Electoral Commission was going to hold multiparty general presidential elections and other lower level elections for the first time in 2006. b) The incumbent President was eligible to contest in the election, a situation that showed the possibility of continuity of the Movement system disguised as a party, and a hot contestation. c) The issue of the Commission being composed of Movement/government appointees would raise demands for representation from political parties. d) The electoral season in 2006 was going to be very congested with three-in-one polling, which would increase pressure on the Commission. Parties’ demands for representation onto the Commission were made but were ignored. The Commission was not only tasked to fulfill its constitutional and legal mandate; it was expected to “outperform” the 2001 one. The election season started with presidential and parliamentary elections on February 23, 2006. Local Government (L.C.V) elections were held on March 2, 2006 and L.C. III elections held on March 11, 2006. Many complaints inevitably arose from this exercise and the Commission was expected to handle/resolve them, at least in theory.

Election Complaints Management in Theory.
Sovereignty of the people is enshrined in the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Article 1). Article 61(f) of the Constitution, empowers the Electoral Commission to hear and determine election complaints arising before and during polling. The enabling laws enacted to operationalise this Article are emphatic on this[17]. Post-election complaints are submitted to court as petitions, in accordance with Article 64 of the 1995 constitution. Engholm (1958) reveals that elections can raise complaints and petitions that can be handled, either by the Electoral Commission, or by Courts of Law. Thus, state institutions, in exercising their mandate, must grant sovereignty of the people.

Tumwine-Mukubwa (2004:5) argues that state authority of the government derives from the will of the people as expressed in genuine, free and fair elections. This is enshrined in the 1995 constitution of Uganda and the electoral laws. That people have a right to vote in an election on a non-discriminatory basis; access to impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for registration of voters; and access to polling stations to exercise their voting rights, in which case every voter’s vote is accorded equal weight to that of others. Rights of candidature; membership to parties; campaigns and security, are enshrined in the laws, which must be consistent with the country’s obligation under international law. He adds that the state must ensure the realization of these rights through registration of voters; formation and free functioning of parties; separation of parties from the state; civic and voter education; and should take the necessary policy and institutional steps to ensure the progressive achievement and consolidation of democratic goals, including the establishment of a neutral impartial or balanced mechanism for the management of elections. Complaints of violations of these provisions, he maintains, should be promptly determined.

Ibingira (1973:130) reveals that free election is a necessary undertaking for the maintenance of government in society by creating a sentiment of popular consent and participation in public affairs, and providing for orderly succession in government by the present transfer of authority to new members. Bwengye (1985:13) states that elections are held according to the law. Violation of electoral laws is illegal and complaints arising from this are essentially legal questions, which must be promptly attended to, to ensure a free and fair exercise. For this to be achieved, there must be a complaints handling mechanism administered by the Commission in a free, fair and transparent manner.

Institutions of governance must be competent, impartial and independent, and should operate with in the confines of the law when servicing society. For electoral outcomes to be respected, for instance, the election administrators must be competent (managerially and technically), impartial, independent and must promote public trust by responding to public demands, notably demands for a free and fair electoral game. Election complaints arising from “corrupt practices” intended to interfere with voters’ choices must be carefully determined and timely resolved (Engholm, 1958: 29). Mechanisms for election complaints handling are thus essential for a peaceful, free and fair electoral game.

The above reveals three facts: a) election administrators are state actors, operating with in state institutions developed in response to society expectations and state-led service delivery. b) The centrality of the Electoral Commission in election complaints handling is unquestionable, due to its constitutional obligation of conducting and managing elections. c) The actions of non-state actors, voters, politicians and election administrators may aggravate or reduce the intensity and regularity of complaints and petitions in the electoral process. Where complaints arise, the Commission must act diligently to resolve them. What the Commission did to resolve complaints that arose in the 2006 elections is the next focus.

Complaints Handling in the 2006 Elections in Uganda.
There are three fundamental truths recognizable from Uganda’s election management mechanism. One is that funding for the Commission is not sufficient. The result is that important aspects of the electoral cycle, like voter education and complaints handling, are negatively affected. The second is that the appointment of Commissioners is still vested with the President. Considering Uganda’s political system before the July 28, 2005 referendum, the Commission appeared, at least in the eyes of oppositional politicians, a “Movement Commission”. The main issue arising from this was (the complaint from the opposition) that the Commission served the interests of the ruling government, and not national/state interests (Henry Mayega, 2005: O.I.). The third truth is that Uganda has pre-mature institutions of democratisation, exhibiting administrative and other weaknesses which impact negatively on their activities. Lack of a clean Voters’ Register reveals this on Uganda’s Electoral Commission. Parliament itself, relying on the Executive for the formulation and tabling of electoral laws, passes these laws too late to allow election administrators enough time to prepare and manage the exercise well. This interplay of factors breads ground for election complaints which the Commission has to grapple with.

On November 8, 2005, a Management and Human Resources consultancy firm, UNISIS, advertised 69 positions of district complaints desk and systems officers; one for National Complaints Desk and Systems Officer; and one for National Inter-Party Liaison Officer. The idea of a complaints desk was born out of the Commission’s consultations with political parties, civil society groupings, other Commissions in Africa, and donors.

The national complaints desk and national inter-party liaison offices were to be manned by officers recruited together with District Complaints Desk and Systems Officers. The firm, UNISIS, recruited and submitted to the Commission, a list of 71 recruited persons to work as the above officers. Emphasis was placed on graduates of Law and Political Science, although other professions like Mass Communication found their way in. The newly recruited officers were taken for an indunction/training course to Entebbe Botanical Beach Hotel on January 3, 2006, where they spent a week under rigorous training by senior Commission officials and senior legal consultants in Kampala. The officers were posted to the districts with a settlement fee of 415,500= on January 27, 2006. By this time, presidential and parliamentary campaigns were mid-way.

The duties of District Complaints Desk and System Officers were as follows:
§ To receive, analyze and provide the District Registrar and National Complaints Desk and Systems Officer with up-to-date information and analysis of complaints related to the electoral process in the district
§ To collect and provide up-to-date information and analysis on the status of complaints and their resolution in the district
§ To document complaints with details of where and when they were made in the district
§ To detail complaints with legal basis of the complaints arising in the district
§ To document whom complaints have been referred to in the district for further action
§ To ascertain and document the results of any investigation, mediation and adjudication of complaints in the district
§ To advise the District Registrars on any sanctions to be levied and/or levied for any electoral offence
§ To draft responses to complaints received in the district as appropriate in a timely manner
§ To act as convener/secretary to constituency and district peace committees as directed supervisors, and provide minutes for the above committees
§ Any other duties as may be assigned from time to time[18]

In line with the above duties, complaints officers had the obligation to:
a) Set up a district complaints desk and open relevant files to record the complaints and keep information pertaining to their resolutions.
b) Keep the National Complaints and Inter-Party Liaison Offices informed of the complaints’ status in the district, signifying constant communication and writing regular/monthly reports.
c) Liaise with the District Election Coordination Committee, Police and district administration to handle/resolve complaints.
d) Form, and act as Secretaries to, the District Inter-Party Liaison/Election Coordination Committee. The committee, chaired by the Returning Officer, had members including: representatives from all active political parties in the district; representatives of independent candidates[19]; the District Police Commander representing security organisations; and representatives of election monitors, like DemGroup.
e) Convene and act as Secretaries to regular meetings of the District Election Liaison Committees, called to resolve complaints and suggest necessary improvements to the Commission.
f) Move downward and form Inter-Party (Peace) Liaison Committees at county and sub-county levels; supervise the operations of these committees; and train their members on election-related issues and conflict resolution.
g) Acquaint themselves with all electoral laws and constitutional provisions concerning elections, to be effective in all the above duties, including acting as legal advisors to Commission staff in the districts as well as security organisations.

The national complaint desk was duplicated at district level, and the whole burden of liaison at district and lower levels placed under District Complaints Desk and Systems Officers. The recruitment and deployment of these officers was funded by Partners for Democracy and Governance (PDG) - Election Support Unit. Officers were recruited for a contract period of 06 months. Therefore, complaints arising from lower local council elections, which were held after June 2006, remained not attended to. Some successes were made by the complaints desk in the Commission during the 2006 elections.

The first is that for the first time in Uganda’s electoral history, election complaints were attended to. The Commission received a total of 2,031 complaints and petitions. 832 of these were received at the Centre. Bugiri district received 57 - the highest number of complaints - while Kampala received 56 complaints on record. Pader district recorded no complaint at all. But the number of complaints recorded by the District Complaints Officers is not exhaustive. Some were reported to Police as electoral offences and/or illegal practices, but did not find their way to the complaints desks. Some would be settled there-and-then and were not recorded. In Kamuli district, for instance, the Police recorded 34 cases while the Complaints Desk Officer recorded 22 complaints, and only those reported to the EC were submitted to the Centre. The District Complaints Desk played a very big role, for the public felt that their problems were being listened to and acted on. As a result, tension was diffused and public trust of the Commission increased.

The second positive aspect is that the Commission dealt positively with security organizations. Complaints would be raised (pointed out) in the District Election Liaison Committee meetings, and Police (which was represented at the Committee) would take appropriate action. The District Election Liaison Committee provided a forum to explain and clarify situations. The presence of this desk became a preventive measure against those who intended to carry out election malpractices. For the first time in Uganda’s electoral history, there was a good working relationship between the security agencies and the Electoral Commission, which was strengthened through regular updates and meetings. Complaints officers worked hand in hand with Police to manage complaints and give punitive sanctions to recalcitrant persons.

Thirdly, the District Election Liaison Committee brought political actors on table with Electoral Commission staff and security organizations. This committee helped in diffusing tensions; resolving conflicts; and providing vital information to the public/voters and party members and /or supporters of independent candidates. Further still, a record of complaints now guides the Commission’s operations, since complaints raised against its work were recorded, forwarded and worked on. The centrality of the law was given its due consideration by complaints officers; for complaints were recorded and categorized in accordance with the law affected and the degree of its contravention. But the complaints handling process did not go without loopholes.

The complaints handling mechanism would have been very effective had the District Election Liaison Committees been facilitated. The procedure was that complaints were presented to representatives of political parties in these committee meetings, and members would resolve them through discussion and arbitration. But these committees were not facilitated. They were formed very late. They were not duplicated downwards to lower levels, hence curtailing the complaints handling mechanism/process. Members to these committees lost morale attending long conflict-resolving meetings without any allowance. The Chairman Electoral Commission revealed that members of the National Inter-Party Liaison Committee refused to move down to district and lower levels to supervise and advise on the operations of the District Election Liaison Committees[20]. This removed chances of donor funding to these committees. A UPC senior official, who was also a member of the National Inter-Party Liaison Committee, revealed two factors that discouraged members of the Committee from moving down wards. One is that the committee would agree on certain issues, but the Commission ends up doing the opposite. He exemplified that it was agreed in one of the meetings that presidential and parliamentary campaigns start at 9:00 am in the morning, but the Commission announced the following day, that campaigns start at 7:00 am. This, he said, discouraged some members from further attending these meetings and moving downwards. Toward the end of presidential and parliamentary campaigns, some members pulled out. However, the Commission insists that this was discouraging on the part of political parties.

The second discouragement, it was revealed, was time constraint. The complaints desk and the Party Liaison office were set up too late. They started full-blast operations on January 27, 2006, when campaigns were mid-way[21]. The argument is that the committee failed to catch up with some of the essential aspects of elections that gave birth to complaints, mainly voter registration and campaigns. It was not helpful, therefore, to move downward to district and lower levels, when polling was few days away. Thus politicians concentrated on campaigning for their candidates and abandoned these meetings. Indeed the District Election Liaison Committees failed to form county and sub-county peace/liaison committees because of time constraints and lack of facilitation. Complaints would be raised about the August 2005 reorganisation of Polling Stations, or the September/October 2005 update of the Voters’ Register. Complaints officers found difficulties with such complaints, and would just forward them to District Registrars. If these officers had been recruited early in time, preferably soon after the July 2005 referendum, they would have done significant work, and handled a lot more complaints.

Another significant hindrance to the efficient operations of the complaints desk in the Commission was legislative. The Uganda Electoral Commission has no legislative powers, and subsidiary legislations must be approved by Parliament. The Chairman revealed that the Commission wanted legislative powers, like the Ghanaian Commission, but Parliament refused. The Commission long time in consultation with donors, Civil Society Organisations and political parties to form a Code of Conduct for Political Parties. The draft code was finalized on November 14, 2005, in a consultative meeting held at Fairway Hotel in Kampala. It was presented to the Attorney-General who would then present it to Parliament[22]. The code was not passed - Parliament went in recess before this could be done. Consequently, the National Inter-Party Liaison Office and the Complaints Desk were set up on the basis of the draft code. Apart from lack of facilitation, absence of the code explains why county and sub-county peace/liaison committees were not formed. It was therefore a process of satisficing to make things move on. The period for which the complaints desk existed was too short. From January to June 2006 implied that lower Local Government Elections were not attended to. Elections at L.C.I, II and IV were held when the complaints desk no longer existed, though there were plans of retaining the Inter-Party Liaison Committee at national level. This left these elections back in the hands of the old system. There was a missing link in complaints handling. It is this missing link that the paper now turns to.

Complaints Handled: Any Missing Link?
Complaints Officers who were interviewed revealed important things the Commission ought to have done to make the complaints desk more effective. One such a thing was publication. It was argued that the public was not fully aware of the presence of these officers at the districts until it was too late. People were still used to the old system of reporting to District Registrars. This made the desk less effective, for complaints were reported to the Registrars. DemGroup, in its comprehensive report on the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, does not highlight significant details about the complaints desk, probably due to scanty information about it. In addition, complaints officers were not taking decisions as to the complaints received. Power to advise complainants and summon respondents, where need arose, should have been given to these officers. They were only tasked to record and forward complaints, and give advice to Police and District Registrars on what actions to take. Officers almost acted as office secretaries. One officer humourised: “We were barking dogs which could not bite; we were scarecrows”[23]. Consequently, time for reporting and forwarding complaints caused delays in complaints resolution. It was also revealed that common electoral malpractices were difficult to handle. District Election liaison Committees would be called to present, discuss and resolve existing complaints. However, practices like bribery were difficult, since every party accused the other of bribing voters. Therefore, no single party would pinpoint another. In Adjumani district, for instance, in a meeting held on February 27, 2006, all parties’ representatives said they had given some form of bribes, and agreed to put the issue aside. This is a consequence of electoral laws, which ban bribery but allow facilitation. Bribes were thus given but termed refreshments/facilitation.

Politicians used the office to fight personal battles, even where there was no genuine reason for complaining. Officers would sometimes fail to see a genuine complaint, but were constrained in advising complainants. This, the Commission had not warned them about. Complaints officers were expected to coordinate with too many offices: DISO, RDC, Police, Election Offences Squad/CID, District Administration and Party offices. One needed to investigate the accuracy of some complaints before acting on them. This meant working with DISO and CID. These were too many offices to deal with in the absence of sufficient facilitation. Nothing was paid to these officers beyond salary and housing allowance. The fact that these officers went to the districts at a time when campaigns were mid-way, and could not be seen by politicians and voters, made them less effective. Communication too was not facilitated. Responses from the Centre delayed even when these officials were expected to give regular updates to the centre. In fact, there was no complaints officer who got a reply to his or her report, or any response on action taken to a complaint which one forwarded to the centre. Officers needed to go to the field and investigate complaints, but were not facilitated. Others were not allowed to attend District Election Security Coordination Committee meetings, even when some complaints were raised against the actions of security officials. The needed chance to have a grasp of what was taking place everywhere was missing.

Electoral Commission Staff at the districts; district administration officials; government officials and security agencies; political party officials as well as some civil servants, suspected complaints officers as spies. People feared to complain asking: “Who are these people who have been sent to every district toward polling?” Some Registrars/Returning Officers feared that complaints officers had been sent by the Electoral Commission and Auditor-General’s Office to spy on the way they were using finances! One officer was frankly told by the RDC and DISO that they were so suspicious of her presence in the district, that they nearly arrested her! In places where the government had no support, it was worse. It was very tasking for these officers to build confidence and trust with workmates, security officials, politicians and other work relations.

Complaints were supposed to be written. Where these were brought not by real complainants but by agents/representatives, it was difficult to record them. This was a case given that voter registration details of the complainant were necessary for a complaint to be registered. Those who did not know how to read and write would be helped by complaints officers. Some complaints officers did not speak the languages of people in areas where they were posted. So, they could not easily communicate with illiterate complainants to effectively help them. Submission of written complaints, or writing for such people, was difficult in such areas. Though recording of complaints reduced cases of deception, it was hard for illiterates and some would fear to present genuine complaints because of the writing requirement. Phone-call complaints were also difficult to record. Given the already existing suspicion, people feared that they would be ‘followed up’ after complaining. This, the Commission would have cleared through publication. It was not done. It ended up affecting the complaints desk.

During induction, some district staff ought to have been included in the program to give them a grasp of what these officers were learning. It was surprising that some of them had never seen some of the documents complaints officers went (or were supposed to go) with, including a Draft Code of Conduct for Political Parties (due to Parliament’s failure to pass the code); some electoral laws; and complaints record forms. The District Election Liaison Committees and the Inter-Party Liaison Committee were formed basing on the draft code, which was not yet a law or subsidiary legislation with legal authenticity. They were ‘semi-legal’. It was possible that any Court proceeding against this arrangement would have plunged the Commission in a legal fix. Again, some parties and candidates were not represented on District Election Liaison Committees. Official candidates’ agents, who were members of these committees, constantly moved with their candidates in campaigns. They would not attend meetings regularly. After presidential and parliamentary elections, political tensions cooled; meetings were no longer called. And committee members were already discouraged by lack of facilitation. This curtailed further functioning of the committee, although complaints were still being received. The whole drudgery of complaints handling now remained with the district Commission staff in the absence of politicians’ representatives on the committees.

Conclusion.
The development of a complaints handling mechanism was a great stride in realizing the sovereign rights of the people and an attempt at forging an electoral system that is trustworthy, accessible and reliable. A compilation of election complaints received and petitions raised countrywide now exists with the Commission. The Electoral Commission must be credited on this. For the first time, there was a mechanism by which people’s grievances were attended to. This, notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, has been overdue. While without donor support the complaints and party liaison desks would not have been formed, attempts should be made to incorporate these desks in the functions and hierarchy of the Commission. Complaints officers should be empowered to investigate complaints (with the help of Police) and take appropriate actions. Where the Commission has recruited staff on a contract basis, their workmates and other stakeholders should be well informed of the duties and work limits of these recruits, through publication. Suspicion from workmates and other work relations demoralized some officers, while lack of facilitation pushed them far from hard work. The time at which they were deployed was a sensitive one which the Commission should in future look into. This will ease their work even further. It should be emphasized that failure to have a complaints desk in future may cause more complications, unless some alternative provision is made for that.

It is essential to conclude that the complaints handling mechanism was a belated development in the Electoral Commission. From the time of voter registration, this office is necessary. Some complaints were received against failure to register, an activity undertaken in September 2005. The current stride and achievement recorded as a result of the complaints handling process acts as a guide to the Commission to ensure a better electoral process in future. Notwithstanding the constraints faced by the office, credit goes where it is due. Informing the public about the presence and function of the complaints office will ease its work. When essential electoral activities are integrated with the complaints handling mechanism, it is hoped, better strides shall be made. This, the Commission, helped by the government, is yet to do. The future will tell.


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[1]A political actor in this case implies a candidate, his/her agents and active supporters engaged directly in the campaign and other political processes pertaining to the election.

[2] These were: Kawalya Kagwa, from Buganda; Nyangabyaki, from Bunyoro; and Zilaba-Muzaale, from Busoga.

[3] The first nationwide political party, the UNC was formed in 1952 with Ignatius Musaazi as its first President-General. The Progressive Party (PP) was formed in 1955 by Baganda who were negotiating for the Kabaka’s return from exile, following the November 1953 deportation by Governor Andrew Cohen. After the LEGCO meeting of 1958, a new party - Uganda Peoples’ Union (UPU) - was formed by Nadiope of Busoga and Magezi of Bunyoro (Karugire, 1996:42). This was an anti-Buganda arrangement

[4] Ankole District Council, fearing a catholic-dominated electorate, rejected direct elections and appointed two protestant representatives to the council. Bugisu and Tooro too opted out of direct elections

[5] One wing of the congress remained under Musazi, while the other, the non-Buganda wing, lined behind Obote.

[6] This committee, had majority of its members being African representatives to the LEGCO, but Kabaka’s government refused to appoint representatives to or even give evidence to this committee.

[7] In the 1961 elections, there were widespread malpractices by both UPC and DP in many parts of the country. Ddungu and Wabwire (1991:3) reveal that “extra ballots in bundles appeared in some ballot boxes unaccountably and some ballot boxes in certain remote areas disappeared” (Aseka, 2005:22)

[8] This was a political tactic of UPC notably Obote to woo the Mengo establishment to support the party in fighting against the DP.

[9] One such a maneuver was the 1966 Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, which forbade parties from using symbols or names associated with federal states; and the 1969 passage of the Bill that ended the legal existence of KY.

[10]Grace Ibingira believed “…it is the duty of all citizens in the (whole) country no matter to which political party they belong to help president Binaisa’s government and the NEC so that they can effect the process of returning the country to an elected democratic government”

[11] Still in exile in Tanzania, Milton Obote wrote to Paul Muwanga who was Binaisa’s minister for Internal Affairs, to start laying plans to foil the UNLF democratic set up, so as to prepare for a forceful seizure of power by UPC.
[12] Parliament had used Sessional Committees, instead of the Committee of the whole House, to pass the Referendum Bill. This, petitioners argued, was unconstitutional.

[13] In addition to incumbent President Yoweri K. Museveni, other contenders were Rt. Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye (Reform Agenda.) 45; Aggrey Awori (62); Francis Bwengye (from one of the DP factions), 59; Mahammad Mayanja Kibirige (of JEEMA), 51; and Karuhanga K. Chapaa (of National Democrats Forum), 49. Ssenkubuge Charles Siyasa, a Musician, was nominated but later dropped out. Dr. Kiiza Besigye had fallen off from the mainstream Movement and opposed the working of the government, and it had become clear by 1999, that he was oppositional, although he was a Movement historical from the Bush Days.

[14] The Register was inflated to 11 million voters, compared to the 2005 referendum when it was 8.5 million.

[15] He sought the nullification of results and an order for reelection, citing many illegal practices and electoral offences. He also revealed the degree of intimidation, harassment and beating inflicted by PPU and Kalangala Action Plan (KAP).

[16] The government and opposition were in agreement to open up, but government’s campaign against itself in favoring a return to a political order, which the president himself had for long opposed, was very dramatic. It has been argued that the president was trying to use the referendum campaign to kickstart his campaigns for the 2006 elections.
[17] See presidential elections Acts 2000 and 2005; Parliamentary Elections Acts, 2000 and 2005; and Electoral Commission Act, 1997 (amended, 2002).
[18] Source: Electoral Commission, 2006. Also accessible from Partners for Democracy and Governance Group – Election Support Unit; UNISIS; and press reports of November 8, 2005.

[19] Engholm, G. F. (1958) says independent candidates are candidates who contest not as members of political parties, but as ‘independents’, sponsoring themselves. They are neither oppositional nor among the ruling party. Some may be sympathizers of either the ruling party or the opposition. In Uganda, some members of the ruling NRM, as well as some members of the opposition, failed in the party primaries, but contested and won the Parliamentary and Local Government seats as independents.
[20] With neither facilitation nor encouragement and advice from the National Party Liaison Committee, and supplemented by time constraints, the District Election Coordination Committees failed to move downwards to form County and sub-county peace/liaison committees as was expected.
[21] However, their contract had started on January 3, 2006. They spent nearly two weeks at the EC headquarters being oriented, but there was considerable delay in releasing/posting them to the districts. Some spent another week before reaching their workplaces.

[22] The first draft of the code was released in April 2005, and regular consultations with political parties, CSOs and donors were made to finalise it. In November 2005, the final draft was presented to Parliament.
[23] This Officer, like many others who were interviewed, preferred anonymity.