LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
QUESTION 1
Examine the relevance of the local community action in conflict resolution in Sub-Sahara Africa and explain some of the challenges there in.
INTRODUCTION
A community is defined as a group of interacting people, possibly living in close proximity, and often refers to a group that shares some common values, and is attributed with social cohesion within a shared geographical location, generally in social units larger than a household (Barker et al. 1987).
Conflict resolution is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of some social conflict. Often, committed group members attempt to resolve group conflicts by actively communicating information about their conflicting motives or ideologies to the rest of the group such as intentions, reasons for holding certain beliefs and by engaging in collective negotiation. Ultimately, a wide range of methods and procedures for addressing conflict exist and of course local community action is one of them (Robinson and Clifford (1974).
Local community action in conflict resolution use local actors and traditional community-based judicial and legal decision-making mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts within or between communities. Local mechanisms aim to resolve conflicts without resorting to state-run judicial systems, police, or other external structures.
Local community negotiations in conflict can lead to ad-hoc practical agreements which keep broader inter-communal relations positive.
Additional results of local conflict management occur when actors who do not have political, social or economic stake in continuing violence come together and build a "constituency for peace." In some cases, this can undermine the perpetrators of violence, leading to the development of momentum toward peace.
Local mediation typically incorporates consensus-building based on open discussions to exchange information and clarify issues. Conflicting parties are more likely to accept guidance from these mediators than from other sources because an elder’s decision does not entail any loss of face and is backed by social pressure. The end result is, ideally, a sense of unity, shared involvement and responsibility, and dialogue among groups otherwise in conflict.
Local mechanisms intervene to resolve community disputes before they escalate to large-scale violence or to prevent a resumption of violence after a period of calm. Generally one or both parties to a dispute request intervention by an elder, the elder council, or other community member. Occasionally, elders unite and take the initiative in forming a local council to represent the community’s interests.
Community members involved in the conflict participate in the dispute resolution process. These community members can include traditional authorities, elders, chiefs, women’s organizations, local institutions and professional associations.
The elders function as a court with broad and flexible powers to interpret evidence, impose judgments, and manage the process of reconciliation. The mediator leads and channels discussion of the problem. Parties typically do not address each other, eliminating direct confrontation. Interruptions are not allowed while parties state their case. Statements are followed by open deliberation which may integrate listening to and cross-examining witnesses, the free expression of grievances, caucusing with both groups, reliance on circumstantial evidence, visiting dispute scenes, seeking opinions and views of neighbors, reviewing past cases, holding private consultations, and considering solutions.
The elders or other traditional mediators use their judgment and position of moral ascendancy to find an accepted solution. Decisions may be based on consensus within the elders’ or chiefs’ council and may be rendered on the spot. Resolution may involve forgiveness and mutual formal release of the problem, and, if necessary, the arrangement of restitution.
Also International agencies can promote local dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure that local actors participate in conflict management by partnering with existing local institutions.
External players such as humanitarian organizations, UN officials, peacekeepers and official delegations can empower local mediation groups in acknowledging their relevance, meeting with them when visiting an area and securing their input into planning, building on traditional structures for peace and conflict resolution, and using those structures in dealing with ongoing conflicts, developing a strategy for identifying conflict resolvers and peacemakers within each cultural group in the operating area, validating and empowering existing conflict resolvers, and creating opportunities for their interaction with other communities
It should be remembered that a local peace process is generally low-cost. Local efforts may be financed through community sources, or may require external, including international, support especially in the initial stage of rejuvenating such mechanisms.
There are several challenges facing community action in conflict resolution as here below presented;
First of all, the process may be time-consuming and encourage broad discussion of aspects that may seem unrelated to the central problem, as the mediator tries to situate the conflict in the disputants’ frame of reference and decide on an appropriate style and format of intervention.
Some traditional conflict mitigation efforts may be weakened by age or gender bias for example, in cases with no women elders, some women may believe that male elders are biased against women and that this will be reflected in their decisions. Indigenous, traditional authorities generally are not progressive elements of social change.
Local conflict management’s potential effectiveness is diminished where traditional authority has eroded and armed authority has increased, since these trends run counter to traditional values and ways of social organization, including those of handling conflict.
Indigenous mediation has a dynamic of its own and does not always respond positively to external prompting. Indigenous mediation requires delicate and knowledgeable management, and external actors must bring an intimate understanding of local conditions.
The process of strengthening international and regional institutions has neglected internal solutions. Conflict is inherent in society; so are mechanisms for dealing with it. The decline of traditional authority and its role in conflict mediation has contributed to the development of large-scale conflict (as in Liberia, Somalia and Sudan). In other cases, parties to broader conflicts have subverted traditional mediation mechanisms or included them in the conflict for example in Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Burundi.
Finally High-profile peace fora financed and organized by external parties may interfere with more than assist in producing plausible settlements, especially if conducted without coordinating with local non-military leaders. At the national or international level, such efforts may require external support, such as logistical assistance, and probably should be accompanied by other actions to prevent the immediate outbreak of violence
CONCLUSION
Key authority structures of conflicting parties must be included in the process, including traditional, military, administrative, and religious leaders and those with moral authority in the community must be central to the process, educated exiles also have a role to play. while the external support should be minimal and fill gaps, taking care not to replace indigenous leadership. Hence the external assistance must take care to supplement rather than overwhelm existing local grassroots initiatives and the external actors planning to support local mediation mechanisms must bring local experience, perhaps even anthropological knowledge of the area.
REFERENCES
Adams,M. & Bradbury,M(1995): Conflict and Development: Background Paper for UNICEF/NGO Workshop. New York, NY: United Nations.
Agrawal, A., (1995): Dismantling the Divide between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge. Development and Change.
Avruch,K(1991): Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
Barzilai, Gad. (2003): Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Berkes, F. (1989): Co-management and the James Bay Agreement. In Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community Development, ed. by E. Pinkerton.
Cox, F,J.(1970): Strategies of Community Organization: A Book of Readings. Itasca, IL: F. E.
Warren, D & Brokensha,D:(1995): The Cultural Dimensions of Development. Intermediate Technology Publications, London.
QUESTION 2
With specific references to northern Uganda, Discuss the practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda and suggest some possible solution.
INTRODUCTION
The Lord's Resistance Army is a militant group with a syncretic Christian and traditional African religious ideology. Until it was flushed out of Uganda, the group was operating in northern Uganda, But now it has moved to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central Africa Republic.
The LRA was formed in 1987 and until about 2007 it was engaged in an armed rebellion against the Ugandan government. It is led by Joseph Kony, who proclaims himself the "spokesperson" of God and a spirit medium, primarily of the Holy Spirit, which the group believes can represent itself in many manifestations.
Practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda;
Lasting peace for northern Uganda, which has been plagued by conflict and displacement for twenty-one years, remains a challenge. With the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictments issued against top leaders of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains a thorny question, with the potential to derail the peace effort. Hence this poses a challenge to peace agreements between LRA and the government of Uganda.
It is a challenge in that the Rebel leaders do state that they cannot sign an agreement unless the ICC indictments are dropped. Lifting the indictments, however, poses serious concerns about the integrity of international justice. To break the deadlock, all parties should carefully consider practical approaches to provisions of the Rome Statute (the treaty constituting the ICC) that would enable suspension of the indictments.
In late December 2003, President Museveni referred the situation in northern Uganda to the newly created International Criminal Court. In July 2004, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) officially opened an investigation, and in October 2005, the ICC issued indictments for five top LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony.
Real progress on ending the humanitarian crisis and pursuing a coherent long-term strategy for reconstruction in the north cannot take place without guarantees of peace and security. Establishing peace, however, requires difficult decisions about how to reconcile humanitarian imperatives and the unquestionable need for stability in the region with the outstanding ICC indictments.
As stated in the Rome Statute, the goal of the ICC is to prevent atrocities like war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by ending impunity. In the statute’s Preamble, the states parties affirm that such crimes “must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured.” States also pledge in the Preamble to “reaffirm the Principles and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.” The UN Charter commits states to take collective measures to maintain peace and security through peaceful means when possible. This obligation is rooted in a fundamental principle to avoid the instability, atrocities, and protracted humanitarian crises war often produces.
Ideally, these international commitments to prosecute and punish serious crimes and peacefully end or prevent conflict should work hand in hand. To some extent, this scenario has occurred in northern Uganda.
In addition due to pressure from the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), the LRA’s decision to negotiate in Juba was partially attributed to the international indictments, which initially raised rebel fears that an international force would attempt to arrest the LRA leaders and that finding safe haven would become more difficult. During the negotiations, LRA attacks in northern Uganda essentially stopped.
The involvement of the ICC strengthened discussions of justice and accountability in Uganda and within the context of the negotiations. In fact, one of the five agenda items of the talks, Agenda Item Three, specifically addresses reconciliation and accountability. The agreement on Agenda Item Three provides for formal judicial processes within Uganda to adjudicate allegations of serious human rights violations arising from the conflict. As stated in the annexure to the agreement, a special division of the High Court of Uganda would try such cases.
The agreement also provides for “a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions,” which would reflect the gravity of the crimes and promote reconciliation within communities. The parties have discussed domestic justice mechanisms because under the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute, a state may lawfully reclaim a case begun by the ICC and try it domestically if the state is genuinely willing and able to carry out prosecution and conform to international standards of prosecution and punishment. This also meant practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda simply because of suspicion of unfair trial in case the local courts were to try the rebel commanders.
The twin goals of peace and justice begin to diverge, however, when we assume that imprisonment is the only form of punishment acceptable under the Rome Statute and under international standards more generally. Therefore it was unlikely that Kony and the other ICC inductees would agree to be subjected to a judicial process which would ultimately lead to their incarceration. Consequently, imprisonment was probably not among the “alternative penalties and sanctions” envisioned in the Agenda Item Three Agreement on Reconciliation and Accountability signed by the LRA. This indeed posed a challenge to the prospects for peace in northern Uganda.
Further more, while the Rome Statute upholds the obligation to end impunity and punish perpetrators who commit terrible atrocities, the treaty also leaves room in certain provisions to deal with hard cases where a range of factors must be weighed. While these provisions could conceivably preclude international or domestic prosecution and incarceration, their careful use is nonetheless consistent with international law. The flexibility they allow also serves to uphold respect for the international justice system over the long run. Moreover, implementation of these provisions need not involve a zero-sum trade-off of justice for peace. In each instance, justice should certainly be maximized within the limitations raised by the case at hand. This kind of arrangement directly or indirectly affected the practices and legal peace agreement between LRA and the government of Uganda hence proved to be a challenge to peace agreements.
Further still according to Rome Statute, it is critical to build the ICC’s enforcement capacity. The Statute envisions an international justice system where perpetrators of major international crimes are arrested, tried, and punished with commensurate prison terms. But the enforcement challenges presented by the Uganda case suggest that expectations of what the ICC can achieve in its early stages may be too high. Insisting on unrealistic outcomes causes the victims to pay unacceptably for the challenges the international justice system currently faces. Instead, the international community should explore ways to strengthen the ICC’s enforcement capacity in ways that minimize the risks to stability and to drawing out protracted humanitarian crises. Moving forward, a more tangible international commitment to improved enforcement would counter any concerns about the integrity of international justice raised by the Uganda case.
This briefing provides a background of the conflict and ongoing attempts at peace, reflects the diverse views expressed during the consultations about justice priorities, and offers recommendations on how to move forward with a comprehensive justice plan.
Another point in place as to the practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda was the Comprehensive Amnesty designed by the Uganda government whose one of its key components of justice is the Amnesty Act, which the Ugandan government enacted in 2000 as a response to popular demand to end the stalemated conflict. The amnesty granted is exceptionally broad, stating that from 1986 onward "any Ugandan who has himself of herself engaged in war or armed rebellion against the government by either participating in combat, engaging in any other criminal activity connected with the conflict, or aiding or abetting insurgents shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment" as long as they agree to renounce their affiliation with rebel groups. This indeed also posed a challenge to the practices and legal peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda.
Possible solutions to practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA and the government of Uganda are here below presented;
First and foremost, alternative justice mechanisms are necessary to solve the challenges highlighted above as these shall promote reconciliation and shall include traditional justice processes, alternative sentences, reparations, and any other formal institutions or mechanisms.
Secondly, the parties in the conflict need to acknowledge the need for an overarching justice framework that will provide for the exercise of formal criminal jurisdiction, and for the adoption and recognition of complementary alternative justice mechanisms hence they need to promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms to address issues arising from within or outside Uganda with respect to the conflict.
Further more the removal of the LRA/LRM from the list of Terrorist Organizations under the Anti-Terrorism Act of Uganda upon the LRA/LRM abandoning rebellion, ceasing fire, and submitting its members to the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration can be a solution as well.
Finally, alternative penalties and sanctions are necessary to solve the challenges. Such alternatives need to reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations, promote reconciliation between individuals and within communities, promote the rehabilitation of offenders, take into account an individual's admissions or other cooperation with proceedings and require perpetrators to make reparations to victims.
CONCLUSION
Conclusively, Uganda has institutions and mechanisms, customs and usages as provided for and recognized under national laws, capable of addressing the crimes and human rights violations committed during the LRA conflict. Therefore such mechanisms can solve the legal and peace challenges mentioned in this presentation as this will ensure modifications required within the national legal system to ensure a more effective and integrated justice to deal with the rebels of LRA domestically.
REFERENCES
Briggs, Jimmie (2005): Innocents Lost: When Child Soldiers Go to War. Basic Books.
Green, Matthew (2008): The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa's Most Wanted. Portobello Books.
Singer, P, W. (2006): Children at War. University of California Press.
Vlassenroot, K. (2010): The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. Zed Books Ltd..
BBC News (23 January 2008): Uganda's LRA confirm Otti death. Retrieved 20 Noember 2011.
Kavanagh, M J. (2010): "Obama Administration Asks for Funds to Boost Uganda's Fight Against Rebels". Bloomberg. Retrieved 19/11/2011.
"Obama Sending 100 Armed Advisers to Africa to Help Fight Renegade Group". New York Times. 2011-10-14. Retrieved 15/11/2011
http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/peacerec2.html/17/11/2011
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/4/801.abstract/17/11/2011
http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/19/11/2011
QUESTION 3
Explain the objectives of African union and discuss why AU is unable to enforce and promote legal and practical peace.
INTRODUCTION
The African Union (abbreviated AU) is a union consisting of 54 African states. The only African state not in the AU is Morocco. Established on 9 July 2002, the AU was formed as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The most important decisions of the AU are made by the Assembly of the African Union, a semi-annual meeting of the heads of state and government of its member states. The AU's secretariat, the African Union Commission, is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The African Union is made up of both political and administrative bodies. The highest decision-making organ is the Assembly of the African Union, made up of all the heads of state or government of member states of the AU. Currently the Assembly is chaired by Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, leader of Equatorial Guinea, elected at the tenth ordinary meeting of the Assembly in January 2011. The AU also has a representative body, the Pan African Parliament, which consists of 265 members elected by the national parliaments of the AU member states.
Other political institutions of the AU include;
• The Executive Council, made up of foreign ministers, which prepares decisions for the Assembly;
• The Permanent Representatives Committee, made up of the ambassadors to Addis Ababa of AU member states; and
• The Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), a civil society consultative body.
.
The following are objectives of the African Union (AU);
Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African counties and the peoples of Africa
Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States
Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent
Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent
Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance
Promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments
Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations
Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies
Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples
Coordinate and harmonize policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union
Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology
Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent
The African Union aims range from promoting the advancement of science and technology to raising the living standards of Africa’s citizens.
African Union is unable to enforce and promote legal and practical peace due to various factors as here under presented;
First and foremost, the success of the African Union depends primarily on the ability to learn from the failures of the Organization of African States (OAU), one of which was the inability of the Organization to foster peace within its own membership.
The Organization of African States, which was created in 1963, was not able, although outlined within its own charter to stop wars between its member states, nor was it able to prevent genocidal violence such as in Rwanda in 1994. This historical factor in still present in Africa and makes AU unable to effectively enforce legal and practical peace.
Secondly, according to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the defining feature of intervention is that it is conducted without the consent of the target state. A request for assistance by a recognized government therefore falls outside of this definition. The right of intervention by international or regional organizations in the internal affairs of member states therefore contradicts the traditional concept of state sovereignty on which the UN and the present AU charters are based.
Thirdly, the African Union Constitutive Act Article 4(j) provides that for the “right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.” This goes far beyond the ‘just cause’ threshold defined by the ICISS.
Further more, on the face of it, the act provides much leeway in this regard, for example, Article 4(m) provides for “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance”. Article 4(o) provides for “respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities”. Article 4(p) provides for the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government”.
Also basing on the above sweeping provisions, and others that create the lack of clarity in the act that has now led to the development of a Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to be submitted to African heads of state in Durban for their approval. The Protocol provides for the establishment of a completely revamped Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution “which shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.8 This will replace the existing structure authorized through the 1993 Cairo Declaration on the establishment of the AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.
Other considerations in the development of the Protocol are, of course, the intense sense of competition evident in Addis Ababa from the overlap on peace and security issues with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD A second contention is the extent to which the peer review mechanism, the sole remaining preserve of the unit responsible for the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation (CSSDCA) within the AU, is now duplicated by the proposed NEPAD peer review mechanism hence such confusion does help African Union to effectively enforce and promote legal and practical peace.
The concept of state sovereignty, on which the international system and the AU are founded, presumes that each state has the power, authority and competence to govern its territory. For many African states, however, sovereignty is a legal fiction that is not matched by governance and administrative capacity. Some analysts go so far as to argue that such states violate the prerequisite for UN membership contained in Article 4(1) of the UN Charter, that members must be “able and willing to carry out the obligations”5 of the organization. This indeed makes it difficult for African Union to effectively enforce and promote legal and practical peace.
On the other hand, the AU itself derives its authority from state actors, and is built on the presumption of their sovereignty and legitimacy. The challenge for the AU is to become accountable to the people of Africa. It can only do so if it is composed of elected leaders that adhere to human rights and respect the tenants of accountable and good governance where governance in the interests of all and not only a few. Admittedly the OAU had little choice in the matter since intergovernmental organizations are ultimately beholden to their member states. But the AU could be different.
Transparency and popular participation must be built into the procedures of the AU at all levels, including the proposed Peace and Security Council (the successor to the Central Organ of the OAU) if the Union is to develop the political will and responsiveness necessary to uphold the commitments of the AU act. But much more is needed. African leaders must reflect, through their actions and treatment of one another, the values that lie at the core of stability, democracy and peace. Such a demonstration demands a fundamental break from the past practice of unquestioning solidarity among leaders. It demands an acceptance of the responsibility to protect.
CONCLUSION
The modern trend, also reflected in Article 4(o) of the AU act, is that it is necessary to combat cultures of impunity in order to promote long-term reconciliation, peace and democracy. Collective security can also help African Union to effectively enforce and promote legal and practical peace since the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace. This encompasses the totality of states within the region addresses a wide range of possible threats.
REFERENCES
Asante, S.K(2001): Towards an African Economic Community’, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria.
Genge, M(2000): African Union and a Pan – African Parliament: Working Papers’, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria.
Mazrui, A.A and Patel, H.H(1973): Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years’, The Third Press, New York.
Meny, Y, and Quermonne, J(1996): Adjusting to Europe : The impact of the European Union on national institutions and policies’, Routledge, London.
Robson, P,(1983): Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa’, George Allen & Unwin’, London.
Rumford, C,(2002): The European Union: A Political Sociology’, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
QUESTION 4
Discuss the fact that the atrocities being committed in northern Uganda are major threat to international security.
INTRODUCTION
International security consists of the measures taken by nations and international organizations, such as the United Nations, to ensure mutual survival and safety. These measures include military action and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. International and national security are invariably linked. International security is national security or state security in the global arena.
Atrocities refer to appalling or atrocious acts, situations, or objects, especially an act of unusual or illegal cruelty inflicted by an armed force on civilians or prisoners which are extremely wicked or cruel, typically ones involving physical violence or injury.
Northern Uganda had suffered from civil unrest since the early 1980s. Hundreds of people were killed in the rebellion against the Ugandan government, and an estimated 400-thousand people were left homeless.
As the question proposes, indeed the atrocities being committed in northern Uganda are major threat to international security as presented here below;
First of all it has attracted the attention of international security players for example USA was forced to intervene as evidenced by the statement made by the President OBAMA on the signing of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. This law was introduced into the US Senate and House of Representatives in May 2009, and has since become the most widely supported Africa-specific legislation in recent Congressional history. The law was cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 65 Senators and 201 Representatives, representing 49 states and 90% of US citizens. Tens of thousands of Americans mobilized in support of the legislation, participating in hundreds of meetings with Congressional offices across the country.
Secondly the Human Rights Watch has also noted that LRA has committed various atrocities against the people of northern Uganda in particular and the international community in general. Anneke Van Woudenberg, Senior Researcher at Human Rights Watch maintains that for years civilians in central Africa have also suffered immensely from LRA violence.
Because of the above situation, human rights watch support apprehension of the indicted LRA commanders as part of a comprehensive strategy to permanently stop LRA atrocities. Human rights watch further recommends that President Obama should move swiftly to take advantage of this historic opportunity to help bring closure to one of the worst human rights crises likely to be caused by LRA.
Thirdly, it has also attracted the International intervention which include International criminal court issuing warrant of arrest to the top commanders of LRA who are accused of crimes against humanity. ICC notes that LRA violence has plagued central Africa for more than two decades. In northern Uganda, thousands of civilians were killed and nearly two million displaced by the conflict between the rebels and the Ugandan government.
In July 2005, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the senior leaders of the LRA for crimes they committed in northern Uganda, but the suspects remain at large. Though the rebel group ended attacks in northern Uganda in 2006, it then moved its bases to the northern Democratic Republic of Congo and has since committed acts of violence against civilians in Congo, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Kony and his top commanders sustain their ranks by abducting civilians, including children, to use as soldiers and sexual slaves.
So far, the International Criminal Court has opened investigations into seven situations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda; the Central African Republic, Darfur, Sudan; the Republic of Kenya; the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire. Of these seven, three were referred to the Court by the states parties (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic), two were referred by the United Nations Security Council (Darfur and Libya) and two were begun proprio motu by the Prosecutor (Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire).
The Court publicly indicted 26 people, proceedings against 23 of whom are ongoing. The ICC has issued arrest warrants for 17 individuals and summonses to nine others. Five individuals are in custody and are being tried while eight individuals remain at large as fugitives (although one is reported to have died). Additionally, two individuals have been arrested by national authorities, but have not yet been transferred to the Court. Proceedings against three individuals have finished following the death of two and the dismissal of charges against the other.
As of end September 2010, the Office of the Prosecutor had received 8,874 communications about alleged crimes. After initial review, 4,002 of these communications were dismissed as “manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court”
In December 2008, following the collapse of a negotiations process, Sudan, Uganda and Congo began a joint military offensive, “Operation Lightening Thunder,” against the rebel group, with backing from the United States. In the subsequent 17 months the LRA had dispersed into multiple smaller groups and had brutally murdered at least 1,500 civilians and abducted at least 1,600 people, many of them children. LRA violence has often targeted churches, school and markets, and includes the massacre of over 300 Congolese civilians in an attack in the same year.
Further more, the northern Uganda atrocities by LRA have spread through out the Central Africa where they continued to kill and abduct people both indigenous and foreigners. At one time LRA commanders threatened to undermine the referendum in southern Sudan. Hence the LRA atrocities are a clear threat to international peace and security.
With the movement of the LRA into CAR, the Uganda Civil War had effectively escalated into a regional conflict that involved 4 countries that is the DRC, the CAR, Sudan, and Uganda. The LRA, the last remaining anti-government organization from the Uganda Civil War, continued to remain a threat to the region in 2010 by attacking remote locations and they continued to evade capture of the Ugandan military. The goals of the LRA had become increasingly unclear and they did not appear to pose a threat to the governments of any of the countries they operated in, preferring to prey on civilians, killing, raping, and mutilating the people of central Africa; stealing and brutalizing their children; and displacing hundreds of thousands of people in the process. The United States government stated in 2010, that the Lord's Resistance Army had no agenda and no purpose other than its own survival.
Conclusion
The ICC, by investigating and prosecuting those responsible of committing mass atrocities, is supposed to act as a method for deterring and preventing future atrocity crimes from being committed. The effectiveness of this deterrence and prevention depends on the certainty and severity of the consequences of committing those crimes. However, should justice or peace be more important in terms of ending a conflict, such as those in Somalia, Uganda and Sudan? Should justice be sacrificed for peace and an end to conflict and ultimately, the greater good? Or should justice prevail and perpetrators be prosecuted even at the expense of atrocity crimes being perpetrated? The ICC is still in its infant stage to some extent and whether the prosecution of Al-Bashir and other perpetrators will cause other would-be perpetrators to think twice before committing gross human rights abuses remains to be seen.
REFERENCES
Evans, G. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C.
Kegley, C.W. and Wittkopf, E.R. (2006): World Politics: Trends and Transformation Thomson Wadsworth: Belmont, USA.
Associated Press, 30 May 2007. Human Rights Watch: Ugandan rebels must face justice, even if not before international court. Accessed 24/11/211.
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/cah/ij/w_context/w_context.aspx . Accessed: 14/11/2011.
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_Crime_of_Aggression_Factsheet_FINAL_eng_1May07.pdf. (Coalition for the International Criminal Court. 2007). The ICC and the Crime of Aggression. Available from: Accessed: 20/11/2011.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5966&l=1 . Accessed: 06/01/2010.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7500437.stm . Accessed: 07/01/2010.
Examine the relevance of the local community action in conflict resolution in Sub-Sahara Africa and explain some of the challenges there in.
INTRODUCTION
A community is defined as a group of interacting people, possibly living in close proximity, and often refers to a group that shares some common values, and is attributed with social cohesion within a shared geographical location, generally in social units larger than a household (Barker et al. 1987).
Conflict resolution is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of some social conflict. Often, committed group members attempt to resolve group conflicts by actively communicating information about their conflicting motives or ideologies to the rest of the group such as intentions, reasons for holding certain beliefs and by engaging in collective negotiation. Ultimately, a wide range of methods and procedures for addressing conflict exist and of course local community action is one of them (Robinson and Clifford (1974).
Local community action in conflict resolution use local actors and traditional community-based judicial and legal decision-making mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts within or between communities. Local mechanisms aim to resolve conflicts without resorting to state-run judicial systems, police, or other external structures.
Local community negotiations in conflict can lead to ad-hoc practical agreements which keep broader inter-communal relations positive.
Additional results of local conflict management occur when actors who do not have political, social or economic stake in continuing violence come together and build a "constituency for peace." In some cases, this can undermine the perpetrators of violence, leading to the development of momentum toward peace.
Local mediation typically incorporates consensus-building based on open discussions to exchange information and clarify issues. Conflicting parties are more likely to accept guidance from these mediators than from other sources because an elder’s decision does not entail any loss of face and is backed by social pressure. The end result is, ideally, a sense of unity, shared involvement and responsibility, and dialogue among groups otherwise in conflict.
Local mechanisms intervene to resolve community disputes before they escalate to large-scale violence or to prevent a resumption of violence after a period of calm. Generally one or both parties to a dispute request intervention by an elder, the elder council, or other community member. Occasionally, elders unite and take the initiative in forming a local council to represent the community’s interests.
Community members involved in the conflict participate in the dispute resolution process. These community members can include traditional authorities, elders, chiefs, women’s organizations, local institutions and professional associations.
The elders function as a court with broad and flexible powers to interpret evidence, impose judgments, and manage the process of reconciliation. The mediator leads and channels discussion of the problem. Parties typically do not address each other, eliminating direct confrontation. Interruptions are not allowed while parties state their case. Statements are followed by open deliberation which may integrate listening to and cross-examining witnesses, the free expression of grievances, caucusing with both groups, reliance on circumstantial evidence, visiting dispute scenes, seeking opinions and views of neighbors, reviewing past cases, holding private consultations, and considering solutions.
The elders or other traditional mediators use their judgment and position of moral ascendancy to find an accepted solution. Decisions may be based on consensus within the elders’ or chiefs’ council and may be rendered on the spot. Resolution may involve forgiveness and mutual formal release of the problem, and, if necessary, the arrangement of restitution.
Also International agencies can promote local dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure that local actors participate in conflict management by partnering with existing local institutions.
External players such as humanitarian organizations, UN officials, peacekeepers and official delegations can empower local mediation groups in acknowledging their relevance, meeting with them when visiting an area and securing their input into planning, building on traditional structures for peace and conflict resolution, and using those structures in dealing with ongoing conflicts, developing a strategy for identifying conflict resolvers and peacemakers within each cultural group in the operating area, validating and empowering existing conflict resolvers, and creating opportunities for their interaction with other communities
It should be remembered that a local peace process is generally low-cost. Local efforts may be financed through community sources, or may require external, including international, support especially in the initial stage of rejuvenating such mechanisms.
There are several challenges facing community action in conflict resolution as here below presented;
First of all, the process may be time-consuming and encourage broad discussion of aspects that may seem unrelated to the central problem, as the mediator tries to situate the conflict in the disputants’ frame of reference and decide on an appropriate style and format of intervention.
Some traditional conflict mitigation efforts may be weakened by age or gender bias for example, in cases with no women elders, some women may believe that male elders are biased against women and that this will be reflected in their decisions. Indigenous, traditional authorities generally are not progressive elements of social change.
Local conflict management’s potential effectiveness is diminished where traditional authority has eroded and armed authority has increased, since these trends run counter to traditional values and ways of social organization, including those of handling conflict.
Indigenous mediation has a dynamic of its own and does not always respond positively to external prompting. Indigenous mediation requires delicate and knowledgeable management, and external actors must bring an intimate understanding of local conditions.
The process of strengthening international and regional institutions has neglected internal solutions. Conflict is inherent in society; so are mechanisms for dealing with it. The decline of traditional authority and its role in conflict mediation has contributed to the development of large-scale conflict (as in Liberia, Somalia and Sudan). In other cases, parties to broader conflicts have subverted traditional mediation mechanisms or included them in the conflict for example in Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Burundi.
Finally High-profile peace fora financed and organized by external parties may interfere with more than assist in producing plausible settlements, especially if conducted without coordinating with local non-military leaders. At the national or international level, such efforts may require external support, such as logistical assistance, and probably should be accompanied by other actions to prevent the immediate outbreak of violence
CONCLUSION
Key authority structures of conflicting parties must be included in the process, including traditional, military, administrative, and religious leaders and those with moral authority in the community must be central to the process, educated exiles also have a role to play. while the external support should be minimal and fill gaps, taking care not to replace indigenous leadership. Hence the external assistance must take care to supplement rather than overwhelm existing local grassroots initiatives and the external actors planning to support local mediation mechanisms must bring local experience, perhaps even anthropological knowledge of the area.
REFERENCES
Adams,M. & Bradbury,M(1995): Conflict and Development: Background Paper for UNICEF/NGO Workshop. New York, NY: United Nations.
Agrawal, A., (1995): Dismantling the Divide between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge. Development and Change.
Avruch,K(1991): Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
Barzilai, Gad. (2003): Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Berkes, F. (1989): Co-management and the James Bay Agreement. In Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community Development, ed. by E. Pinkerton.
Cox, F,J.(1970): Strategies of Community Organization: A Book of Readings. Itasca, IL: F. E.
Warren, D & Brokensha,D:(1995): The Cultural Dimensions of Development. Intermediate Technology Publications, London.
QUESTION 2
With specific references to northern Uganda, Discuss the practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda and suggest some possible solution.
INTRODUCTION
The Lord's Resistance Army is a militant group with a syncretic Christian and traditional African religious ideology. Until it was flushed out of Uganda, the group was operating in northern Uganda, But now it has moved to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central Africa Republic.
The LRA was formed in 1987 and until about 2007 it was engaged in an armed rebellion against the Ugandan government. It is led by Joseph Kony, who proclaims himself the "spokesperson" of God and a spirit medium, primarily of the Holy Spirit, which the group believes can represent itself in many manifestations.
Practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda;
Lasting peace for northern Uganda, which has been plagued by conflict and displacement for twenty-one years, remains a challenge. With the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictments issued against top leaders of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains a thorny question, with the potential to derail the peace effort. Hence this poses a challenge to peace agreements between LRA and the government of Uganda.
It is a challenge in that the Rebel leaders do state that they cannot sign an agreement unless the ICC indictments are dropped. Lifting the indictments, however, poses serious concerns about the integrity of international justice. To break the deadlock, all parties should carefully consider practical approaches to provisions of the Rome Statute (the treaty constituting the ICC) that would enable suspension of the indictments.
In late December 2003, President Museveni referred the situation in northern Uganda to the newly created International Criminal Court. In July 2004, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) officially opened an investigation, and in October 2005, the ICC issued indictments for five top LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony.
Real progress on ending the humanitarian crisis and pursuing a coherent long-term strategy for reconstruction in the north cannot take place without guarantees of peace and security. Establishing peace, however, requires difficult decisions about how to reconcile humanitarian imperatives and the unquestionable need for stability in the region with the outstanding ICC indictments.
As stated in the Rome Statute, the goal of the ICC is to prevent atrocities like war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by ending impunity. In the statute’s Preamble, the states parties affirm that such crimes “must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured.” States also pledge in the Preamble to “reaffirm the Principles and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.” The UN Charter commits states to take collective measures to maintain peace and security through peaceful means when possible. This obligation is rooted in a fundamental principle to avoid the instability, atrocities, and protracted humanitarian crises war often produces.
Ideally, these international commitments to prosecute and punish serious crimes and peacefully end or prevent conflict should work hand in hand. To some extent, this scenario has occurred in northern Uganda.
In addition due to pressure from the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), the LRA’s decision to negotiate in Juba was partially attributed to the international indictments, which initially raised rebel fears that an international force would attempt to arrest the LRA leaders and that finding safe haven would become more difficult. During the negotiations, LRA attacks in northern Uganda essentially stopped.
The involvement of the ICC strengthened discussions of justice and accountability in Uganda and within the context of the negotiations. In fact, one of the five agenda items of the talks, Agenda Item Three, specifically addresses reconciliation and accountability. The agreement on Agenda Item Three provides for formal judicial processes within Uganda to adjudicate allegations of serious human rights violations arising from the conflict. As stated in the annexure to the agreement, a special division of the High Court of Uganda would try such cases.
The agreement also provides for “a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions,” which would reflect the gravity of the crimes and promote reconciliation within communities. The parties have discussed domestic justice mechanisms because under the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute, a state may lawfully reclaim a case begun by the ICC and try it domestically if the state is genuinely willing and able to carry out prosecution and conform to international standards of prosecution and punishment. This also meant practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda simply because of suspicion of unfair trial in case the local courts were to try the rebel commanders.
The twin goals of peace and justice begin to diverge, however, when we assume that imprisonment is the only form of punishment acceptable under the Rome Statute and under international standards more generally. Therefore it was unlikely that Kony and the other ICC inductees would agree to be subjected to a judicial process which would ultimately lead to their incarceration. Consequently, imprisonment was probably not among the “alternative penalties and sanctions” envisioned in the Agenda Item Three Agreement on Reconciliation and Accountability signed by the LRA. This indeed posed a challenge to the prospects for peace in northern Uganda.
Further more, while the Rome Statute upholds the obligation to end impunity and punish perpetrators who commit terrible atrocities, the treaty also leaves room in certain provisions to deal with hard cases where a range of factors must be weighed. While these provisions could conceivably preclude international or domestic prosecution and incarceration, their careful use is nonetheless consistent with international law. The flexibility they allow also serves to uphold respect for the international justice system over the long run. Moreover, implementation of these provisions need not involve a zero-sum trade-off of justice for peace. In each instance, justice should certainly be maximized within the limitations raised by the case at hand. This kind of arrangement directly or indirectly affected the practices and legal peace agreement between LRA and the government of Uganda hence proved to be a challenge to peace agreements.
Further still according to Rome Statute, it is critical to build the ICC’s enforcement capacity. The Statute envisions an international justice system where perpetrators of major international crimes are arrested, tried, and punished with commensurate prison terms. But the enforcement challenges presented by the Uganda case suggest that expectations of what the ICC can achieve in its early stages may be too high. Insisting on unrealistic outcomes causes the victims to pay unacceptably for the challenges the international justice system currently faces. Instead, the international community should explore ways to strengthen the ICC’s enforcement capacity in ways that minimize the risks to stability and to drawing out protracted humanitarian crises. Moving forward, a more tangible international commitment to improved enforcement would counter any concerns about the integrity of international justice raised by the Uganda case.
This briefing provides a background of the conflict and ongoing attempts at peace, reflects the diverse views expressed during the consultations about justice priorities, and offers recommendations on how to move forward with a comprehensive justice plan.
Another point in place as to the practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda was the Comprehensive Amnesty designed by the Uganda government whose one of its key components of justice is the Amnesty Act, which the Ugandan government enacted in 2000 as a response to popular demand to end the stalemated conflict. The amnesty granted is exceptionally broad, stating that from 1986 onward "any Ugandan who has himself of herself engaged in war or armed rebellion against the government by either participating in combat, engaging in any other criminal activity connected with the conflict, or aiding or abetting insurgents shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment" as long as they agree to renounce their affiliation with rebel groups. This indeed also posed a challenge to the practices and legal peace agreement between LRA, the government of Uganda.
Possible solutions to practices and legal challenges of peace agreement between LRA and the government of Uganda are here below presented;
First and foremost, alternative justice mechanisms are necessary to solve the challenges highlighted above as these shall promote reconciliation and shall include traditional justice processes, alternative sentences, reparations, and any other formal institutions or mechanisms.
Secondly, the parties in the conflict need to acknowledge the need for an overarching justice framework that will provide for the exercise of formal criminal jurisdiction, and for the adoption and recognition of complementary alternative justice mechanisms hence they need to promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms to address issues arising from within or outside Uganda with respect to the conflict.
Further more the removal of the LRA/LRM from the list of Terrorist Organizations under the Anti-Terrorism Act of Uganda upon the LRA/LRM abandoning rebellion, ceasing fire, and submitting its members to the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration can be a solution as well.
Finally, alternative penalties and sanctions are necessary to solve the challenges. Such alternatives need to reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations, promote reconciliation between individuals and within communities, promote the rehabilitation of offenders, take into account an individual's admissions or other cooperation with proceedings and require perpetrators to make reparations to victims.
CONCLUSION
Conclusively, Uganda has institutions and mechanisms, customs and usages as provided for and recognized under national laws, capable of addressing the crimes and human rights violations committed during the LRA conflict. Therefore such mechanisms can solve the legal and peace challenges mentioned in this presentation as this will ensure modifications required within the national legal system to ensure a more effective and integrated justice to deal with the rebels of LRA domestically.
REFERENCES
Briggs, Jimmie (2005): Innocents Lost: When Child Soldiers Go to War. Basic Books.
Green, Matthew (2008): The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa's Most Wanted. Portobello Books.
Singer, P, W. (2006): Children at War. University of California Press.
Vlassenroot, K. (2010): The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. Zed Books Ltd..
BBC News (23 January 2008): Uganda's LRA confirm Otti death. Retrieved 20 Noember 2011.
Kavanagh, M J. (2010): "Obama Administration Asks for Funds to Boost Uganda's Fight Against Rebels". Bloomberg. Retrieved 19/11/2011.
"Obama Sending 100 Armed Advisers to Africa to Help Fight Renegade Group". New York Times. 2011-10-14. Retrieved 15/11/2011
http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/peacerec2.html/17/11/2011
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/4/801.abstract/17/11/2011
http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/19/11/2011
QUESTION 3
Explain the objectives of African union and discuss why AU is unable to enforce and promote legal and practical peace.
INTRODUCTION
The African Union (abbreviated AU) is a union consisting of 54 African states. The only African state not in the AU is Morocco. Established on 9 July 2002, the AU was formed as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The most important decisions of the AU are made by the Assembly of the African Union, a semi-annual meeting of the heads of state and government of its member states. The AU's secretariat, the African Union Commission, is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The African Union is made up of both political and administrative bodies. The highest decision-making organ is the Assembly of the African Union, made up of all the heads of state or government of member states of the AU. Currently the Assembly is chaired by Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, leader of Equatorial Guinea, elected at the tenth ordinary meeting of the Assembly in January 2011. The AU also has a representative body, the Pan African Parliament, which consists of 265 members elected by the national parliaments of the AU member states.
Other political institutions of the AU include;
• The Executive Council, made up of foreign ministers, which prepares decisions for the Assembly;
• The Permanent Representatives Committee, made up of the ambassadors to Addis Ababa of AU member states; and
• The Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), a civil society consultative body.
.
The following are objectives of the African Union (AU);
Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African counties and the peoples of Africa
Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States
Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent
Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent
Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance
Promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments
Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations
Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies
Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples
Coordinate and harmonize policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union
Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology
Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent
The African Union aims range from promoting the advancement of science and technology to raising the living standards of Africa’s citizens.
African Union is unable to enforce and promote legal and practical peace due to various factors as here under presented;
First and foremost, the success of the African Union depends primarily on the ability to learn from the failures of the Organization of African States (OAU), one of which was the inability of the Organization to foster peace within its own membership.
The Organization of African States, which was created in 1963, was not able, although outlined within its own charter to stop wars between its member states, nor was it able to prevent genocidal violence such as in Rwanda in 1994. This historical factor in still present in Africa and makes AU unable to effectively enforce legal and practical peace.
Secondly, according to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the defining feature of intervention is that it is conducted without the consent of the target state. A request for assistance by a recognized government therefore falls outside of this definition. The right of intervention by international or regional organizations in the internal affairs of member states therefore contradicts the traditional concept of state sovereignty on which the UN and the present AU charters are based.
Thirdly, the African Union Constitutive Act Article 4(j) provides that for the “right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.” This goes far beyond the ‘just cause’ threshold defined by the ICISS.
Further more, on the face of it, the act provides much leeway in this regard, for example, Article 4(m) provides for “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance”. Article 4(o) provides for “respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities”. Article 4(p) provides for the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government”.
Also basing on the above sweeping provisions, and others that create the lack of clarity in the act that has now led to the development of a Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to be submitted to African heads of state in Durban for their approval. The Protocol provides for the establishment of a completely revamped Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution “which shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.8 This will replace the existing structure authorized through the 1993 Cairo Declaration on the establishment of the AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.
Other considerations in the development of the Protocol are, of course, the intense sense of competition evident in Addis Ababa from the overlap on peace and security issues with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD A second contention is the extent to which the peer review mechanism, the sole remaining preserve of the unit responsible for the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation (CSSDCA) within the AU, is now duplicated by the proposed NEPAD peer review mechanism hence such confusion does help African Union to effectively enforce and promote legal and practical peace.
The concept of state sovereignty, on which the international system and the AU are founded, presumes that each state has the power, authority and competence to govern its territory. For many African states, however, sovereignty is a legal fiction that is not matched by governance and administrative capacity. Some analysts go so far as to argue that such states violate the prerequisite for UN membership contained in Article 4(1) of the UN Charter, that members must be “able and willing to carry out the obligations”5 of the organization. This indeed makes it difficult for African Union to effectively enforce and promote legal and practical peace.
On the other hand, the AU itself derives its authority from state actors, and is built on the presumption of their sovereignty and legitimacy. The challenge for the AU is to become accountable to the people of Africa. It can only do so if it is composed of elected leaders that adhere to human rights and respect the tenants of accountable and good governance where governance in the interests of all and not only a few. Admittedly the OAU had little choice in the matter since intergovernmental organizations are ultimately beholden to their member states. But the AU could be different.
Transparency and popular participation must be built into the procedures of the AU at all levels, including the proposed Peace and Security Council (the successor to the Central Organ of the OAU) if the Union is to develop the political will and responsiveness necessary to uphold the commitments of the AU act. But much more is needed. African leaders must reflect, through their actions and treatment of one another, the values that lie at the core of stability, democracy and peace. Such a demonstration demands a fundamental break from the past practice of unquestioning solidarity among leaders. It demands an acceptance of the responsibility to protect.
CONCLUSION
The modern trend, also reflected in Article 4(o) of the AU act, is that it is necessary to combat cultures of impunity in order to promote long-term reconciliation, peace and democracy. Collective security can also help African Union to effectively enforce and promote legal and practical peace since the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace. This encompasses the totality of states within the region addresses a wide range of possible threats.
REFERENCES
Asante, S.K(2001): Towards an African Economic Community’, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria.
Genge, M(2000): African Union and a Pan – African Parliament: Working Papers’, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria.
Mazrui, A.A and Patel, H.H(1973): Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years’, The Third Press, New York.
Meny, Y, and Quermonne, J(1996): Adjusting to Europe : The impact of the European Union on national institutions and policies’, Routledge, London.
Robson, P,(1983): Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa’, George Allen & Unwin’, London.
Rumford, C,(2002): The European Union: A Political Sociology’, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
QUESTION 4
Discuss the fact that the atrocities being committed in northern Uganda are major threat to international security.
INTRODUCTION
International security consists of the measures taken by nations and international organizations, such as the United Nations, to ensure mutual survival and safety. These measures include military action and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. International and national security are invariably linked. International security is national security or state security in the global arena.
Atrocities refer to appalling or atrocious acts, situations, or objects, especially an act of unusual or illegal cruelty inflicted by an armed force on civilians or prisoners which are extremely wicked or cruel, typically ones involving physical violence or injury.
Northern Uganda had suffered from civil unrest since the early 1980s. Hundreds of people were killed in the rebellion against the Ugandan government, and an estimated 400-thousand people were left homeless.
As the question proposes, indeed the atrocities being committed in northern Uganda are major threat to international security as presented here below;
First of all it has attracted the attention of international security players for example USA was forced to intervene as evidenced by the statement made by the President OBAMA on the signing of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. This law was introduced into the US Senate and House of Representatives in May 2009, and has since become the most widely supported Africa-specific legislation in recent Congressional history. The law was cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 65 Senators and 201 Representatives, representing 49 states and 90% of US citizens. Tens of thousands of Americans mobilized in support of the legislation, participating in hundreds of meetings with Congressional offices across the country.
Secondly the Human Rights Watch has also noted that LRA has committed various atrocities against the people of northern Uganda in particular and the international community in general. Anneke Van Woudenberg, Senior Researcher at Human Rights Watch maintains that for years civilians in central Africa have also suffered immensely from LRA violence.
Because of the above situation, human rights watch support apprehension of the indicted LRA commanders as part of a comprehensive strategy to permanently stop LRA atrocities. Human rights watch further recommends that President Obama should move swiftly to take advantage of this historic opportunity to help bring closure to one of the worst human rights crises likely to be caused by LRA.
Thirdly, it has also attracted the International intervention which include International criminal court issuing warrant of arrest to the top commanders of LRA who are accused of crimes against humanity. ICC notes that LRA violence has plagued central Africa for more than two decades. In northern Uganda, thousands of civilians were killed and nearly two million displaced by the conflict between the rebels and the Ugandan government.
In July 2005, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the senior leaders of the LRA for crimes they committed in northern Uganda, but the suspects remain at large. Though the rebel group ended attacks in northern Uganda in 2006, it then moved its bases to the northern Democratic Republic of Congo and has since committed acts of violence against civilians in Congo, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Kony and his top commanders sustain their ranks by abducting civilians, including children, to use as soldiers and sexual slaves.
So far, the International Criminal Court has opened investigations into seven situations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda; the Central African Republic, Darfur, Sudan; the Republic of Kenya; the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire. Of these seven, three were referred to the Court by the states parties (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic), two were referred by the United Nations Security Council (Darfur and Libya) and two were begun proprio motu by the Prosecutor (Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire).
The Court publicly indicted 26 people, proceedings against 23 of whom are ongoing. The ICC has issued arrest warrants for 17 individuals and summonses to nine others. Five individuals are in custody and are being tried while eight individuals remain at large as fugitives (although one is reported to have died). Additionally, two individuals have been arrested by national authorities, but have not yet been transferred to the Court. Proceedings against three individuals have finished following the death of two and the dismissal of charges against the other.
As of end September 2010, the Office of the Prosecutor had received 8,874 communications about alleged crimes. After initial review, 4,002 of these communications were dismissed as “manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court”
In December 2008, following the collapse of a negotiations process, Sudan, Uganda and Congo began a joint military offensive, “Operation Lightening Thunder,” against the rebel group, with backing from the United States. In the subsequent 17 months the LRA had dispersed into multiple smaller groups and had brutally murdered at least 1,500 civilians and abducted at least 1,600 people, many of them children. LRA violence has often targeted churches, school and markets, and includes the massacre of over 300 Congolese civilians in an attack in the same year.
Further more, the northern Uganda atrocities by LRA have spread through out the Central Africa where they continued to kill and abduct people both indigenous and foreigners. At one time LRA commanders threatened to undermine the referendum in southern Sudan. Hence the LRA atrocities are a clear threat to international peace and security.
With the movement of the LRA into CAR, the Uganda Civil War had effectively escalated into a regional conflict that involved 4 countries that is the DRC, the CAR, Sudan, and Uganda. The LRA, the last remaining anti-government organization from the Uganda Civil War, continued to remain a threat to the region in 2010 by attacking remote locations and they continued to evade capture of the Ugandan military. The goals of the LRA had become increasingly unclear and they did not appear to pose a threat to the governments of any of the countries they operated in, preferring to prey on civilians, killing, raping, and mutilating the people of central Africa; stealing and brutalizing their children; and displacing hundreds of thousands of people in the process. The United States government stated in 2010, that the Lord's Resistance Army had no agenda and no purpose other than its own survival.
Conclusion
The ICC, by investigating and prosecuting those responsible of committing mass atrocities, is supposed to act as a method for deterring and preventing future atrocity crimes from being committed. The effectiveness of this deterrence and prevention depends on the certainty and severity of the consequences of committing those crimes. However, should justice or peace be more important in terms of ending a conflict, such as those in Somalia, Uganda and Sudan? Should justice be sacrificed for peace and an end to conflict and ultimately, the greater good? Or should justice prevail and perpetrators be prosecuted even at the expense of atrocity crimes being perpetrated? The ICC is still in its infant stage to some extent and whether the prosecution of Al-Bashir and other perpetrators will cause other would-be perpetrators to think twice before committing gross human rights abuses remains to be seen.
REFERENCES
Evans, G. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C.
Kegley, C.W. and Wittkopf, E.R. (2006): World Politics: Trends and Transformation Thomson Wadsworth: Belmont, USA.
Associated Press, 30 May 2007. Human Rights Watch: Ugandan rebels must face justice, even if not before international court. Accessed 24/11/211.
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/cah/ij/w_context/w_context.aspx . Accessed: 14/11/2011.
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_Crime_of_Aggression_Factsheet_FINAL_eng_1May07.pdf. (Coalition for the International Criminal Court. 2007). The ICC and the Crime of Aggression. Available from: Accessed: 20/11/2011.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5966&l=1 . Accessed: 06/01/2010.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7500437.stm . Accessed: 07/01/2010.
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