All conflicts in the world are largely caused by poverty. Discuss critically Root causes of violent conflict in developing countries
INTRODUCTION
Poverty is the state of being without, often associated with need, hardship and lack of resources across a wide range of circumstances.
There are various causes of conflicts in developing countries where poverty is one of them. Here below is a presentation of various root causes of violent conflicts in developing countries;
First and foremost the horizontal inequalities and social exclusion, particularly when they coincide with identity or regional boundaries may increase a society’s predisposition towards violent conflict. Such background conditions can be exploited by political entrepreneurs.
Chronic poverty may also be a significant factor in sustaining wars and violent conflicts and predation becomes the only viable livelihood strategy for the chronically poor.
Modern conflicts are multi causal with a range of short term and long term factors coming into play, including a sudden economic slow down in the face of rising expectations, external shocks and state crises.
Poverty is a permissive or causal factor of some violent conflicts in some countries. It is indeed a structural cause, a trigger or an accelerator of violent conflicts.
A body of empirical work has emerged which examines poverty’s role as one of a number of causal factors behind violent conflict, although again, this does not differentiate between chronic and transient poverty.
Broadly, it is argued that uneven development processes lead to inequality, exclusion and poverty. This contributes to growing grievances particularly when poverty coincides with ethnic, religious, language or regional boundaries. These underlying grievances may explode into open conflict when triggered by external shocks such as a sudden change in terms of trade or mobilized by conflict entrepreneurs. Although few argue that poverty per se, causes conflict, research points to the importance of extreme horizontal inequalities, as a source of grievance which is used by leaders to mobilize followers and to legitimate violent actions (Stewart and FitzGerald, 2000).
Many of today’s conflicts are rooted in colonial era and post colonial development strategies, which led to the marginalization of the rural and urban poor. Uvin traces the roots of the Rwanda crisis back to failed development policies pursued in previous decades.
In Nepal, the failure of development assistance to trickle down, particularly to the rural poor in the mid-West contributed to growing discontent and eventually violent conflicts.
Further more in countries which have high value resources, for instance oil as in the case of Nigeria, inequitable resource extraction and distribution and the negative local environmental impacts have led to growing tensions/conflicts amongst the people.
More still violent conflicts are sometimes caused by extractive development policies where these lead to resource scarcity and environmental stress. This may manifest itself in tensions between pastoralists and farmers, or between the landless and landowners. It may also lead to stress-induced migration. Environmental degradation and resource scarcity, while perhaps not being the underlying cause of conflict may become a significant aggravator or trigger for violent conflicts.
The institutional capacity and policies of the state are critical in terms of ensuring that grievance is contained or to prevent it from becoming violent. Moore (2000) identifies a close link between bad governance and poverty. Politically underdeveloped states are too independent of their citizens. They are able to raise revenues through ‘unearned’ income that is mineral resources or foreign aid and have few incentives to provide public goods for their citizens. In fact Reno (2000) argues that rulers of ‘shadow states’ are motivated in the opposite direction.
Although on the other hand, Collier emphasizes that greed rather than grievance in his statistical analysis shows that countries with a large majority and small minority have a greater propensity to violent conflict than ethnically diverse countries. In a number of countries the coincidence of poverty and exclusion with minority or majority group boundaries has proved to be a combustible cocktail instrument of control. Although not all states are shadow states, in many parts of the world large numbers of people are excluded from the benefits of development, in part, as a result of conscious state policies.
It is also argued that even nominally democratic states may fail to address the needs of the chronically poor, as they do not represent an attractive constituency for political parties whose policies are geared to short term electoral cycles.
Additionally, state bias towards particular groups leads to changes in the entitlement configurations of excluded groups. In Sri Lanka for instance, land colonization and education policies had an important impact on the entitlements of the Tamil population, leading to alienation and growing grievance hence violent conflicts as resultant.
Conflicts also tend to be concentrated in countries with limited education provision. Hence lack of educated population may cause violent conflicts due to ignorance for example in Sierra Leone, the pool of marginalized young men was a significant driving force behind the conflicts there.
On the other hand Sri Lanka’s excellent record in the field of education did not inoculate it from violent conflict. Rebellion in the south was mobilized by the educated, but jobless youth. This suggests that education without economic opportunities is likely to lead to increased grievance hence violent conflicts.
Unfriendly International policies may also cause violent conflicts in certain countries. Moore, (2000) notes that bad governance leading to political underdevelopment is made, not born. He maintains that international policies contribute to processes which generate exclusion and grievance. For example structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have been criticized for undermining social contracts and coalitions. The budgetary axe tends to fall on programmes for the poor and such situations often result into violent conflicts.
Trade deregulation may have a crippling effect on certain groups, thus accentuating inter-group tension. For instance liberalization in many developing nations devastates peasant farming and agriculture in general. Moreover politically blind policies in transition countries do exacerbate social tensions. Land privatization policies in given countries for example run the risk of increasing conflict between their communities.
It should also be noted that a long term crisis of underdevelopment, of economic and social exclusion, may be exacerbated by short term shocks. Poverty and poor social services can fuel conflict ‘from below’, just as it feeds into ‘top down’ violence (Keen, 1998). Historically, marginalized sections of the population have been likely to turn to organized banditry.
Particular social conditions such as a surplus rural population or an economic crisis are therefore conducive to the development of predatory conflicts. The crusades, for example had a particular attraction for landless and younger sons (Keen, 1998). Similar processes can be identified in many of today’s conflicts as Keen notes: “in Sierra Leone, a chronic shortage of employment opportunities has been matched by a contraction in educational opportunities and in these circumstances many youths have turned to rebellion as a kind of ‘short cut’ to wealth as well as status.” (Keen, 1998).
Although liberalization has brought benefits to urban areas in many parts of the developing nations, it has also produced a fragile and brittle rural economy and growing economic disparities. Although poverty may not be the initial trigger for violent conflict, it can be an important factor that sustains it. In situations where there are few sources of livelihood, joining military groups may represent an essential survival strategy for instance in some nations for instance, poor households are increasingly dependent on recruitment to the country’s armed services.
It should also be realized that possible links between remote rural areas, poverty and conflict deserves further exploration. Many of today’s conflicts emanate from and are fought out in border regions that have historically suffered from marginality, limited voice and hard core poverty. For example conflicts in Nepal and Chiapas, Mexico are clearly linked to differential development and patterns of exclusion. Such border regions may have historically had an ambiguous relationship with the state and been a magnet for potential dissidents. Conflict entrepreneurs have been able to mobilize around a discourse of grievance. Moreover the weak presence of the state in such areas has made it easier for militant groups to mobilize and establish base areas for their activities.
Bottom up violence therefore serves economic functions. As Keen (1998) notes it also serves important psychological functions. Violence may be attractive because it offers the opportunity to restore a sense of power and status. It can effect a dramatic and immediate reversal of power relationships, something that may have an immediate attraction to young men with a deep seated resentment towards the established order.
In certain developing countries, rebel groups offer social mobility and a leadership role. Some youths see receive such with an alternative ‘career path’, when the political and economic mainstream has little to offer them. While there are therefore clearly links between poverty and bottom up violence, one could hypothesize that it is more likely to be the transiently poor, rather than the chronically poor that rebel. The chronically poor tend to be the least organized and most passive group in society.
Some studies have identified resource wealth rather than poverty to cause conflicts. Recent research by Paul Collier of the World Bank questions the view that conflicts are driven by grievance. He argues that popular perceptions are shaped by the discourse which conflicts themselves generate. Social scientists however, should be distrustful of the loud public discourse on conflict and question the language of protest often used by the conflicting parties themselves. War “cannot be fought just on hopes and hatreds” According to Collier, civil wars occur when rebel organizations are financially viable. Therefore it is the feasibility of predation which determines the risk of conflict. “..rebellion is motivated by greed, so that it occurs when rebels can do well out of war” (Collier, 2000).
.
CONCLUSION
This presentation examines violent conflicts and poverty. It has been argued that violent conflicts are not a side issue that can be ignored by developing coutries. It needs to be better understood, accounted for and tackled if development goals are to be achieved. There has been limited empirical research, which examines the nature of the relationship between poverty and violent conflicts.
This presentation examines the processes through which poverty generates grievance leading to violent conflict and concludes that poverty by itself is unlikely to lead to violent conflicts. It points out that the poor often lack political voice and organization. However, horizontal inequalities and social exclusion, particularly when they coincide with identity or regional boundaries may increase a society’s predisposition towards violent conflict. Poverty may also be a significant factor in sustaining wars as violent conflicts and predation become the only viable livelihood strategy for the poor.
Finally, this presentation examines and critiques the argument that greed rather than grievance causes conflict. In other words conflicts are driven by economic agendas rather than factors which cause grievance such as inequality and poverty.
REFERENCES
Atkinson, P (1997): The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis’ Relief and
Rehabilitation Network Paper, 22, London
Bhalla, A & Lapeyre (1997): ‘Social exclusion, towards and analytical and operational
framework'’ Development and Change, Vo. 28, 413 - 433)
Chambers, R (1997): ‘Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last’ Intermediate
Technology Publications.
Collier, P (2000): ‘Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy’
World Bank, June, 15, 2000.
Keen, D (1994): ‘The functions of famine in South Western Sudan: Implications for Relief’
in Macrae, J & Zwi, A (1994).
Keen, D (1998): ‘The economic functions of violence in civil wars’ Adelphi Paper,
International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.
Keen, D (2000): ‘Incentives and disincentives for violence’ in Berdal and Malone (2000).
Klugman, J (1999) ‘Social and Economic Policies to Prevent Complex Humanitarian
Emergencies. Lessons from Experience’ UNU/WIDER
Moore, M (2000): ‘Political Underdevelopment’ Paper presented at the 10th Anniversary
Conference of the Development Studies Institute, LSE, Sept, 2000.
Poverty is the state of being without, often associated with need, hardship and lack of resources across a wide range of circumstances.
There are various causes of conflicts in developing countries where poverty is one of them. Here below is a presentation of various root causes of violent conflicts in developing countries;
First and foremost the horizontal inequalities and social exclusion, particularly when they coincide with identity or regional boundaries may increase a society’s predisposition towards violent conflict. Such background conditions can be exploited by political entrepreneurs.
Chronic poverty may also be a significant factor in sustaining wars and violent conflicts and predation becomes the only viable livelihood strategy for the chronically poor.
Modern conflicts are multi causal with a range of short term and long term factors coming into play, including a sudden economic slow down in the face of rising expectations, external shocks and state crises.
Poverty is a permissive or causal factor of some violent conflicts in some countries. It is indeed a structural cause, a trigger or an accelerator of violent conflicts.
A body of empirical work has emerged which examines poverty’s role as one of a number of causal factors behind violent conflict, although again, this does not differentiate between chronic and transient poverty.
Broadly, it is argued that uneven development processes lead to inequality, exclusion and poverty. This contributes to growing grievances particularly when poverty coincides with ethnic, religious, language or regional boundaries. These underlying grievances may explode into open conflict when triggered by external shocks such as a sudden change in terms of trade or mobilized by conflict entrepreneurs. Although few argue that poverty per se, causes conflict, research points to the importance of extreme horizontal inequalities, as a source of grievance which is used by leaders to mobilize followers and to legitimate violent actions (Stewart and FitzGerald, 2000).
Many of today’s conflicts are rooted in colonial era and post colonial development strategies, which led to the marginalization of the rural and urban poor. Uvin traces the roots of the Rwanda crisis back to failed development policies pursued in previous decades.
In Nepal, the failure of development assistance to trickle down, particularly to the rural poor in the mid-West contributed to growing discontent and eventually violent conflicts.
Further more in countries which have high value resources, for instance oil as in the case of Nigeria, inequitable resource extraction and distribution and the negative local environmental impacts have led to growing tensions/conflicts amongst the people.
More still violent conflicts are sometimes caused by extractive development policies where these lead to resource scarcity and environmental stress. This may manifest itself in tensions between pastoralists and farmers, or between the landless and landowners. It may also lead to stress-induced migration. Environmental degradation and resource scarcity, while perhaps not being the underlying cause of conflict may become a significant aggravator or trigger for violent conflicts.
The institutional capacity and policies of the state are critical in terms of ensuring that grievance is contained or to prevent it from becoming violent. Moore (2000) identifies a close link between bad governance and poverty. Politically underdeveloped states are too independent of their citizens. They are able to raise revenues through ‘unearned’ income that is mineral resources or foreign aid and have few incentives to provide public goods for their citizens. In fact Reno (2000) argues that rulers of ‘shadow states’ are motivated in the opposite direction.
Although on the other hand, Collier emphasizes that greed rather than grievance in his statistical analysis shows that countries with a large majority and small minority have a greater propensity to violent conflict than ethnically diverse countries. In a number of countries the coincidence of poverty and exclusion with minority or majority group boundaries has proved to be a combustible cocktail instrument of control. Although not all states are shadow states, in many parts of the world large numbers of people are excluded from the benefits of development, in part, as a result of conscious state policies.
It is also argued that even nominally democratic states may fail to address the needs of the chronically poor, as they do not represent an attractive constituency for political parties whose policies are geared to short term electoral cycles.
Additionally, state bias towards particular groups leads to changes in the entitlement configurations of excluded groups. In Sri Lanka for instance, land colonization and education policies had an important impact on the entitlements of the Tamil population, leading to alienation and growing grievance hence violent conflicts as resultant.
Conflicts also tend to be concentrated in countries with limited education provision. Hence lack of educated population may cause violent conflicts due to ignorance for example in Sierra Leone, the pool of marginalized young men was a significant driving force behind the conflicts there.
On the other hand Sri Lanka’s excellent record in the field of education did not inoculate it from violent conflict. Rebellion in the south was mobilized by the educated, but jobless youth. This suggests that education without economic opportunities is likely to lead to increased grievance hence violent conflicts.
Unfriendly International policies may also cause violent conflicts in certain countries. Moore, (2000) notes that bad governance leading to political underdevelopment is made, not born. He maintains that international policies contribute to processes which generate exclusion and grievance. For example structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have been criticized for undermining social contracts and coalitions. The budgetary axe tends to fall on programmes for the poor and such situations often result into violent conflicts.
Trade deregulation may have a crippling effect on certain groups, thus accentuating inter-group tension. For instance liberalization in many developing nations devastates peasant farming and agriculture in general. Moreover politically blind policies in transition countries do exacerbate social tensions. Land privatization policies in given countries for example run the risk of increasing conflict between their communities.
It should also be noted that a long term crisis of underdevelopment, of economic and social exclusion, may be exacerbated by short term shocks. Poverty and poor social services can fuel conflict ‘from below’, just as it feeds into ‘top down’ violence (Keen, 1998). Historically, marginalized sections of the population have been likely to turn to organized banditry.
Particular social conditions such as a surplus rural population or an economic crisis are therefore conducive to the development of predatory conflicts. The crusades, for example had a particular attraction for landless and younger sons (Keen, 1998). Similar processes can be identified in many of today’s conflicts as Keen notes: “in Sierra Leone, a chronic shortage of employment opportunities has been matched by a contraction in educational opportunities and in these circumstances many youths have turned to rebellion as a kind of ‘short cut’ to wealth as well as status.” (Keen, 1998).
Although liberalization has brought benefits to urban areas in many parts of the developing nations, it has also produced a fragile and brittle rural economy and growing economic disparities. Although poverty may not be the initial trigger for violent conflict, it can be an important factor that sustains it. In situations where there are few sources of livelihood, joining military groups may represent an essential survival strategy for instance in some nations for instance, poor households are increasingly dependent on recruitment to the country’s armed services.
It should also be realized that possible links between remote rural areas, poverty and conflict deserves further exploration. Many of today’s conflicts emanate from and are fought out in border regions that have historically suffered from marginality, limited voice and hard core poverty. For example conflicts in Nepal and Chiapas, Mexico are clearly linked to differential development and patterns of exclusion. Such border regions may have historically had an ambiguous relationship with the state and been a magnet for potential dissidents. Conflict entrepreneurs have been able to mobilize around a discourse of grievance. Moreover the weak presence of the state in such areas has made it easier for militant groups to mobilize and establish base areas for their activities.
Bottom up violence therefore serves economic functions. As Keen (1998) notes it also serves important psychological functions. Violence may be attractive because it offers the opportunity to restore a sense of power and status. It can effect a dramatic and immediate reversal of power relationships, something that may have an immediate attraction to young men with a deep seated resentment towards the established order.
In certain developing countries, rebel groups offer social mobility and a leadership role. Some youths see receive such with an alternative ‘career path’, when the political and economic mainstream has little to offer them. While there are therefore clearly links between poverty and bottom up violence, one could hypothesize that it is more likely to be the transiently poor, rather than the chronically poor that rebel. The chronically poor tend to be the least organized and most passive group in society.
Some studies have identified resource wealth rather than poverty to cause conflicts. Recent research by Paul Collier of the World Bank questions the view that conflicts are driven by grievance. He argues that popular perceptions are shaped by the discourse which conflicts themselves generate. Social scientists however, should be distrustful of the loud public discourse on conflict and question the language of protest often used by the conflicting parties themselves. War “cannot be fought just on hopes and hatreds” According to Collier, civil wars occur when rebel organizations are financially viable. Therefore it is the feasibility of predation which determines the risk of conflict. “..rebellion is motivated by greed, so that it occurs when rebels can do well out of war” (Collier, 2000).
.
CONCLUSION
This presentation examines violent conflicts and poverty. It has been argued that violent conflicts are not a side issue that can be ignored by developing coutries. It needs to be better understood, accounted for and tackled if development goals are to be achieved. There has been limited empirical research, which examines the nature of the relationship between poverty and violent conflicts.
This presentation examines the processes through which poverty generates grievance leading to violent conflict and concludes that poverty by itself is unlikely to lead to violent conflicts. It points out that the poor often lack political voice and organization. However, horizontal inequalities and social exclusion, particularly when they coincide with identity or regional boundaries may increase a society’s predisposition towards violent conflict. Poverty may also be a significant factor in sustaining wars as violent conflicts and predation become the only viable livelihood strategy for the poor.
Finally, this presentation examines and critiques the argument that greed rather than grievance causes conflict. In other words conflicts are driven by economic agendas rather than factors which cause grievance such as inequality and poverty.
REFERENCES
Atkinson, P (1997): The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis’ Relief and
Rehabilitation Network Paper, 22, London
Bhalla, A & Lapeyre (1997): ‘Social exclusion, towards and analytical and operational
framework'’ Development and Change, Vo. 28, 413 - 433)
Chambers, R (1997): ‘Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last’ Intermediate
Technology Publications.
Collier, P (2000): ‘Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy’
World Bank, June, 15, 2000.
Keen, D (1994): ‘The functions of famine in South Western Sudan: Implications for Relief’
in Macrae, J & Zwi, A (1994).
Keen, D (1998): ‘The economic functions of violence in civil wars’ Adelphi Paper,
International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.
Keen, D (2000): ‘Incentives and disincentives for violence’ in Berdal and Malone (2000).
Klugman, J (1999) ‘Social and Economic Policies to Prevent Complex Humanitarian
Emergencies. Lessons from Experience’ UNU/WIDER
Moore, M (2000): ‘Political Underdevelopment’ Paper presented at the 10th Anniversary
Conference of the Development Studies Institute, LSE, Sept, 2000.
posted by mwesigye herbert at 2:39 AM
2 Comments:
I agree that world conflicts are caused by poverty. but, one of the root causes of poverty is unemployment. With unemployment, people are very much reliant on their income insurance that they sometimes forget that such coverage will only be valid for a short time. Having their government to address such issue will somehow lessen the poverty rate which eventually low conflicts.
A very wonderful piece.ineguality and poor resource sharing is driving forces of poverty instilled conflicts
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